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THE ACCOUNTING HISTORIANS JOURNAL
Statement of Policy
The Accounting Historians Journal is an international journal that
addresses the development of accounting thought and practice. While
the Journal embraces all subject matter related to accounting history,
research that provides an historical perspective on, and thus, furthers
understanding of contemporary accounting issues is particularly
encouraged.
An essential component of the historian's craft is clear and persuasive
writing. The editors encourage authors to use active voice to promote
clarity and to highlight the researcher's responsibility for interpretations
of data and conclusions.
Authors may find the following additional guidelines helpful.
1. Authors should provide a clear specification of the research
issue or problem addressed and the motivation for the study.
2. Authors should describe the method employed in the research,
indicating the extent and manner in which they ind to employ the
methodology. The editors encourage manuscripts that draw on a variety
of conceptual frameworks and techniques, including those used in other
social sciences.
3. Manuscripts that rely on primary sources should contain a
statement specifying the original materials or data collected or analyzed
and the rationale used in selection of those source materials. We
encourage authors to use evidence that is varied, accessible and reliable.
4. Authors who use a critical or new theoretical framework to
examine prior historical interpretations of the development of accounting
thou-ht or practice should include a brief discussion of the source and
rationale for use of that framework in the manuscript.
5. In performing all analyses, authors should be sensitive to and
take adequate account of the social, political and economic contents of
the time period examined and of other environmental factors.
6. While historians have long debated the ability to assign
causation to particular factors, we encourage authors to address and
evaluate the probable influences related to the problem or issue
examined.
7. Authors should clearly state all their interpretations of results,
and the conclusions they draw should be consistent with the original
objectives of and data used in the study. Interpretations and conclusions
should be clearly linked to the research problem. We encourage authors
to emphasize the relevance of the study to contemporary practice,
education and/or research as appropriate. Authors also should state the
implications of the study for future research.
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Guide for Submitting Manuscript
Manuscripts should be in English and of acceptable style and
organization for clarity of presentation. Submit three copies, typewritten,
double spaced on side of 8½ X 11 inch (approx. 28.5 cm X 28.0 cm)
white paper; indent paragraphs. The manuscript should not exceed 7,000
,words and margins should be ,wide enough to facilitate editing and
duplication. All pages, including, reference pages, should be serially
numbered. Manuscripts should be run through a spell-check software
program or similar review prior to submission.
Cover Sheet The cover sheet should state the title of the paper,
name(s) of author(s), affiliations), the address for future correspondence
and the FAX number or EMAIL address (or both) of the author
designated as the contact person for the manuscript.
Abstract An abstract of not more than 100 words should accompany
the manuscript on a separate page. The title, but not the name(s) of the
author(s) should appear on the abstract page and on the first pace of the
manuscript.
Submission fee A submission fee of $38 (U.S.) for non-Academy
members. See p. vii for instructions and form that can be used to pay
submission fees by credit card. The form also allows an author to join
the Academy when submitting a manuscript. There are no submission
fees for Academy members. Manuscripts currently under review by
other journals should not submitted.
Major headings within the manuscript should be centered,
underlined, and unnumbered with the first letter of major words
capitalized. Subheadings should be on a separate line beginning flush
with the left margin and underlined with the first letter of major words
capitalized. Third level heading should lead into the paragraph, be
underlined and followed by a period; text should follow immediately on
the same line.
Tables, Figures and Exhibits should be numbered (arabic), titled,
and, when appropriate, referenced. Limited use of original documents
can be accommodated in the Journal if authors can provide glossy black
and white prints at least 5 X 7. Important textual materials may be
presented in both the original language and the English translation.
Tables, and similar items must be discussed in the text and will not be
included unless they lend support to the text.
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Literature References
Footnotes should not be used for literature references. The work
cited should be referenced using the author's name and date of
publication in the body of the text, inside work square brackets, i.e.,
Garner [1954, p.33], [Mills, Fall 1979, p.52]. If the author's name is
mentioned in the text, it need not be repeated, i.e., Garner [1954, P.33]
concluded. If a reference has more than three authors, only the first name
and et al should be used in the text citation. References to statutes, legal
treatise or court cases should follow the accepted form of legal citation.
All references, whether to direct quotations or to paraphrased materials,
should contain page numbers
Content Footnotes
Content footnotes may be used sparingly to expand upon or
comment upon the text itself. These should numbered consecutively
throughout the manuscript and should appear at the bottom of page.
Bibliography
A bibliography of works cited should appear at the end of the
manuscript. The works cited should be listed alphabetically according
to the surname of the first author. Information about journals should
include the following information—Books, author(s), title underlined,
place of publication, name of publisher, date; Journals, author(s), article
title with quotation marks, journal title underlined, date of issue in
parenthesis, page numbers. Multiple works by an author should be listed
in chronological order; if multiple works appear in a single year, the
suffix a, b, etc. should be used to identify each work.
For questions of style not covered above, authors should consult a
style manual such as Turabian, Kate L. A Manual for Writers of Term
Papers, Theses and Dissertations, published by the University of
Chicago Press.
Diskette When a manuscript has been accepted for publication,
authors will be asked to submit a diskette (either 5 1/4 or 3 1/2 inch)
with the final manuscript. The diskette should be prepared in IBM
compatible ASCII file format.
Galley proofs will be sent to the author(s) as permitted by
scheduling; however, additions of new material must be strictly limited.
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The Accounting Historians Journal
Vol. 24, No. 2
December 1997
Robert Bricker
CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY
and
Kevin Brown
CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY

THE USE OF HISTORICAL DATA IN ACCOUNTING
RESEARCH: THE CASE OF THE AMERICAN SUGAR
REFINING COMPANY
Abstract: In 1908, the American Sugar Refining Company
(ASR) reversed its long-held policy of secrecy as to its
financial condition and performance. Prior work, applying
contemporary capital market methods to ASR security price
data of that period, has suggested a value to ASR
shareholders of this policy reversal. This paper examines
the historical record of that time and presents additional
evidence on this matter, particularly in terms of identifying
potentially confounding events occurring during the period
under study. The results of this analysis suggest a difficulty
in attributing observed abnormal returns to ASR's secrecy
policy reversal on the basis of the results obtained from
applying capital markets methods. This analysis is useful
for scholars interested in applying modern capital market
methods to historical data. It highlights the significance of
the possible effects of contemporaneous historical events,
focuses attention on the importance of a deep understanding
of the historical period studied, and suggests a value in
combining historical and empirical-markets methods to
gain a richer understanding of the events and conditions in
the time period under study.
The application of modern capital markets methods to explore
accounting issues in historical time periods has attracted increased
interest in recent years. One such study, Porter et al, (1995) (hereafter
PSW) examine the effects of American Sugar Refining's (ASR's) 1908
reversal of afinancialsecrecy policy to determine the value of voluntary
disclosure per se and voluntary disclosure policy. They find in part,
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using traditional capital markets methods and an event window around
the time of the secrecy policy reversal, positive abnormal returns for
ASR stock. Thesefindingslead them to conclude that the secrecy policy
reversal had measurable value to ASR stockholders. Narrowly, the
purpose of this paper is to assess these findings and to consider whether
other chronologically proximate events and conditions could plausibly
have affected the valuation of American Sugar securities. Broadly, this
paper seeks to address the use of data in capital markets studies of
historical time periods, and the interpretation of results derived in such
studies. Not addressed in this paper are underlying issues related to
institutional arrangements, acceptable trading practices, and other
matters pertinent to the issue of market efficiency during this historical
period. We are not challenging the assumption that ASR security pricing
was efficient with respect to publicly available information. Readers
interested in studying issues of this period related to market efficiency
are referred to Previts and Bricker (1994).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, we review
the PSW study and summarize the historical events amidst which it is
set, these being the illness and death of H.O. Havemeyer, the long time
President of ASR, the succession of a new president, and the company's
annual meeting at which time ASR formally announced the reversal of
its long-held financial secrecy policy. Several research issues pertinent
to the PSW study, primarily related to the existence of other possibly
significant historical events during the period covered by PSW, are
identified. We then provide a contextual, historical analysis of
contemporaneous events and conditions of the period and use this as a
basis for evaluating the PSW study of ASR. Particular attention is
focused on events reported in the financial press that may have affected
ASR security pricing, dates on which press reports related to ASR's
financial secrecy policy are published, and the period of uncertainty
surrounding the succession to the ASR Presidency that occurred
following Havemeyer's death. Next, using the PSW data and methods,
tests extending the original PSW analysis are conducted based on the
results of our historical analysis. Following a presentation and discussion
of these results, we conclude the paper with a discussion of the
opportunities and difficulties of applying capital markets methods to data
from historical time periods.
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BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH ISSUES
The PSW study follows a line of research that has applied
contemporary capital markets methods and models to data from
historical time periods. Prior work has included Chow (1983) and
Sivakumar and Waymire (1993 and 1994). The focus of these studies on
historical time periods makes them interesting and appealing. Chow's
work, however, has been specifically criticized by Merino et al (1987),
and Previts and Bricker (1994) argue generally that such studies must
fully consider historical contextual issues that are essential in both the
design of such studies and the interpretation of results.
The PSW study finds that ASR shareholders earned abnormal
returns as a result of the 1908 reversal of Henry 0. Havemeyer's longheldfinancialsecrecy policy. As summarized in PSW, Havemeyer, who
opposed disclosure of any ASR information, died suddenly on December
4, 1907 after becoming ill on November 28, 1907. Havemeyer's
successor, W. B. Thomas, "announced the company's intent to reverse
its long-standing secrecy policy by making periodic reports" (PSW,
1995, p. 129) at the company's annual meeting on January 8, 1908. On
March 23, 1908, ASR made its first annual report available to
shareholders. PSW examine cumulative abnormal returns to ASR
shareholders for both the secrecy policy reversal on January 8, and the
publication of the annual report on March 23 (and each preceding day).
They find a positive wealth effect which is statistically significant for
three sets of dates: January 8th, January 8th and March 23rd combined,
and January 7th and 8th and March 21 st and 23rd combined. On the basis
of the abnormal returns of these dates, PSW conclude the existence of a
value to voluntary reporting - for the first event as related to voluntary
reporting policy, and for the second event as related to voluntary
reporting per se, for ASR shareholders. We do not address the value of
voluntary reporting per se in the remainder of this paper, but rather on
the issue of a value to a policy of voluntary reporting, as studied by
PSW in their assessment of the effects of ASR's secrecy policy reversal.
The PSW study measures ASR returns from September 30th, 1907
to May 29th, 1908. PSW use a dummy variable is used to measure the
difference in returns during the event window(s) in comparison to returns
outside the event window. The event date for the secrecy policy reversal
(disclosure precommitment date) is defined as January 8, the date on
which the company's policy reversal was officially announced during its
annual meeting. The resulting model is significant (p = .023) and they
find a significant cumulative positive abnormal return of 2.35 percent.

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol24/iss2/11
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Several issues not fully addressed in PSW may bear on their results
and the interpretation thereof, as listed below.
•

The date used by PSW to isolate the financial secrecy policy
reversal effect (January 8th) is the date of ASR's annual meeting. It
is conceivable that other potentially significant disclosures may have
occurred on that date. Such disclosures would raise issues about
distinguishing ASR's secrecy policy reversal from its voluntary
reporting, per se, (or other economic effects) as causes of ASR
security price changes.

•

January 8th is the sole date used by PSW in assessing the
(separable) effect of ASR's secrecy policy reversal. If, however,
there are other dates on which ASR's secrecy policy was addressed
in financial press reports prior to January 8, then such dates should
also be added to any empirical analysis addressing the effect of the
secrecy policy reversal on ASR securities.

•

The period of the illness and death of Havemeyer is included by
PSW as a part of the period for estimating ASR normal returns.
However, any systematic ASR pricing reaction to Havemeyer's
passing may influence the PSW results.

Several research questions arise from these issues. First, is it
reasonable to attribute any abnormal ASR price effect on January 8th to
a change in the company's financial secrecy policy, or do other
disclosures confound such an interpretation? Second, were there other
dates in addition to January 8th (the date used by PSW) which are
plausible event dates for assessing the effect of the secrecy policy
reversal? Third, was there an ASR security price reaction to the
succession uncertainty that may have occurred with and following the
illness and death of Havemeyer? If so, would this effect influence PSW's
findings?
ANALYSIS
Our analysis consists of two parts. First, we study the events and
conditions roughly contemporaneous with January 8th to address the
three questions posed above. Then, using the same data and methods as
PSW, we conduct additional empirical testing based on the results of our
first phase of analysis.
Research question one explores the attribution of the observed ASR
abnormal return effect to the announcement of the secrecy policy
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reversal, and whether other information released on this date could have
had information content and have affected ASR security pricing. An
analysis of the financial press articles of the period in the Financial
Chronicle, the Wall Street Journal, and the financial section of the New
York Times raises issues potentially bearing on this matter. Significantly,
January 8th was not just a date on which ASR announced the reversal of
the secrecy policy, but (as noted in PSW) was the date of ASR's annual
meeting. For instance, it was on this day that the company made its
initial report of its annual operations to shareholders, and also discussed
other economic and political developments prospectively affecting ASR.
It appears (and widely believed), for example, that sugar crop and tariff
announcements were important factors in ASR security pricing. As
reported on the following day by the Wall Street Journal, management
discussed several topics during the annual meeting: that the past year had
been the best that the company had experienced, that the policy of the
company with new management would be less antagonistic and less
secret, that various lawsuits would be adjudicated, that sugar crops were
smaller and prices higher, that labor trouble in Cuba implied a smaller
crop, and that government statements on tariffs were favorable to ASR.
All of these reported disclosures, to the extent unanticipated, could be
expected to increase ASR security prices. Even with the presence of
some level of anticipation, the elimination of uncertainty accompanying
the official company announcement would also tend to increase ASR
security prices and returns. These several potentially significant
information disclosures confound interpretations of stock price reactions
for the day and certainly do not lend themselves to an unambiguous
attribution of the day's abnormal price effect to any single cause.
Research question two addresses the existence of additional dates
which may have lead to a market anticipation of a reversal of ASR's
secrecy policy. We searched financial press reports of the period from
the date of Havemeyer's illness to the date of the official announcement
of the policy reversal to identify all days on which the secrecy policy
reversal of ASR was discussed, implied, or anticipated. We identified the
following four dates:
•

In The Wall Street Journal of Thursday, December 5th 1907 in an
article following H. O. Havemeyer's death, it was asserted that
"(Havemeyer's) policy was not that of publicity, so that he belonged
to a passing rather than to a new era of corporate finance." This
assertion implies that Havemeyer's secrecy policy would not survive
him.

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol24/iss2/11
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•

In the Wall Street Journal of Tuesday, December 10th, 1907, the
following article appeared: "American Sugar Refining Co.:
Havemeyer's Death Likely to Result in Abandonment of Secrecy
Policy".

•

In the Wall Street Journal of Tuesday, January 7th, 1908 in an
article preceding the next day's annual meeting, it was written that
". . . it is supposed that the policy of the company will change, the
keynote of the new administration being less antagonistic and less
secret".

•

In the Wall Street Journal of Wednesday, January 8th, in an article
published prior to that day's annual meeting, it was written that
"Friends of (ASR) . . . admit that more publicity in regard to the
company's affairs would be better policy... President Thomas has
given his word to this effect... the first step in this direction is
expected at the annual meeting tomorrow, when President Thomas
may in his review of the year disclose more information than has
been given out heretofore." January 8th was also, of course, the date
of the actual annual meeting at which the financial secrecy policy
reversal was officially announced later that day (See January 9 New York Times).

Although PSW use event dates of January 7th and 8th as well as
those of March 21st and March 23rd, only January 8th is tested
individually for a secrecy policy reversal effect. PSW's remaining tests
address the joint hypothesis of a price response as a function of both
voluntary reporting and the secrecy policy reversal. If PSW's hypothesis
about the value of a voluntary reporting and publicity policy, per se, is
correct, then we would expect to see positive security price effects on
each of the event days, with the effect on the 8th being limited to the
elimination of whatever uncertainty remained regarding reversal of the
secrecy policy.
As related to the third research question posed, any analysis of this
period or interpretation of results requires consideration of any possible
effect on ASR security prices of the illness and death of Henry
Havemeyer. Particularly, as described subsequently, if Havemeyer's
death resulted in a period of uncertainty related to management
succession, and if that period was included in an estimation window for
calculating normal ASR returns, then the stationarity assumption of
PSW's beta estimate would be violated, with the result that in the
estimation of ASR normal returns would be mathematically biased.
Published by eGrove, 1997
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Specifically, the statistical analysis computing returns in the immediately
subsequent period would be biased in favor of finding abnormal returns.
Ha.vemeyer's passing was clearly regarded as a significant event in
the eyes of ASR, the financial markets, and its shareholders, according
tofinancialpress accounts of the time. These accounts reflect the belief,
for example, of an association between Havemeyer's illness and death
and an ASR's stock price decline that occurred. On December 4th, the
Wall Street Journal's daily column "Features of the Market" column
noted "American Sugar was naturally depressed on the serious illness of
H.O. Havemeyer". On December 6th, the same column noted that "(t)he
first transaction in (ASR) was one point below the closing sale of the
previous day on President Havemeyer's death. It is admitted that the loss
to the company is a very serious one . . ."On December 12, as ASR's
common stock price neared its nadir, "Features of the Market" stated that
"(ASR) selling . . . comes through conservative commission houses . ..
It is naturally based upon the very tangible loss the company . . . has
sustained in H.O. Havemeyer's death and represents investment
holdings." On December 16, the column reported that "Boston has been
selling the stock since H. 0. Havemeyer's death. This is a natural result,
as investors there had great faith in the late president." An article in
December 17th's Wall Street Journal stated " . . . One reason advanced
for the marked decline in the stock is the loss of H.O. Havemeyer, which,
if be true, is indeed a tribute to his ability as the real genius of the
American Sugar Refining Company." On January 4th, well into ASR's
price rebound, and following a day on which the stock closed up over 6
1/2 points to 107, the "Features of the Market" column noted, "One
reason for the exceptional strength in Sugar is the real scarcity of the
stock... It was always a dangerous short sale, and was oversold when
H. O. Havemeyer died".
As the matter of succession was not settled at ASR at the time of
Havemeyer's illness and death, it is plausible to believe that his passing
initiated a significant process of increasing uncertainty as to management
succession and ASR prospects. PSW, in contrast, address the possible
impact of Havemeyer's death from a different perspective:
" . . . our results may be confounded by Havemeyer's sudden
death. For example, investors may have expected Havemeyer's
death to lead to the adoption of a disclosure policy, and
impounded any wealth effects at that time. Accordingly, we
investigated ASR stock returns at the time of Havemeyer's
death. The evidence does not support the hypothesis that
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favorable effects of the subsequent policy reversal were
capitalized when Havemeyer died; the market adjusted return
on the date of his death was -2.26 percent. No large price
movements were observed in adjacent days." (PSW, 1995, p.
136-137)
PSW, then, focus on the possibility that the death of Havemeyer
itself may have signaled a reversal of the secrecy policy, and so test for
a positive abnormal return effect. But they do not examine an alternative
possibility that an uncertainty-increasing process began at the date of
Havemeyer's illness regarding management succession and ASR
prospects and concluded at ASR's announcement of his successor,
resulting in a negative abnormal return effect for the period.
Chronologically, this succession-uncertainty process occurred
several weeks prior to ASR's annual meeting and the formally
announced reversal of the secrecy policy. Havemeyer's sickness began
November 29th (he died December 4), and W.B. Thomas was announced
as his successor on December 20th. A visual inspection of Figure 1,
which is reproduced from PSW, shows that ASR returns turned negative
about the time of Havemeyer's sickness and death, and remained
negative until the December 20th announcement regarding W.B.
Thomas.
FIGURE 1
ASR Cumulative Market-Adjusted Returns
(Reprinted from Porter et al [1995])
Cumulative Market-Adjusted Returns on ASR Common Stock from Late
November 1907 to Late March 1908
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decline in ASR returns during this period, it does provide prima facia
evidence of a decline in ASR security prices as well as an analyst and
press belief that this was so. Such an effect, as described above, would
bias an analysis of abnormal returns on January 8th in favor of a
rejection of the null hypothesis. Specific empirical tests on this are
described later in the paper.
The empirical portion of our analysis began with a replication of a
portion of PSW in order to establish comparability with its data and
methods. Using the same parameters and process for selecting a data set,
and duplicating the general model employed by PSW, we tested for a
price effect on January 8th, the date of the financial secrecy policy
reversal. Following PSW we employed a dummy variable for the date of
January 8th as the secrecy policy reversal event date, and used the
railroad index to proxy for the market. The results, shown in Table 1,
Panel A, compare the PSW results (Item 1) with our replication (Item 2);
The results are generally consistent, including an event-variable
coefficient (probability) of .0235 (.023) and .0237 (.026) respectively.
Therefore, we are comfortable that our data and method fairly closely
approximates those of PSW.
Table 1
Estimation Results for Event Parameter Models
Panel A
Single Event Models
Description (event dates)
(1) Porter Results

ά

ά(t)

β

β(t)

δ

δ(t)

δ(p)

r2

CAR%

.008 1.11.833 12.18.0235 2.29.023.436

2.35

(1/8/08)
(2) Replication Results

.001 .91.798 11.31 .0237 2.24.026.387 2.37

(1/8/08)
(3) Four Event Dates Results .001 1.21 .796 11.16 -.0061 -1.14 .250 .386 -2.45
(12/5/07,12/10/07,
1/7/08,1/8/08)
(4) Uncertainty Results
(12/3/07 through 1/19/08)

.001 1.72 .791 11.23 -.0070 -2.47 .014 .400 -10.47

(5) Two Event Dates Results .001 1.01 .795 11.12 .0031 .40.687.382

.61

(1/7/08,1/8/08)
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ά(t) β β(t)
δ1 δ1(t) δ1(p) δ1CAR% δ2 δ2(t) δ2(p) δ2CAR% r2
.001 1.67 .791 11.21 -.007 -2.458 .015 11.20 .0025 .387 .131 .50
.398
ά

where δ1 represents the "succession uncertainty" event of 12/3/07 to
1/19/08
andδ2represents the "secrecy policy reversal" event of 1/7 and 1/8/08.
Next, to empirically address research question 2, we tested for a
policy reversal effect using the four dates identified above (days on
which reversal of the secrecy policy was discussed in press articles).
Although PSW use event dates of January 7th and 8th as well as those
of March 21st and March 23rd, only January 8th is tested individually
for a secrecy policy reversal effect. PSW's remaining tests address the
joint hypothesis of a price response as a function of both voluntary
reporting and the secrecy policy reversal. Using the method described
above, we tested for a secrecy policy reversal effect using December 5th,
December 10th, January 7th, and January 8th. The results are given in
Table 1, Panel A, Item 3 which shows no significant effect on the
secrecy reversal variable for the dates with secrecy policy reversal
references. Notably, the sign of the coefficient on the event variable is
negative (-.0061).
Using the data set and general model described above, we tested the
hypothesis derived from research question 3: that an uncertaintyincreasing process began with the illness of Havemeyer and ended with
the announced selection of Thomas. We employed a dummy variable for
the dates of December 3rd, when Havemeyer's illness was first reported
in the New York Times, through December 19th, the day before the Wall
Street Journal announced W.B. Thomas's upcoming election as ASR
president. We observe in Table 1, Panel A, Item 4 a highly significant
effect (p. = .014) on the event days in the direction consistent with an
uncertainty-increasing process (that is, negative). Using PSW's method
of calculating the size of the abnormal return as the product of the
dummy coefficient (-.0070) and the number of days in the event period
(15), we find a cumulative abnormal return of -10.50%. Overall, this
evidence is consistent with a picture of investors who became
increasingly distressed by the uncertainty of management succession
until the experienced W. B. Thomas was identified as H. O.
Havemeyer's successor. As a further test of investor uncertainty during
Published by eGrove, 1997
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this period, we compared an ASR market model using the period of
September 30th 1907 through January 19th, 1908, with a model using
a period of the same length immediately after. As shown in Table 2,
ASR's beta increases from .786 to .963 in the two models, and their
difference is marginally significant at alpha = . 10.
Irrespective of the interpretation of the above results, they
demonstrate that any model used for estimating ASR normal returns that
includes the period from December 3 rd through December 19th cannot
assume beta stationarity; the inclusion of the period effectively
incorporates a bias for rejecting a null hypothesis for any event date(s)
proximately subsequent to that period. This occurs because the inclusion
of the uncertainty-increasing period mathematically reduces the slope
(coefficient) on the systematic (market) return. Given the evidence and
findings described above, the PSW findings are reinforced by the
occurrence of an event window that merely happened to fall following a
period of significant negative abnormal returns included in the estimation
period. Indeed, any event identified during the period immediately
following the resolution of the succession issue would be biased towards
the finding of positive abnormal returns for ASR investors. A second
implication, as mentioned earlier, is that any policy reversal tests using
event dates falling during this period could be confounded by the
succession uncertainty effect. For this reason, our earlier results, which
included two secrecy policy reversal event dates falling during this
apparent succession uncertainty period, may be biased against finding a
positive ASR abnormal return associated with a reversal in its secrecy
policy1.

1

It is hard to have much confidence in these results. As described in the
next section, tests reveal a negative security market response to the succession
uncertainty accompanying the illness and death of Havemeyer, which
potentially confounds any analysis including event days in the period from
November 29th to December 20th. The policy reversal test described above
includes the event dates of December 5th and December 10th. Further
complicating any interpretation of our results, news articles on ASR on the
two remaining days, December 7th and 8th, refer to both the secrecy policy
reversal and other matters of potential importance. We have previously
described the topics covered in the press on January 8th. The day before
ASR's annual meeting (January 7th) The Wall Street Journal not only
discussed the anticipated secrecy policy reversal, but based on favorable news
about the sugar market and the favorable estimates made regarding ASR's
financial
results, the article declares ASR's "past fiscal year... was one of the
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol24/iss2/11
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We, therefore, respecified our model to include a separate dummy
variable for the event dates falling in the succession uncertainty period
and used only the event dates of January 7th and January 8th (we
removed December 5th and 10th). The results, shown in Table 1, Panel
B again suggest no effect of the secrecy policy reversal. The coefficient
on the policy reversal variable is positive (.0025) but not significant,
with an implied CAR of .50%. The succession uncertainty variable is
negative (-.007) and significant (p = .015), with an implied CAR of 11.2%. While this may appear odd, our investigation suggests that it
may reflect (as reported by the financial press) C.A. Spreckels'
published attack on ASR which appeared on that day.
To test the sensitivity of the results to the separation of the
succession uncertainty dates as a second event, we reran the analysis
including the succession uncertainty dates as estimation dates (that is,
along with all the other dates in the estimation period), continuing with
January 7th and 8th as event dates. Table 1, Panel A, Item 5 shows a
positive coefficient on the policy reversal variable that, while slightly
larger than the result in Panel B, is still statistically insignificant.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In conclusion, the results do not necessarily rule out that the positive
wealth effect observed on January 8th for ASR shareholders resulted
from ASR's reversal of its secrecy policy. However, our analysis of the
events and context surrounding January 8th suggests the following. First,
there were several disclosures with potential import to investors. While
PSW are correct in their finding of an empirically measurable abnormal
return on January 8th, it is difficult to know how much of this effect can
be attributed to the official policy reversal announcement versus ASR's
report of a good year, Cuban crop shortages, favorable government tariff
policies, the methodological artifact stemming from the succession
uncertainty following Havemeyer's death (nonstationary beta), or the
secrecy policy reversal. There are, thus, several possible factors which
may have contributed to the ASR abnormal return effect found by PSW
on January 8th.
Second, the financial press anticipated the reversal of the secrecy
policy other dates. When included in an analysis, no positive abnormal

best that the company has experienced..."
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returns for those dates are found. However, these results may be suspect
because the analysis includes event dates during the negative-return
period that accompany the apparent succession uncertainty at the time
of H.O. Havemeyer's death. Nevertheless, when controlling for the
succession uncertainty dates and reducing the event dates to January 7th
and 8th, we found no secrecy policy reversal event effect, even when
including the succession uncertainty dates in the "normal return"
estimation period. Yet even this result cannot be relied upon, as financial
press articles attribute ASR stock price weakness on the 7th to C.A.
Spreckels published criticism of ASR on that date.
Finally, as mentioned just above, the positive abnormal return of
January 8th is, in part, a statistical artifact resulting from the succession
uncertainty following Havemeyer's death. During this period of
succession uncertainty ASR returns were below market returns. The
nonstationary beta confounds the interpretation of any event dates
occurring during the succession uncertainty period (including some of the
secrecy reversal policy dates), and mathematically biases any statistical
analysis using this period in the window for estimating normal returns in
favor of finding a positive abnormal return for immediately subsequent
dates.
We conclude that it is not possible with the present data and capital
markets methods to empirically and statistically attribute ASR's positive
abnormal returns to its reversal in its secrecy policy. Our objective,
however, is not to disprove that ASR's secrecy policy reversal resulted
in a stock price change. Rather, our point is to emphasize the importance
in considering all the contextual factors salient to research focusing on
historical time periods. This is particularly important when applying
contemporary markets methods to data from such periods. Aside from
issues of market efficiency during this period (Previts and Bricker,
1994), the nature of historical data may frequently place some
limitations on the drawing of conclusions, particularly when the data are
scarce and the historical context of the events renders data interpretation
ambiguous. Correspondingly, it may be in such instances that historical
analysis can be a useful and tool for more fully investigating,
interpreting, and augmenting the results of empirical work. In this way,
modern capital markets method and historical analysis may prove to be
valuable complements in studying historical time periods.
It is helpful and desirable for accounting scholars to carefully
construct research that applies contemporary methods to historical
accounting data as a backdrop for considering present-day issues.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol24/iss2/11
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Empirical researchers are to be commended for conducting pioneering
work in this area. Future research of this sort should continue to develop
full and careful approaches to combining historical analysis with modern
capital market methods, so that adequate consideration of the
fundamental contextual factors can be used in the design of such
research and in the interpretability of results.
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Appendix A
American Sugar Refining Prices
November 1, 1907 through January 31, 1908

Date
11/1
11/2
11/4
11/6
11/7
11/8
11/9
11/11
11/12
11/13
11/14
11/15
11/16
11/18
11/19
11/20
11/21
11/22
11/23
11/25
11/26
11/27
11/29
11/30
12/2
12/3
12/4
12/5
12/6
12/7
12/9
12/10
12/11
12/12
12/13
12/14
12/16
12/17
12/18
12/19
12/20

American
Sugar
100.625
100.625
104.000
105.000
103.625
103.625
103.625
105.875
104.500
104.250
101.875
100.500
101.250
103.000
101.125
101.750
101.000
101.500
103.000
103.000
104.000
103.000
103.750
106.000
107.750
106.000
106.500
107.250
107.750
107.000
105.000
102.000
98.375
98.375
94.125
94.125
95.625
95.750
96.250
98.000
100.000
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Dow Jones
Railroad
index

Notes

84.360
84.140
85.050
85.720
84.270
85.090
85.070
85.910
85.410
84.800
84.150
82.500
82.970
84.600
82.930
82.380
81.410
81.490
83.400
81.720
83.510
84.090
85.800 Havemeyer is ill 11/28
87.130
88.280
87.320 Havemeyer illness reported in NY
89.110 Havemeyer
90.300 Havemeyer death reported. Secrecy
90.560 reversal—date 1
90.120
89.190
87.880 Secrecy policy reversal—date 2
87.850
87.850
86.940
87.760
86.730
86.610
87.230
87.390
88.780 W.B. Thomas announced as
Havermeyer successor
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Appendix A (continued)

Date
12/21
12/23
12/24
12/26
12/27
12/28
12/30
12/31
1/2/08
1/3
1/4
1/6
1/7
1/8
1/9
1/10
1/11
1/13
1/14
1/15
1/16
1/17
1/18
1/20
1/21
1/22
1/23
1/24
1/25
1/27
1/28
1/29
1/30
1/31

American
Sugar
100.125
99.125
98.750
96.875
100.250
99.250
100.875
99.500
101.375
107.000
106.250
106.500
104.750
107.000
108.250
108.250
110.250
112.250
113.375
113.250
112.125
113.625
113.625
113.250
111.000
112.375
111.875
111.500
113.500
113.500
114.500
112.500
113.500
114.250

Dow Jones
Railroad
index

Notes

89.350
88.110
87.610
87.010
88.410
88.350
89.500
88.770
89.810
90.380
90.370
91.120
91.150 Secrecy policy reversal—date 3
90.820 Annual Meeting. Secrecy policy
92.860 —date 4
92.030
93.750
94.270
95.060
95.100
94.680
95.270
95.750
94.670
93.090
92.760
92.460
91.660
92.220
92.730
93.400
92.400
92.440
92.190
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Appendix B
Pertinent Articles from the Wall Street Journal
1. "Features of the Market" extract - dates as noted:
Wed. 12/04/07

"American Sugar was naturally depressed on the serious
illness of H. O. Havemeyer. Washington has been selling
a little of the stock lately, which has often shown some
tendency to sell off about the time of the meeting of
Congress. American Sugar, however, has been very
much out of politics for a long time past."

Fri. 12/06/07

"The first transaction in American Sugar was one point
below the closing sale of the previous day on President
Havemeyer's death. It is admitted that the loss to the
company is a very serious one, as he raised it from the
most sensational gambling counter in the unlisted
department to one of the best held and distributed
industrial stocks in the market."

Wed. 12/11/07

". . . Sugar also was subjected to considerable pressure.
There was a poor market in it..."

Thurs. 12/12/07

"Inquiryfrompeople in close touch with the Havemeyer
family and the American Sugar situation disposes of any
rumors of a change in the holding of the stock arising out
of the death of the president. The selling, however comes
through conservative commission houses, and in the
opinion of specialists does not indicate a short position of
any consequence. It is naturally based upon the very
tangible loss the company has sustained in H. O.
Havemeyer's death, and represents investment holdings."

Fri. 12/13/07

"American Sugar opened active and higher. H. Content
who is thought to have sold something like 25,000 shares
on Wednesday, was reported active in making a market,
helped by J. Carlisle, the specialist in the stock. It used to
be one of the best trading industrials on the board, and
the present opportunity is considered favorable for
reviving interest."
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"Halsted & Hodges, who were among the heavy sellers of
stocks in the early trading of Wednesday, sold American
Sugar and Amalgamated Copper in considerable quantity
on the opening strength. Traders called this good
selling, and took it to be long stock."
Sat. 12/14/07

"American Sugar showed the severest break in the
industrial list, losing over 4 points. . ."

Mon. 12/16/07

"Houses which used to do a good deal of business for
lower Wall Street when American Sugar was the most
active industrial on the list, have been selling that stock.
Some of this is probably for shorts."
"There was renewed pressure in American Sugar at the
outset, with selling by J. Carlisle, the specialist in the
stock, CD. Barney & Co., and other influential
commission houses. Boston has been selling the stock
since H.O. Havemeyer's death. This is a natural result,
as investors there had great faith in the late president.
One disturbing factor, however, in the market has been
some selling from Washington in the past few days."

Wed. 12/18/07

Trade interests seem to be the principal bears in American
Sugar. One view is that the short crop will hurt earnings.
The fact possibly that trade enemies of the company see a
chance of retaliation for the Havemeyer attitude towards
them in past years."

Fri. 12/20/07

"American Sugar, after opening quiet, advanced a point
and a half in the first ten minutes. Traders began to suspect
from the beginning of the week that short selling was being
encouraged, and a sharp demand for the stock in the loan
crowd on Wednesday confirmed this view.
The
Washington houses have been borrowers of the stock."

Mon. 12/23/07

"There was some disposition to test the strength of
American Sugar, but J. Carlisle, the specialist in the stock,
had buying orders, and seemed able to support it without
much difficulty. It is well and widely held, and soon
becomes oversold."
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Tues. 12/24/07

"Traders think that a little of the American Sugar bought to
support in the recent decline has been coming out quietly.
Lower Wall Street advices are bearish, but such speculators
do not seem to have made much by their preliminary
campaign after H.O. Havemeyer's death."

Fri. 12/27/07

"With very little pressure Sugar disclosed a rather weak
technical position. There is no doubt that the rally to par
forced in most of the shorts. The bear talk still comes from
lower Wall Street, and it looked as if a little long stock were
coming to the market, to judge by its more frequent
appearance in loans."
"The selling of Sugar in the forenoon was taken as
indicating that the New Street bear party was trying to
make an active market. S.L. Blood & Co. and E. F. Hutton
& Co. were conspicuous among the sellers, while the
specialists supported."

Sat. 12/28/07

"Bear points on American Sugar were again current. They
have reference to the election of the new president on Jan.
8, when lower Wall Street believes some permanent
difference among leading holders as to policy may make
itself felt."

Sat. 1/04/08

"One reason for the exceptional strength in Sugar is the real
scarcity of the stock. It loaned at 1.64 premium in the first
hour, and has been in demand flat in the loan crowd for
some time past. It was always a dangerous short sale, and
was oversold when H.O. Havemeyer died."

Wed. 1/08/08

"American Sugar was 2 points lower at the opening on the
violent attack by Claus A. Spreckles published in a morning
paper. While the Street does not regard him as altogether
impartial witness, traders admit that the attack is the most
formidable made upon the stock in many years."

Thurs. 1/09/08

" . . . Speculators who attacked American Sugar on the
protests of Mr. Spreckles found a market which was too
much for them, and probably took losses during the course
of the day..."
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2. Additional Articles - dates and titles as noted:
Tues. 12/03/07

"Answers to Inquires"
An investing advice column states: " . . . [American] Sugar
stock is in danger of being adversely affected by an
industrial slow-up, and also by agitation of the tariff
question."

Thurs. 12/05/07 "H. O. Havemeyer"
Announcement of the death of H. O. Havemeyer: " . . .
Under his control the American Sugar Refinery Co. has
. made a remarkable record of profitable operation. Mr.
Havemeyer's methods imparted steadiness and efficiency to
his corporation, but his policy was not that of publicity, so
that he belonged to a passing rather than to a new era of
corporate finance."
"H. O. Havemeyer Dead"
Provides a brief biographical sketch of H. O. Havemeyer.
Fri. 12/06/0

"American Sugar Refining Co."
Article downplays the impact of H. O. Havemeyer's
death:"While the removal of death of Henry O. Havemeyer,
founder and president of the American Sugar Refining Co.,
for between sixteen and seventeen years, is a loss which is
bound to be severely felt, the splendid organization which
had been perfected under his leadership, in the opinion of
those most familiar with its affairs, has gathered sufficient
momentum to carry forward the business without
interruption or diminution of prosperity.. ."

Tues. 12/10/07

"American Sugar Refining Co.: Havemeyer's Death
Likely to Result in Abandonment of Secrecy Policy"
Article predicts more open communication with
stockholders.

Wed. 12/11/07

"Dividends and Meetings"
"The directors of the American Sugar Refining Co. have
elected Horace Havemeyer, a director of the company to
succeed his father, H. O. Havemeyer, deceased. VicePresident Thomas was appointed acting President until the
next annual meeting, Jan 8.
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Appropriate resolutions were passed by the board regarding
the death of Mr. Havemeyer."
Mon. 12/16/07

"American Sugar Refining: Trade and Company
Conditions Good"
"Secretary Heike, of the American Sugar Refining Co.,
says: "The condition of the sugar trade and of the company
is very good. We are doing a normal business for this
season of the year, and the general business recession has
not as yet affected the sugar market. The sugar crop is a
little short this year.'
In the sugar trade it is stated that there is no apparent cause
for the selling of sugar stock. The American Sugar
refineries are all running. Its sugar accumulations are
sufficient for thirty days, and of these, 50,000 tons were
bought by Mr. Havemeyer shortly before his death, at the
lowest prices current for sugar for the year and as l/4c.
below present values, which transaction netted a profit of
$200,000.
The company's purchases of sugar in October and
November show their cost was below present value. The
total stocks of all refiners is only 100,000 tons.
Mr. Thomas, the acting president, has been in the
management for many years and has wide knowledge of the
sugar trade.
It is said the financial results for the present fiscal year are
the best that the company has yet experienced. The profits
from the Beet Sugar industry along are said to have
increased fully 25%."

Tues. 12/17/07

"American Sugar Refining Co. Again Center of
Interest"
"Not for years has the American Sugar Refining stock been
so active as during the past week when over 107,000 shares
changed hands at prices ranging from 106 1/2 to 92 3/4, the
latter being the lowest point recorded in years.
Considerable interest has been aroused as to the causes of
this activity, and all the more so, since the company's
officials maintain the trade is normal for this time of year,
and that conditions, generally, are favorable. Injustice to
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the 17,000 stockholders it should be pointed out that in the
sugar trade there is utmost confidence as to the future. The
crop is a little short of last year's crop, but on the other
hand much better prices prevail.
For the fiscal year, about to close, it is believed, and there
is sufficient ground for so doing, that the earnings will be
larger that in any year heretofore. .. .
. . . One reason advanced for the marked decline in the
stock is the loss of H. O. Havemeyer, which, if be true, is
indeed a tribute to his ability as the real genius of the
American Sugar Refining Co. The company was
apparently too well organized for such to have a radical
effect, though it undoubtably did occasion considerable
selling."
Wed. 12/18/07

"American Sugar"
"Many thousand shares of American Sugar common have
been picked up by individual investors on the decline to 92
3/4, and in the cause of several Boston houses, Sugar
buying last week was the investment feature..."

Fri. 12/20/07

"American Sugar"
"... The notice states that proxies will be voted for the reelection of Messrs. Parsons and Frazier and the election of
Horace Havemeyer to succeed his father. It is the intention
of the board, as Mr. Heike [Secretary], at the annual
election of the officers after the stockholders meeting, to
elect W. B. Thomas as president of the company."

Tues. 1/07/08

"American Sugar Refining Co. Completes a Successful
Year"
"The American Sugar Refining Co.'s past fiscal year,
which will be reviewed at the annual meeting on
Wednesday, Jan 8., was one of the best that the company
has experienced. . .
With the inauguration of the new management it is
supposed that the policy of the company will change, the
keynote of the new administration being less antagonistic
and less secret. It is presumed that the various lawsuits
inherited from the Havemeyer regime will be adjudicated.
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. . . The strength of the stock in the past week, during
which it showed a net gain of seven points, is attributable
to various causes. Primarily, the crop is smaller than last
year's. This in itself, is sufficient cause for the higher
prices prevailing... Another bull point as far as the stock
is concerned is the spread of the labor troubles in Cuba.
Still another factor pointed to with considerable satisfaction
by the sugar traders is the attitude of Secretary Taft taken
in regard to the duty on sugar and the regulation of the
supply from the Philippines. . ."
Wed. 1/08/08

"American Sugar"
"The officers of the American Sugar Refining Co. brand the
Spreckel's charges against the Sugar Co. as utterly absurd.
Acting President Thomas says, 'The story is, of course,
untrue,' and Secretary Heike is equally emphatic in denying
the truth of the account.
Friends of the American Sugar Refining Co. in the sugar
trade admit that more publicity in regard to the company's
affairs would be better policy. The new management has
already committed itself to more open and less antagonistic
methods. President Thomas has given his word to this
effect. It will however, take some time to bring about this
result completely but the first step in this direction is
expected at the annual meeting tomorrow, when President
Thomas may in his review of the year disclose more
information that has been given out heretofore."
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DEFINING AUDITORS' RESPONSIBILITIES
Abstract: This paper explores the efforts of the audit
profession to dominate definitions of their roles and
responsibilities throughout the last two decades. The
paper considers alternative definitions of these roles and
responsibilities as forwarded by others and the
justifications and defenses provided by auditors to
legitimize their conceptions of these matters.
The U.S. auditing profession maintains that its work enhances the
reliability and credibility of financial statements and thereby facilitates
the operation of capital markets. Although the profession has
benefitted greatly from legislated requirements for annual audits, it
has also fought forcefully to dominate the definitions of its tasks,
roles, and responsibilities—to perform audits as it sees fit. In
developing and maintaining a particular position relative to their
responsibilities in conducting financial audits, auditors have attempted
to tell the public whom they serve as well as the types of tasks that
the public may reasonably expect the profession to undertake.
This insistence upon a self-definition of tasks, roles and
responsibilities should not be surprising. With the passage of the
securities acts and licensing statutes by individual states, auditors
have demarcated the attestation of financial statements as an element
of their professional jurisdiction. Through such demarcations,
professions attempt to gain legitimate control over particular kinds of
work [Abbott, 1988]. They claim the right to perform work within
their jurisdiction as they deem appropriate and also to dominate
public definitions of their professional tasks. In effect, professions
are asking the public to trust that they know best how to define their
professional roles and responsibilities and how to accomplish their
professional tasks. Carmen Blough [1939, p. 165] succinctly captured
this position in discussing why auditors should refer to audit
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procedures "deemed" appropriate rather than exhaustively listing the
procedures performed during an audit in the audit certificate (i.e.
report):
[These words] say 'You must trust me to do a good job as an
accountant. No detailed recital that I might make of the
auditing procedures followed would tell you enough to make
it worth your while to read them. If you cannot trust me,
you had best not depend upon my certificate, but if you can
bring yourself to the frame of mind where you believe I will
do what an honest, capable and independent public accountant
should do, then you may rely upon it.'
In exchange for defining its professional work and
responsibilities, however, a profession must also be seen to perform
the work defined as contained in its jurisdiction. In other words, an
obligation is imposed upon a profession to do what it says it will do.
For some professions, this obligation is perhaps difficult to monitor.
For example, do lawyers actually serve the needs of justice, their
primary jurisdictional claim [Abbott, 1988].1 For other professions
such as auditing and accounting, "failures" to accomplish professional
work may be highly visible and the definition of a "failure" contested.
Audits are seen to fail. Indeed, the history of auditing might be
interpreted by some as a history of auditing failures [Power, 1992]. But
when is an audit to be described as a failure, and when do such failures
suggest weaknesses in auditing practices or failures by the auditing
profession more generally? Are sudden and unexpected corporate
bankruptcies evidence of an audit failure? What of the failure to detect
material fraud? When may audits described as failed be interpreted to
imply the roles and responsibilities of auditors should be redefined? The
answers to these questions no doubt depend upon to whom they are
addressed.
The significances or meanings to be attached to an audit opinion, the
only visible sign that audit work has been performed, remain ambiguous.
Does a "clean" report imply that fraud was absent or that no fraud was
detected? Can one infer from a "clean" report that a corporation is
financially sound and can be expected to continue its operations into the
future? Or does a "clean" report refer only to the use of GAAP in
constructing financial statements? Each (or all) of these meanings may
be and have been assigned to the "clean" audit report. Yet, they carry

1
This
is 1997
also being increasingly contested in recent years.
Published
by claim
eGrove,

37

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 24 [1997], Iss. 2, Art. 11
Young: Defining Auditors' Responsibilities

27

significantly different implications for the roles and responsibilities of the
auditor. If a "clean" report is interpreted to mean no fraud is present,
then the auditor has a responsibility to detect fraud, to search actively to
find it. If it implies only that no fraud was detected, then the auditor may
not be seen as responsible for searching for fraud. If the report is
interpreted to imply that a company will continue to exist, then the
auditor must assess its future viability before issuing a report.
In recent decades, considerable attention has been given to the
existence of an "expectations gap" between what "the public" believes
auditors should do and how auditors have defined their roles and
responsibilities. Disagreement and controversy have surrounded the
significance and content to be accorded the term "auditors"roles and
responsibilities". This gap has been explored in the accounting
literature. For example, Humphrey et al. [1992] have critically
examined the response of the profession to this gap, primarily in the UK
context. Hooks [1991] has considered efforts to match public concerns
with auditor actions, and suggested that the profession may benefit from
public ignorance. These and other authors have raised questions
regarding whether auditors act in the public interest when they adhere to
extant standards rather than assess the economic consequences of audited
transactions [Merino & Kenny, 1994; Martins & McEnroe, 1992]; when
they respond to public outcries in particular ways [Fogarty, 1996;
Byington & Sutton, 1991; Mills & Bettner, 1992] or even whether they
meet their own definitions of serving the public interest [Sikka et al.,
1989]. In this paper, I hope to make a modest contribution to this
literature by examining the efforts of the U.S. accounting profession to
dominate definitions of its roles and responsibilities during the last three
decades. These efforts have occurred amidst tension between the
perceived obligations of auditors to perform particular tasks and their
declared "rights" to define such tasks. In part, this tension has arisen
from the particular cultural values [Abbott, 1988] with which auditors
have aligned their work. The next section briefly considers some of these
values in an historical context and the justifications employed by
auditors to legitimize their work. It also outlines the ways that auditors
defined their professional tasks during the 1970s. In the subsequent
sections, I consider the challenges that have been posed to these
definitions and the responses of auditors to these challenges, from the
1970s to the 1990s. The final section contains some concluding
observations.
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WHY ARE FINANCIAL AUDITS "VALUABLE"?
In the 1970s, auditors described their role as one of enhancing the
credibility of financial information and furthering the operations of an
effective capital market [Carmichael, 1974]. This claim bears a striking
resemblance to those made in the 1930s regarding the necessity for
enhanced financial disclosure by corporations. Prior to the 1930s,
corporations were required neither to submit annual reports to
government agencies or shareholders nor to have such reports audited.
Corporate managers "regarded their company's affairs as private and
privileged" [McCraw, 1984, p. 166].2 Indeed, "Mystery [i.e.
nonreporting] was treated as an asset, on the grounds that publicity
would be too informing to competitors" [Ripley, 1927, pp. 178-179].
During the economic depression, corporate secrecy was increasingly seen
as a threat to the functioning of capitalism undermining the legitimacy
of the securities industry [McCraw, 1984]. For some, the "worst
damage" of the Depression was the "wholesale betrayal of confidence by
investors" [Andrews, 1932, p. 354], including "unrestrained financial
exploitations which create[d] fictitious values never justified by
earnings" [Roosevelt, 1933, p. 226].
Regaining investor confidence was deemed essential to the economic
recovery of the U.S. [Roosevelt, 1933], and enhanced disclosure by
corporations was seen as one means to this end. It was in this climate of
economic depression and distrust that the 1933 Securities Act ("Truth
in Securities") was enacted. The act was described as a response to "the
reticence of financiers" [Rep. Rayburn, quoted in McCraw, 1984, p.
166], and required that specific disclosures accompany the issuance of
new securities. The 1934 Securities and Exchange Act extended these
disclosure requirements to encompass all publicly traded companies and
established the Securities and Exchange Commission. The New Deal
legislation also required that the disclosures and reports submitted by
corporations be audited. These audits would enable a new era of "caveat
vendor" [Andrews, 1932, p. 359], supplanting that of caveat emptor
which had been prevalent in previous decades. After all, "it is generally
regarded that an independent audit of any business is a good thing" [Col.
Carter during Congressional hearings on the Securities Act, quoted in
Carey, 1960, p. 187]. Through enhanced disclosure, audit, and other
practices, confidence and trust were to be restored in the operations of
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the securities markets.3 The practice of auditing was thus closely linked
to the cultural value of credible financial reporting seen as necessary for
the securities markets.
In the 1970s, audits were still described as affirming the truthfulness
of financial statements and ensuring that financial statements were
"fairly presented" [Palmer in New York Times, April 6, 1975]. This
function was loosely linked to various audit practices including the
review and testing of company records and the procedures and controls
used to assemble financial information, approval of the use of various
accounting principles, and examination of financial statements to ensure
they contained no material misstatements, omissions, or misleading
presentations of data [Silverman, 1971]. Through the application of
such practices, the auditor was to render a professional opinion "as to
the reliability of a company's financial records. . . judged in terms of the
adequacy of records from which the information emanates and the
acceptability of technical accounting principles involved in recording
transactions" [Silverman, 1971]. In describing their role in this way,
auditors maintained that the purpose of an audit was to ensure that
financial statements fairly presented the financial position and condition
of a business entity and that the notion, "fairly presented", was a
function of the acceptability of various accounting principles. The audit
profession did not accept responsibility for the preparation of financial
statements. Instead, these statements were declared to be the
representations of management and the responsibility of management
[Mautz and Sharaf, 1961].4
The terms used to describe the auditors' role were quite
ambiguous—ensuring "fair presentation" and the "truthfulness" of
financial reporting. While such ambiguity serves to suggest the expertise
and knowledge required to conduct an audit properly through the
exercise of professional judgment [Power, 1992], it also increases the
possibility of multiple and conflicting interpretations of these terms as
well as multiple and conflicting assessments as to whether auditors had
accomplished these ends in specific instances. What obligations did the
profession maintain were undertaken by auditors? Could financial
statements be described as "fairly presented" when an auditor failed to

3
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detect fraud? With fraud, revenues and assets might be overstated or
expenses and liabilities understated. If information about these
accounting categories could be said to represent the financial condition
and operations of an entity but the categories themselves were
"inaccurate," then could one argue that the financial statements fairly
presented the operating results andfinancialcondition of the entity? Did
the term "fairly present" which appeared in the standard audit opinion
imply that financial statements were free of material errors resulting
from fraud or other illegal acts?
Prior to the passage of the securities acts, the primary purpose of an
audit was to "ascertain the actual financial condition and earnings of an
enterprise," with the minor object of detecting and preventing fraud and
errors [Montgomery, 1921-22, pp. 19, 21, and 1927, pp. 23, 25].
However, by 1940, the detection of fraud was no longer described as an
object of the audit, as this would "require an examination of such detail
that its cost... would be prohibitive" [Montgomery, 1940, p. 13].5 By
the late 1940s, it was argued that audits were not designed to detect
fraud, nor were auditors responsible for its detection [Montgomery,
1949; Kohler, 1947].
Throughout the 1970s, auditors continued to maintain that the
concept of "fairly present" as defined by the profession imposed a very
limited obligation upon auditors to detect fraud or other illegal acts.
Some argued that it was "sheer ignorance to think the purpose of the
audit is to detect fraud" and, in their engagement letters with corporate
management, audit firms often included explicit statements to indicate
they were not in the business of detecting fraud [Hershman, 1974; Blinn,
1977]. According to the professional literature of the time, auditors were
responsible for detecting fraud only when such detection could occur
through the application of generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS)
[Holdren, 1969; Carmichael, 1975; Kapnick, 1976]. Yet, GAAS was
seen to guide the conduct of "ordinary" audit examinations—those in
which fraud was not thought to occur. Indeed, audits were assumed to
be performed in a corporate environment of honesty and integrity
[Solomon and Muller, 1977] and auditors were not required to presume
that fraud had occurred while conducting an audit [Kapnick, 1976]. As
a consequence, the application of GAAS could not be "relied upon to
assure the discovery of either defalcations and similar irregularities or
deliberate management misrepresentations" [Carmichael, 1975, p. 79].
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From this perspective, if auditors properly applied GAAS in an
engagement but failed to detect fraud, then no audit failure had occurred
even though the financial statements might contain errors. The audit
profession thus limited its definition of an audit failure to include only
those cases in which an auditor failed to apply GAAS. In doing so, it
maintained that auditor performance and their roles and responsibilities
were to be assessed only by reference to the rules and guidelines
established by the profession. Auditors were to be evaluated on their
own terms rather than by reference to the roles and responsibilities that
nonauditors might believe should guide the conduct of an audit.
In defining an audit failure as a failure to follow GAAS, the
profession was promoting and claiming its right to establish definitions
of "fairly present" and to perform its work as it saw fit [Abbott, 1988].
Even as it continued to call upon broader cultural values such as the
credibility of financial statements to justify and legitimate the usefulness
of an audit, the profession also attempted to control and define the terms
used to assess whether these values had been achieved. In this way, and
through these definitions, the audit profession was attempting to
construct and define the "proper" roles and responsibilities of auditors.
Furthermore, with its limited definition of an audit failure, the profession
was apparently attempting to equate the performance of an audit in
accordance with GAAS as sufficient evidence that the cultural value of
credible financial statements had been achieved [Abbott, 1988]. If
audited, financial statements were to be seen as credible. The profession
was attempting to preclude public discussions of the meanings and
significances to be assigned to the audit and, instead, sought to define
those terms seen to provide the audit process with value in ways desired
by the profession, and thereby to control the significance of work
performed within its jurisdiction.
QUESTIONING THE DEFINITIONS PROVIDED BY
AUDITORS—1970s
Although the profession forwarded its desired definition of an audit
failure and thereby of a "quality" audit, the revelation of scandals such
as Westec, Yale Express, and Bar-Chris [Why Accountants, Business
Week, 1971] as well as National Student Marketing [Wall Street
Journal, October 29, 1974], Beverly Hills Bancorp [Wall Street
Journal, August 14, 1974], and Equity Funding [Wall Street Journal,
January 8, 1975; January 10, 1975; December 18, 1975] raised
questions about the propriety of the auditing profession's definitions,
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including questions about its roles and responsibilities in detecting fraud.
Some commentators suggested that if audits could fail to detect a fraud
of the magnitude of Equity Funding, then as currently conducted they
might have little value [Wall Street Journal, July 12, 1974; Hershman,
1974]. The Equity Funding scandal was seen to place intense pressure
upon auditors to accept a duty to detect fraud [Wall Street Journal,
January 8, 1975].
Members of the SEC also criticized the profession's position on
fraud. Some commissioners considered auditors in a strategic position
to "nip fraud before it blossoms" and criticized them for failing to heed
"red flags" that were indicative of potential fraud [Wall Street Journal,
July 12, 1974]. In referring to several major cases of substantial
management fraud, one SEC commissioner commented:
In most of these cases, the fraud was one which was designed
to present a misleading picture of results through transactions
with related parties or through outright fictitious
transactions... If the accounting profession adopts the view that
auditors should never be responsible for detecting management
fraud, there is little likelihood that increased imposition of the
truly onerous and unfair burdens on the accounting profession
can be prevented. Standards can best be promulgated by the
profession and can serve to allay fears that auditors will become
insurers against all forms of management fraud, however
carefully concealed [News Report, Journal of Accountancy,
1973a, pp. 14,16].
He urged the profession to accept responsibility for fraud detection [New
York Times, October 17, 1973] as did the Commission more generally:
"We believe that in examinations for corporations whose securities are
held by the public, accountants can be expected to detect gross
overstatements of assets and profits, whether resulting from fraud or
otherwise" [quoted in Hershman, 1974, p. 53].
In addition to concerns about auditor responsibilities to detect
material errors, auditors were criticized for a perceived failure to
maintain their independence from their corporate clients [It's Time to
Call, Fortune, 1970; Why Accountants, Business Week, 1971]. These
questions were particularly troubling as they suggested that auditors had
failed to meet their own definitions of a "quality" audit. Did auditors
serve their corporate clients or act in the public interest by protecting
investors and creditors [The Big Bath, Newsweek, 1970; Why
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Accountants, Business Week, 1971; New York Times, November 5,
1973]? Were auditors "too friendly" with management and should they
continued to be hired as employees by their former clients [New York
Times, November 18, 1972]? Had heightened competition within the
profession resulted in an increasing unwillingness by auditors to insist on
"compliance" with financial accounting standards and to "pursue
incompetence" [Letter to the Editor, New York Times, December 7,
1975]? Was a "more muscular audit" needed to alleviate pressures on
auditors to provide creative accounting answers for clients who
otherwise threatened to change auditors [New York Times, April 14,
1974]?6
Although accounting writers indicated an awareness of criticisms
that auditors were not adequately independent of corporate clients, that
accounting results disclosed too little, and that financial statements were
too complex [e.g., Seidler, 1973], the general response of the profession
to these criticisms can be summarized in a single phrase: "You just don't
understand." Even as auditors continued to argue that audits enhanced
the credibility of financial information, they also claimed that audits were
not designed to detect fraud. While auditors insisted they could enhance
the credibility of financial reporting without actively searching for fraud,
the public appeared to disagree with this position and apparently
expected that significant or material fraud would be detected by an
audit.7 In contrast to the definition of an audit failure forwarded by the
profession, the public defined such failures as including those audits

6

Apparently, the Securities Acts were not as effective in allowing
auditors to escape the "grip" of management as was originally hoped
[McCraw, 1984], nor were the rules on independence sufficient to achieve
this end despite an awareness by the profession of the need for public
confidence in the "unbiased and selfless character of the public accountant's
role" [Miranti, 1990, pp. 176-177].
7

Forexample, a 1974 Arthur Andersen & Co. survey "indicated that 66%
of the investing public believe[d] that the most important function of the
public accounting firm's audit of a corporation is to detect fraud" [cited in
AICPA, 1978, p. 31]. Further, Baron et al. [1977] reported survey results in
which nonauditors indicated higher levels of auditor responsibility for the
detection of deliberate material falsifications than did auditors. With the
exception of auditors, the survey respondents also indicated a preference for
extending auditor responsibilities with respect to the detection of deliberate
material falsifications of financial statements.
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which did not detect material fraud or errors. This difference in
definition called into question the propriety of the practices both followed
and defined by auditors in conducting audits. The controversy
surrounding Equity Funding and other corporate failures as well as
questions about the independence of auditors suggested that the
profession had not succeeded in equating the performance of an audit in
accordance with GAAS as sufficient evidence that credible financial
reporting had been produced. These corporate failures highlighted
differences between the ways in which the auditing profession linked the
audit to credible financial reporting and how the public interpreted this
linkage.
The profession interpreted these criticisms as indicative of a failure
by the public to understand the roles and responsibilities which it had
defined. The public was described as misinformed about the services
customarily performed by CPAs [Solomon et al., 1976, p. 68]. These
differences between public interpretations and auditor interpretations of
how an audit was to intersect with the production of credible financial
statements were construed by auditors as indicative of a need to educate
the public. A properly educated public would accept that audits could
enhance the credibility of financial statements without serving as
guarantees of the accuracy of financial statements [Hershman, 1974].
In emphasizing the necessity for educating the public, the profession
attempted to avoid reassessing its own definitions of its roles and
responsibilities. Instead, confronted with these differences and
interpretations, the audit profession renewed its efforts to dominate the
signficances to be assigned to its roles and responsibilities and to
persuade the public to accept the value of an audit as defined by
auditors. In particular, the profession sought to manage impressions,
emphasized better communication by auditors, called upon other cultural
values to justify its position, and outlined expertise and its limits.
Managing Impressions. Through various means, the AICPA
attempted to manage public impressions about the roles and
responsibilities of the audit profession. In 1973, the AICPA Board of
Directors announced the formation of a special committee "to study
whether the auditing standards, which are currently considered
appropriate and sufficient in the examination of financial statements [by
the AICPA], should be changed in the light of Equity Funding and to
report its conclusions to the Board of Directors and the auditing
standards executive committee" [News Report, Journal of Accountancy,
1973b, p. 14]. The Institute justified forming the committee by
indicating that "the Institute shares the general public concern about the
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Equity Funding disaster, which caused enormous losses to investors and
creditors apparently by reason of massive and collusive fraud" [News
Report, Journal of Accountancy, 1973b, p. 14]. Although some
individuals claimed that no lessons could be learned from such a poorly
conducted audit engagement, others suggested that the fraud was
possible because Equity Funding employees had exploited blind spots
and crevices in existing audit practices [Wall Street Journal, January 8,
1975; Tipgos, 1977].
This AICPA special committee later concluded that the Equity
Funding fraud could have been detected using existing auditing standards
and that the professional position with respect to its responsibility to
detect fraud was sound [Wall Street Journal, June 5, 1975; Olsen,
1982]. For the committee, the Equity Funding scandal was not
interpreted as evidence of the profession's failure to perform appropriate
tasks but rather as a failure by individual auditors to follow established
rules and guidelines. Even so, the committee urged that the standards
relating to fraud detection be restated in more positive terms to avoid
public misunderstandings of the audit and to reemphasize that audits
might detect fraud but were not specifically designed to do so [Olsen,
1982]. The committee in this way reasserted the position of the
profession with respect to fraud detection and maintained that the audit
purposes as previously articulated were sound. The problem confronting
the profession was thus seen as one of educating the public about the
proper role of the auditor rather than a reconsideration of this role.
Audits were not designed to detect fraud, and the public was to accept
the profession's definitions of its roles and responsibilities.
This emphasis upon interpreting public criticisms as the public's
failure to understand the auditor's role can also be seen in the 1974
formation of the Cohen Commission on auditor's responsibilities.8 This
commission was charged with "determining] whether a gap exists
between what the public expects of auditors and what auditors can
reasonably be expected to accomplish [News Report, Journal of
Accountancy, 1974, p. 14]. The wording of this announcement
suggested the results the AICPA anticipated the Commission would find:
the public's expectations of auditors were unreasonable and auditors had
appropriately defined their tasks. As part of its efforts at impression
management, the AICPA later pointed to the formation of the Cohen

8

The Commission was to explore mechanisms for developing auditing
standards, possible alterations to the standard audit report, and whether
auditors should monitor all financial information released to the public. 46
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Commission as evidence that it was taking the steps necessary to police
itself: "We're going to show that accountants are concerned about the
consumer" [New York Times, May 9, 1976]. Apparently, the formation
of the Commission rather than any changes resulting from its possible
recommendations was to be seen as sufficient evidence of auditor
concerns about discrepancies between public and auditor interpretations
of how to define auditor tasks and responsibilities.
Emphasizing Better Communication. Again, criticisms of auditors
were interpreted as the public's failure to understand properly the role of
the auditor. However, this failure was now explicitly attributed to faulty
communications between the auditor and the public. At times, this faulty
communication was blamed upon the media for misleading the public:
and if the public has cast the accountant in the role of the
nemesis of all those who would embezzle funds, falsify financial
statements or commit other corporate crimes, it is not altogether
at fault. Some of the recent publicity in connection with
lawsuits involving prominent accounting firms appears to lend
considerable credence to the idea that the auditor is, in the final
analysis, the conscience of business, big and small. In reality,
this is a popular misconception [Silverman, 1971, p. 80].
At other times, faulty communication was attributed to the existing audit
opinion. In 1969, Roth [p. 61] argued that
A better understanding of the independent auditor's role by the
users of our reports and by the public generally might go far
toward reducing the number of cases taken to court and
resultant unfortunate legal decisions. One means of attaining
better understanding could possibly be a clearer explanation of
the scope and purpose of our audit in our short-form report.
Rosenfield and Lorenson [1974] also blamed the ambiguous audit report
for the turmoil over auditor responsibilities. In particular, they faulted
the statement made within this standard report that claimed financial
statements were presented fairly in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles. They recognized that this statement could be
subject to a number of different interpretations, each of which implied
differing responsibilities for auditors.
The failure of the public to understand was in part a consequence of
poor communication by auditors. As such, the solution to then current
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controversies surrounding the audit profession was to consider
"improving" the audit report so as to describe better the profession's
conception of an audit's purpose. However, this purpose was still to be
defined by the profession. Apparently, "improved communication" was
to be a monologue in which the public would be told by the profession
what it could "reasonably" expect from an audit. In calling for altered
audit reports, there was a presumption that the existing practices, roles,
and responsibilities of auditors were appropriate. The public was to
accept that the audit profession knew best how to enhance the credibility
of financial information.
Calling Upon Other Cultural Values. Other authors attempted to
justify more directly the position of the profession with respect to the
discovery of fraud. They attempted to convince the public (or perhaps
only Congress and the SEC) that its interpretations of the role of an audit
were unreasonable and inappropriate. Some pointed to the confusion
regarding the definition of fraud and noted that many business failures
arose from other factors such as bad management or adverse economic
conditions [Catlett, 1975]. They also argued that requiring auditors to
accept responsibility for fraud detection would interfere with American
cultural values of "free" enterprise and "opportunity for all" [Catlett,
1975; Cooney, 1995]. By imposing such requirements on auditors, they
would be reluctant to accept more risky companies as clients. As a
result, these companies (often start-ups) would be unable to obtain audit
services and would thereby be effectively denied access to capital
markets. Following this chain of reasoning, free enterprise, and
consequently competition within industries, would be hampered if
auditors were required to accept fraud detection as one of their
responsibilities. Stated in other words, the "traditional" responsibilities
of auditors as currently defined served to promote greater economic
opportunities for all.9
It was also argued that requiring auditors to accept this

9

Interestingly, some individuals attempted to employ the weight of
"tradition" as a reason to maintain the status quo. They claimed that fraud
detection conflicted with the "traditional" audit approach and was, in general,
too costly an undertaking [e.g., New York Times, April 6, 1975]. However,
these arguments represented an effort to construct such a tradition. The
Cohen Commission later traced the steady erosion of fraud detection as an
audit objective [AICPA, 1978, pp. 33-35]. See Hobsbawn and Ranger [1984]
on the construction of traditions.
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responsibility would sacrifice another cultural value—efficiency [Abbott,
1988]. Relative to the large number of audits conducted each year, the
incidence of undetected fraud (an audit failure as defined by the public)
was claimed to be small (a claim perhaps impossible to either refute or
substantiate). Requiring auditors to search actively for fraud would
result in the performance of additional audit procedures. But if one
assumed that undetected fraud was a relatively infrequent event, then
obviously such additional efforts would not be cost-effective [Hershman,
1974], but rather a waste of auditor time and client money.10
Outlining Expertise and Its Limits. Again, auditors maintained
that the public failed to understand the particular expertise of auditors.
Some expressed the opinion that an adequate answer to the question of
what "good" is an audit that could not provide assurance that material
fraud was detected "is exceedingly involved and probably beyond the
grasp of the average user of the auditor's work" [Carmichael, 1979], the
"non-expert." Others questioned the ability of such non-experts to
understand the "esoteric, highly specialized professional standards and
responsibilities" of the auditor [Solomon et al., 1976]. In effect, because
the public was not expert in auditing, the nature and extent of the
complex tasks underpinning the audit report were best left to those
specifically trained in undertaking these tasks. In making these
arguments, Solomon et al. [1976] criticized the actions of the trial judge
in the Continental Vending case who had instructed the jury that "proof
of compliance with GAAP [generally accepted accounting principles] is
evidence which may be very persuasive but not necessarily conclusive
that [the auditor] acted in good faith, and that the facts as certified were
not materially false or misleading." The judge's instructions were to be
seen as inappropriate because the professional expertise and judgment
of the audit profession was being effectively supplanted by that of a less
informed and knowledgeable jury. Instead, for these authors, the jury
should have been instructed that compliance with generally accepted
accounting principles would be sufficient to acquit the auditors. In
forwarding these arguments, the authors suggested that the audit should
be considered an end in itself and that the means to this end were best left
to the experts, the audit profession. In deciding whether an audit had
resulted in the production of reliable financial reports, one need look no
further than assessing whether the statements were prepared in
accordance with the established accounting rules and auditing standards.

10

This argument echoes that made by Montgomery [1940] to explain why
fraud
was1997
not an audit purpose.
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Even as some maintained that the expertise of auditors lay beyond
the understanding of the general public, others argued that this expertise
also had its limits. Now, auditors were argued to possess no special
powers in detecting fraud. They were not favored with hindsight and
conducted audits under a presumption of honest management [New York
Times, April 6, 1975]. As such, the audit profession could not and
should not undertake responsibilities it could not successfully fulfill
[Catlett, 1975].11 Such justifications for the status quo presumed a
certain fixity in the nature of an audit engagement and a self-assurance
as regards its continuing relevance in the face of efforts to exclude
nonauditors from any role in defining its nature and purpose. These
justifications also suggested an extraordinary confidence in the
continuing importance of the audit profession and its self-defined tasks.
In issuing revised auditing standards on fraud and illegal acts in the
late 1970s, the profession attempted to maintain the status quo. The
fraud standard repeated previous professional statements about the
limitations of the existing audit process, limitations that might allow
errors to remain undetected. As such, it was seen to do little more than
to reiterate "traditional" audit doctrine and to emphasize that frauds do
occur [Wall Street Journal, May 6, 1976] and might remain undetected.
Similarly, the proposal on illegal acts explicitly recognized the expertise
limitations of auditors and indicated that auditors could not be expected
to provide legal opinions. Again, this new requirement was seen to have
little effect upon existing auditor responsibilities [Wall Street Journal,
January 31, 1977].
The articles appearing in the accounting practitioner journals and
elsewhere during this period seemed to emphasize the necessity for
making the public understand the auditor's roles and responsibilities as
interpreted by auditors. This understanding was to be imposed upon the
public by the profession. Although auditors claimed to act in the public
interest, they also maintained that as "experts" they were best qualified
to decide their responsibilities. They argued that the profession was best
situated to decide what constituted reasonable public expectations with

11

This lack of expertise/professional competence argument was also used
to justify resistance to placing upon auditors a responsibility for the detection
of illegal payments [New York Times, September 28, 1976]. Many illegal acts
were seen as far removed from entity's financial affairs (the area of audit
expertise). As such, it was unlikely that an auditor could detect them during
the audit engagement (e.g., violations of OSHA or EPA regulations) [Solomon
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol24/iss2/11
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regards to audit performance and auditor roles and responsibilities.
Auditors were to define these tasks both for themselves and the public;
they were to control the activities within their professional jurisdiction
and to decide whether the credibility of financial statements was being
enhanced by their activities.
CHANGING THE TERMS OF DEBATE
In 1976, a highly critical Senate staff study was released about the
accounting profession [U.S. Senate, 1976]. This study claimed that the
professional interests of auditors were too closely intertwined with those
of large corporate clients, attacked auditor claims of independence and
questioned the reliability of private audits [New York Times, January 23,
1977]. In a cover letter, Senator Metcalf stated that the Big Eight
accounting firms had shown "an alarming lack of independence and lack
of dedication to public protection" [New York Times, January 17, 1977].
The study suggested that governmental regulation of auditors might be
necessary, including the establishment of federal auditing standards
[Wall Street Journal, January 17, 1977]. It also questioned the
appropriateness of the existing process for establishing accounting
standards [U.S. Senate, 1976]. Initially, the AICPA expressed dismay
at the Senate staff's
unwarranted conclusions. This effort [of the AICPA over 35
years] combined with actions of SEC results in achieving the
highest quality of financial reporting and disclosure of any
country in the world [Wall Street Journal, January 17, 1977].
Partners from Big Eightfirmswere reported as describing the staff study
as both wrong and superficial [New York Times, January 17, 1977].
Despite these assertions, several auditors who later testified during the
Congressional hearings about the study urged Congress to allow the
auditing profession time to reform itself.
With the publication of this report and the convening of subsequent
Congressional hearings, attention appeared to shift away from questions
about the appropriate roles and responsibilities of auditors and towards
an emphasis upon finding specific practices that could serve as symbols
suggestive of the appearance of auditor independence. The threat of an
increased federal role in the operations of the auditing profession appears
to have been a critical element in this shift. The "new" practices
installed during this period included the formation of audit committees,
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disclosures of disagreements between auditors and corporate clients, and
the implementation of mechanisms to discipline and control the actions
of auditors, such as peer review. In emphasizing the development and
implementation of these practices, questions that had earlier been raised
about the proper roles and responsibilities of auditors faded into the
background. This shift was quite significant in that it allowed the
auditing profession to continue forwarding its preferred meanings for an
audit and its definitions of the appropriate roles and responsibilities for
auditors.
With this shift, attention was redirected from the
interpretations to be accorded an audit to focus instead upon the sorts of
services an audit firm could be permitted to provide and still claim its
independence from clients and the types of disciplinary techniques
needed to convince nonauditors that professional self-regulation was
possible and workable.12
This shift from a consideration of roles and responsibilities to
finding and installing specific practices of self-regulation occurred in
spite of the publication of the tentative and final conclusions of the
Cohen Commission. In its tentative conclusions, this Commission
suggested that the expectations gap often described by auditors as
unreasonable was apparently ". . . caused by the failure of auditors to
fully assume responsibilities they are capable of assuming, rather than
by unreasonable user expectations" [Seidler, 1977, p. 20]. The Cohen
Commission recommended that auditors be required to provide a broader
range of information about corporate clients and to expose publicly the
wrongdoing of clients in certain circumstances. It further recommended
that the auditors clarify their responsibility for fraud detection. In
making this recommendation, the Commission commented that the users
of financial statements "should have the right to assume that audited
financial information is not unreliable because of fraud and that
management maintains appropriate controls to safeguard assets"
[AICPA, 1977, p. 36]. In other words, credible financial reporting could
not be produced if auditors failed to detect material fraud.
These recommendations suggested that public interpretations of the
significance of the audit and auditors' responsibilities of should
supersede some definitions forwarded by the profession. While the
profession was to decide how these different tasks would be
implemented, the Commission explicitly accepted a role for the "public"
in defining the responsibilities of auditors.
In this way, its
recommendations might have been seen to threaten the dominant role of

12
See Fogarty [1996] on peer review.
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the profession in defining its own roles and responsibilities.
Unsurprisingly, its recommendations tended to be ignored by the
AICPA.13
INTEREST RENEWED
As the 1980s began, Congressional interest in accounting and
auditing matters subsided. In 1981, the New York Times commented:
Pressure for Federal regulation has waned. The Securities and
Exchange Commission has shredded its letters warning of the
importance of auditor independence from the companies they
audit.
And, perhaps most surprising, certified public
accountants now occupy powerful positions in Washington
[New York Times, October 7, 1981].
In this same article, an AICPA representative was quoted:
For the first time in years, the accounting profession is
experiencing real power in Washington not just outside
influence.
Even as regulatory interest in accounting waned, articles continued to
appear in the press (although with less frequency than earlier) that were
critical of auditing and accounting. The media continued to report on the
ways in which "slick" accounting ploys were used to improve the
reported income of companies [Wall Street Journal, June 20, 1980], on
the rise of accounting "scams" accepted by auditors without qualification
[Wall Street Journal, July 9, 1982], about SEC charges that financial
statement "fudging" was a growing practice [Wall Street Journal, June
2, 1983; "The SEC Turns Up the Heat," Business Week, 1984] and on
the increasing number of corporations that fired auditors who had issued

13

Indeed, the AICPA was accused of responding superficially to these
recommendations by studying the report intensively in small committees
while failing to heed its advice [Seidler, 1979]. For example, the AICPA
announced the formation of a committee to study the tentative conclusions of
the Cohen Commission in 1977. This announcement also suggested the
importance of the Commission for public relations purposes: "This is the type
of independent study that would benefit any profession which is accountable
to the public" [News Report, Journal of Accountancy, 1977, pp. 16, 18].
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qualified audit opinions [Wall Street Journal, May 12, 1983].
As the prohibitions on advertising and client solicitation were either
dropped or substantially reduced, competition within the auditing
industry (often taking the form of price competition) increased
dramatically and auditing firms entered into the "alien world of
marketing" [Wall Street Journal, March 18, 1981]. Accounting firms
were now characterized as ever more aggressively "courting competitors'
clients, promising lower audit fees" [New York Times, October 3, 1984]
and squeezing profit margins on the traditional auditing business of the
large accounting firms [New York Times, December 30, 1984]. In this
environment, concerns were raised about "whether growing competitive
pressures [might] be encouraging auditors to bend the rules in favor of
clients, such as keeping a questionable loan on the books to keep up the
bank's profits on paper" [New York Times, March, 10, 1985]. Questions
were also raised as to whether audits had become "loss leaders used
merely to win more profitable management and tax-consulting contracts
with the client" [New York Times, February 18, 1985]. These questions
suggested that auditors were failing to carry out the roles and
responsibilities which they had defined for themselves. They implied or
stated outright that auditors and audits were not enhancing the credibility
of financial statements in at least some instances.
Such questions arose amidst a number of significant "audit failures"
occurring relatively soon after an entity had received an unqualified audit
opinion ["Auditing the Auditors," Business Week, 1983]. In 1982, Penn
Square Bank collapsed three and one-half months after receiving an
unqualified audit opinion [Wall Street Journal, July 29, 1982].
Although the auditors had warned Penn Square directors that the bank's
financial problems were growing, they issued an unqualified audit
opinion because of perceived risks to depositor confidence [Wall Street
Journal, August 17, 1982]. Similarly, three weeks before the FDIC
declared United American Bank insolvent, its audit firm issued an
unqualified audit opinion on the bank's financial statements even though
many federal investigators had been present during the audit [Wall Street
Journal, March 4, 1983]. In 1984, the New York Times listed several
instances of alleged audit failures including Litton Industries, Security
America Corporation, Drysdale Government Securities Corporation,
Saxon Industries, Flight Transportation, Alpex Computer, United
American Bank, Penn Square Bank, and Datapoint [New York Times,
May 13, 1984]. Later, the New York Times [November 23, 1984]
reported several lawsuits pending against a single international
accounting firm arising from audit work at DeLorean Motor Company,
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol24/iss2/11
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Nucorp Energy, Seafirst National Bank, Frigitemp, the Reserve
Insurance Co., and the Financial Corporation of America. Between 1980
and early 1985, the largest accountingfirmspaid more than $ 175 million
in settlements and judgments over disputed audits [McComas, 1986].
Despite earlier efforts to convince the public that the profession had
no responsibility to detect fraud, the significant number of instances
designated as "audit failures" again raised questions regarding the
significances that could be accorded to an unqualified or "clean" audit
opinion. For example, the New York Times [May 13, 1984] commented
that auditors are thought of as
the watchdogs who will detect fraud or emerging financial
problems before those problems sink a bank or make a
corporation's stock price plunge.
But such faith has been eroded lately through a series of
incidents in which some of the most elite accounting firms have
blessed a financial statements on the eve of disaster.
Were auditors fulfilling this responsibility? Did the audit enhance the
credibility of financial reports?
In 1985, Congressional attention again focused upon the auditing
profession and hearings were held about the role of auditors. Before
these hearings began, Rep. Dingell, the Committee chair, indicated his
concerns about "whether accounting is giving us a fair and accurate and
truthful picture of what is going on in the industry" [New York Times,
February 18, 1985]. His committee intended to raise questions regarding
whether competitive pressures and MAS services were eroding the
independence of auditors [New York Times, February 18, 1985] and why
auditors had not provided advance warning of the deteriorating financial
condition of banks and other companies [Wall Street Journal, February
12, 1985; February 19, 1985].
In opening the hearings, Dingell referred to a U.S. Supreme Court
description of the auditor's role:
By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a
corporation's financial status, the independent auditor assumes
a public responsibility transcending any employment
relationship with the client....This public watchdog function
demands that the accountant maintain total independence from
the client at all times and requires complete fidelity to the public
trust [quoted in Miller, 1986, pp. 28-29].
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The media also reported charges by the Dingell committee that the
existing regulatory framework had not been effective in
providing a warning system that might have prevented a series
of financial disasters in the last few years—including the run on
Continental Illinois National Bank, and the collapse of Penn
Square Bank and Drysdale Government Securities. In each
case, auditors gave the company's financial statements a clean
opinion shortly before disaster struck [New York Times, March
7, 1985].14
Given these concerns, the Dingell committee investigated the role of
accounting firms in "blessing" those accounting practices that were
perceived to mask the financial condition of several savings and loan
entities that later failed. Comments in the press indicated that the
committee believed self-regulation was flawed: ". . . the same people
write the (financial accounting) rules, interpret the rules . . . [sic] and
enforce the rules" [Wall Street Journal, March 7, 1985]. Dingell
commented:
The present self-regulatory system permits the accounting firms
to control the setting of audit standards, to apply those
standards to individual clients, and to sit in judgment of
themselves when an audit failure occurs. All of this is done in
private [quoted in Miller, 1986, p. 32].
The many alleged audit failures raised renewed concerns about the
independence and objectivity of auditors in the high-pressure competitive
environment in which accounting firms also offered consulting services
[Dingell, 1985; Wall Street Journal, September 20, 1985]. During the
hearings, Dingell highlighted these concerns by referring to a newspaper
advertisement that ended by saying "In fact, there's only one thing wrong
with calling ourselves Deloitte Haskins & Sells & You. The You really
should come first."
He commented: "That doesn't sound too
independent to me" [New York Times, March 10, 1985]. The terms
employed in the previous paragraphs to describe the perceived problems
with auditing are quite telling—a public watchdog function, an early
warning system, "inappropriate" clean bills of health, "blessing" of
misleading financial accounting practices, and concerns about the

14
Also see New York Times [March 10, 1985].
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"independence" of auditors. Admittedly, some of these terms might be
seen as high-flown rhetoric by a Congressional committee desiring the
public attention it could receive by focusing upon the perceived failures
of auditors. However, by asking whether the public watchdog function
of auditors was impaired, the committee suggested that auditors should
serve this function. In suggesting that auditors had failed to provide
advance warning of imminent corporate failures, the Committee implied
that auditors had this responsibility. Further, in saying that auditors had
"blessed" misleading accounting practices, the Committee claimed that
auditors had failed to carry out the roles and responsibilities which the
profession had defined for itself. The committee's allegations were thus
doubly damning—not only had auditors failed to define their tasks
properly but they had also failed to perform the work which they
themselves had defined as appropriate.
The Dingell hearings challenged the definitions of roles and
responsibilities advanced by the profession. These hearings suggested
that the issuance of an audit report implied broader responsibilities than
those previously accepted and advocated by auditors. During the 1970s,
auditors had maintained that audits were not specifically designed to
detect fraud. Now, they were again criticized for failing to detect fraud
and also for failing to provide an "early warning" of possible corporate
failures. The media, in its coverage of the Dingell committee hearings
and elsewhere, appeared to define an audit failure as the issuance of a
"clean" audit report shortly followed by the declaration of corporate
bankruptcy or the incidence of financial problems [Wall Street Journal,
February 21, 1985; March 7, 1985]. This definition contained no
reference to GAAS and implied that an audit failure could occur even
when an auditor had followed such practices, a definition that conflicted
with that provided by the auditors.
Auditor Response. The auditors responded by attempting to defend
their own definitions of the roles and purposes of an audit and to deny
that the existing system was "broken." In testimony before the Dingell
Committee, Philip Chenok, AICPA president, indicated that the
incidence of audit failures was quite small relative to the large number
of audits performed, claiming that of 50,000 audits performed since
1979 only 123 might be called "audit failures" [Wall Street Journal,
February 19, 1985]. In a later editorial, Chenok again stressed the
relative infrequency of audit failures noting that "audit failures can and
do occur but they are rare in relation to the tens of thousands of audits
conducted each year. They result from human error by individual
auditors. They do not reflect the overall quality of work in the
Published by eGrove, 1997

57

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 24 [1997], Iss. 2, Art. 11
Young: Defining Auditors' Responsibilities

47

profession" [New York Times, March 17, 1985]. The small number of
acknowledged audit failures was used to suggest that the current system
was operating properly.
The audit profession and others again argued that nonauditors had
failed to understand the "proper" role of the auditor and the signficances
that could be appropriately assigned to audit opinions. For example,
Chenok [1986] noted that the Dingell hearings were concerned with
whether auditors had effectively discharged their duties. He maintained
that in order to answer this question one must understand the function of
the independent audit—it was to report on the fairness with which
financial statements presented corporate financial position [Chenok,
1986]. The audit profession was to be judged on its own terms.
As in the 1970s, auditors maintained that criticisms of the profession
resultedfromthe public's failure to understand the "appropriate" role of
the auditor and to accept the definition of this role as forwarded by
auditors. From this perspective, an unqualified audit opinion was to be
seen as providing reasonable assurance that financial statements
conformed with generally accepted accounting principles rather than as
providing evidence of a "clean bill of health." As such, an unqualified
opinion might be appropriate for a company on the brink of financial
collapse as long as the financial statements "reflect[ed] a fair and
accurate picture of the company'sfinancialcondition" [New York Times,
March 10, 1985].15 Furthermore, audits were not foolproof as the audit
process relied upon a small sample of company transactions, many
accounting matters were open to judgment [New York Times, March 10,
1985; Chenok, 1986] and fraud was difficult to detect [Chenok, 1986].
Perhaps the following quote best summarizes the audit profession's
position with regard to the controversy surrounding its work:
A number of the questions raised in your proceedings [the
Dingell Committee] and in our own studies of these matters are
provoked by even more fundamental questions concerning
auditor performance. These questions involve not how well the

15

However, if an entity was seen to be on the brink of collapse, the going
concern assumption would be invalid and the use of historical cost accounting
inappropriate according to generally accepted accounting principles. One
wonders how manyfinancialstatements of companies that failed shortly after
receiving an unqualified audit opinion were prepared using a basis of
accounting other than historical cost.
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auditor has performed, but whether the auditor must undertake
additional responsibilities to satisfy society's needs. Repeatedly
it has been asserted that the public is seeking more from
auditors in the area of protection from fraud and early warnings
of business failure. In these respects, it would seem that there
exists a gap between public expectations of the auditor's role
and that which the auditor is, in fact, today performing. It is
our belief that skepticism about the work of independent
auditors has more to do with this mismatch. . . than it does with
actual performance failures [cited in Miller, 1986, p. 34].
Again, the profession attempted to reframe concerns about its work as
evidence of rising public expectations rather than as a controversy over
the meanings to be assigned to audit reports and audit work and who
would decide such meanings. Although concerns about the responsibility
of auditors to detect fraud had arisen previously, the profession had not
substantially altered its conception of its responsibilities or accepted an
explicit responsibility to detect fraud or warn of imminent corporate
collapses. It was still attempting to dominate definitions of its roles and
responsibilities and to resist those forwarded by the Dingell committee
and the press. Again, it formed a committee amidst the controversy.
This committee was to "look at the current responsibilities of
management, the auditors within and outside the company to detect
fraud" [Wall Street Journal, February 12, 1985] and to develop methods
to prevent and detect fraud among public and closely held companies
[Wall Street Journal, February 19, 1985].16 The framing of the issue to
be investigated by this panel suggested the answer desired by the
AICPA. In particular, note the ordering of the individuals whose
responsibilities were to be investigated: managers followed by internal
auditors followed by external auditors. This ordering might be
interpreted to reflect the profession's interest in maintaining that the
detection of fraud was primarily management's responsibility.
Congressional Intervention? Despite the arguments of the audit
profession and SEC and the tentative actions taken by the audit
profession, several Congresspersons introduced legislation to require

16

In announcing the formation of the panel, the AICPA denied that its
formation was linked to the Dingell hearings that were due to begin on
February 20, 1985: "We have been considering suggesting formation of this
panel since last September, and we aren't doing this in reaction to the
hearings"
[Chenok1997
in Wall Street Journal, February 12, 1985].
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auditors to report to Government authorities suspicions of fraud or other
illegalities noted during an audit [New York Times, May 23, 1986]. Rep.
Wyden, a bill sponsor, indicated that "We've got to have an early
warning system out there" [New York Times, May 23, 1986].17 Despite
criticisms, the audit profession was still seen as a means to enhance the
credibility of financial reporting. The bill did not propose replacing
auditors with other experts. Instead, the responsibilities of the profession
would be altered and expanded by this legislative action. The bill was
of course, opposed by accounting firms as well as by the SEC and
certain trade groups [Wall Street Journal, August 19, 1986].
In justifying this opposition, certain members of the profession
expressed concerns that by requiring auditors to "blow the whistle" the
relationship between the auditor and the client would be fundamentally
altered [e.g., Wall Street Journal, June 20, 1986], "put[ting] us into an
adversarial police-like role with corporations we currently service, and
no one would benefit" [Wall Street Journal, May 23, 1986]. Auditors
would become nothing more than "state-regulated examiners" when
auditing "should be a private-sector activity, not an extension of the
government's role" [Wall Street Journal, May 23, 1986]. Changing the
role of independent auditors "to a police role" would detract from the
primary responsibility of auditors—that of providing opinions as to
whether corporate financial statements accurately reflect the "true"
financial condition of a company [New York Times, May 23, 1986].
This proposed role for auditors would be "unworkable in relation to
the auditor's principal objective of assessing the fair presentation of
financial statements in accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles . . ." [Miller, 1986]. The bill was seen as "unworkable" in
part because it conflicted with the auditing profession's definition of its
own roles and responsibilities. From its perspective, auditors were to
assess whether financial statements fairly presented financial condition
and performance, a task that did not require them to search actively for
fraud even if it might result in material misstatements of financial
condition and performance. These comments suggest the reluctance of
auditors to alter their conception of their roles and responsibilities and
a desire to dominate the definitions of tasks and responsibilities within
their jurisdiction.

17

Wyden later introduced a watered down version of the bill to require
auditors to inform management about significant fraud and then to notify the
SEC only if management failed to act properly upon such information within
three
months [Wall Street Journal, August 19, 1986].
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Other prominent members of the auditing profession began to
advocate altering professional responsibilities to include a responsibility
for fraud detection. Change was seen as necessary in light of public
expectations that auditors and the financial reporting system would warn
the public of impending failures [Bertholdt, 1986]. Although the
auditing profession was not described as failing to meet its public
responsibilities, some believed it could no longer ignore the concerns
raised by Congress, courts and the public. The expectations of the
public were described as changed and so the roles and responsibilities of
auditors and financial reporting should also ". . . be amended to provide
the 'predictive' value the public now demands" [Connor, 1986, p. 77].
Perhaps, in these changed circumstances, auditors should accept
responsibility to search for conditions that might lead to materially
misstated financial statements and to reduce the risk that fraud would
remain undetected [also see editorial by Connor in Wall Street Journal,
December 3, 1985].
A limited role for the public in defining auditor's roles and
responsibilities was also implied by the Treadway Commission report
which recommended amending the auditor's opinion to indicate that
auditors could provide reasonable but not absolute assurance that
financial statements were free of fraud [New York Times, July 13,
1987].18 This role was further recognized with the issuance of several
new auditing standards in 1988 that were intended to improve auditor
performance and communications, to address the concerns raised by the
Treadway Commission report, and to narrow the expectations gap.
Among other requirements, these standards enjoined auditors to be alert
for illegal activities during the conduct of an audit, to design audit work
to provide reasonable assurance of detecting material irregularities and
errors, and to inform the board of directors of any such findings.19 These
18

This report also recommended that all public companies be required to
have audit committees and that auditors be evaluated by their peers. However,
the report contained little evidence that audit committees, peer reviews, or an
altered audit opinion would educe the incidence of fraudulent financial
reporting. Indeed, pTL which was embroiled in financial scandal had an audit
committee. However, the committee was composed of individuals with little
experience, and they served primarily to rubber stamp the fraudulent activity
of pTL officers such as Jim Bakker [Tidwell, 1993].
19

Rep. Wyden criticized the new standards on the detection of fraud as he
believed auditors needed to report suspicions of fraud to regulators ] Wall
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standards implied that, in designing audits, auditors could no longer
presume that management was honest and expressed more affirmatively
the responsibilities of auditors relative to fraud [Carmichael, 1988]. The
audit report was also revised in an effort to articulate more clearly the
responsibilities of auditors to detect errors and irregularities. In
particular, the following sentence was added to the report: "Those
standards [GAAS] require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of
material misstatements" [Roussey, et al., 1988, p. 45, emphasis added].
The new audit standards also required auditors to evaluate whether there
was substantial doubt about a company's ability to continue as a "going
concern" and to disclose such doubts.20
Reactions to these standards by auditors included criticisms of the
lack of clarity in detailing the extent of the auditor's responsibility to
detect fraud [Neebes & Roost, 1987]. Others continued to advocate the
"right" of the profession to define its own tasks and responsibilities. For
example, Elliott and Jacobson [1987, p. 18] asked:
Should CPAs judge proposed standards primarily by whether
they do or do not conform to public expectations...A
professional either has expertise and integrity that separates him
[sic]fromthe public or he [sic] does not. . . That does not mean
that public expectations are unimportant, only that they should
not be the basic criterion used to evaluate proposed auditing
standards. The appropriate criterion is whether and to what
degree a proposal would improve the effectiveness of audits of
financial statements. This responds to the public need the
profession serves, not to supposed expectations. And needs and
expectations can differ. (Emphasis in original)
Although Elliot and Jacobson raised some valid criticisms of the
proposed expectation gap standards in the remainder of their article, their
basic opposition to the new accounting standards was premised upon
disagreement over who should define the roles and responsibilities of
auditors. For these authors, auditors should decide the nature and
content of the tasks within their professional jurisdiction. In turn, the

20

A business bulletin that briefly described the proposal preceding this
new requirement indicated that predictions of survivability were "a
responsibility auditors have tried to duck until now" [Wall Street Journal,
December 11, 1986].
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public must rely upon (and trust) auditors to assess public needs rather
than capitulate to unwarranted public expectations. Yet, the authors did
not explicate how one could distinguish between a need and an
expectation nor did they suggest any measure by which to evaluate the
effectiveness of audits. Instead, they presumed that audits were essential
to the economy and were capable of addressing the warranted concerns
of the public by continuing on those terms previously established by
auditors. In other words, the lay public was to have little role in defining
this work or its expected outcomes.
In contrast to the events of the 1970s, critical attention was not
deflected from the auditing profession. As the media reported on new
corporate failures, questions about the usefulness of audit opinions, and,
in particular, questions regarding how financial results could turn sour
so quickly after the issuance of a "clean" audit report continued to be
raised. Alleged audit failures included Regina Co., Allegheny
International Inc., Crazy Eddie Inc., Coated Sales Inc., and American
Biomaterials Corp. [Wall Street Journal, January 24, 1989]. The ZZZZ
Best Co. collapse was thought to provide the ". . . most vivid proof that
the present system for independent auditors reporting financial fraud" did
not work [Dingell in Wall Street Journal, January 22, 1988]. This
collapse was particularly troubling as ZZZZ Best had fired one audit
firm and hired another shortly before its financial collapse. Although the
first audit firm communicated its suspicions of financial misdeeds to the
SEC within the allotted time (30 days), this communication occurred
after ZZZZ Best had filed for bankruptcy protection {Wall Street
Journal, January 22, 1988; New York Times, January 27, 1988].
The audit profession was also heavily criticized in the press and by
Congress, the General Accounting Office and others for its perceived
failure to warn the public of the impending savings and loan crisis, a
warning some claimed might have reduced the costs arising from the
savings and loan bailout [see e.g., Wall Street Journal, November 23,
1987; Jacob, 1991; Sternberg, 1992; "Big 6,"Business Week, 1992].
The quality of audits was criticized in almost every major savings and
loan failure.21 For example, after the failure of Lincoln Savings and
Loan, one regulator commented: "Lincoln is proof positive that any
thrift in America could obtain a clean audit opinion despite being grossly
insolvent" [Wall Street Journal, November 21, 1989] and allegations

21
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were also made that Lincoln's auditors had approved transactions that
were "accounting-driven" in order to generate profits [Wall Street
Journal, August 7, 1989; November 15, 1989]. Congress held many
hearings to investigate these savings and loan failures, at which auditors
were frequent witnesses. Audit firms were confronted with numerous
lawsuits and paid significant settlements and fines in the aftermath of the
savings and loan crisis [see e.g., Wall Street Journal, December 30,
1988; January 24, 1989; January 27, 1989; March 2, 1990; February 6,
1991; June 14, 1991; July 5, 1991; December 6, 1992].
In the midst of this controversy and scrutiny, Rep. Wyden continued
to advocate legislation to require auditors to report to regulators the
uncorrected illegal acts of audit clients and to promote legislation
designed to establish an early warning system to prevent future financial
debacles such as that which had occurred in the savings and loan
industry [Wall Street Journal, Sept. 14, 1990, October 5, 1990, August
2, 1991; September 3, 1991; July 29, 1992]. Various versions of this
bill continued to be opposed by assorted business groups receiving on
again but mostly off again support from the AICPA. This continued
opposition occurred within the context of a self-described audit "liability
crisis". Audit firms were reported to have expended hundreds of millions
of dollars in fines, legal fees and settlements in the wake of the savings
and loan crisis and as a consequence of securities fraud class action suits
filed after a fluctuation in stock prices. One 1992 commentary estimated
that accounting firms faced 4,000 liability suits (twice the number in
1985) and that the largest firms were spending $30 million each year in
legal fees [McCarroll, 1992]. Indeed, lawsuits resulted in the
bankruptcy of one major U.S. auditing firm in 1990.
Legal liability exposure was now described as the profession's top
concern [see e.g., Sternberg, 1992; "Big 6", Business Week, 1992;
O'Malley, 1993a,b; Lochner, 1993; Epstein, 1993; Fogarty et al., 1994]
and it portrayed itself as a scapegoat for bureaucratic errors and investor
desires to avoid losses ["Big 6", Business Week, 1992; O'Malley,
1993a]. Members of the profession sought liability reform as litigation
was increasing ". . . at a rapid rate . . . but that would not be so bad if
only incompetent or dishonest auditors were penalized by huge
judgments. However, few intelligent observers believe that this is the
case" [Lochner, 1993, p. 94], as "unwarranted litigation and forced
settlements constitute the vast majority of claims against accountants"
[O'Malley, 1993b, p. 84]. In 1992, the Big 6 accounting firms joined a
coalition of professional organizations and business, the Coalition to
Eliminate Abusive Securities Suits, to lobby in favor of federal
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol24/iss2/11
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legislation to curb "abusive lawsuits alleging securities fraud" [Wall
Street Journal, September 1, 1992].
This rising incidence of litigation against auditors was interpreted as
a search by the public for absolute assurance and as a threat to the
ability of the financial reporting system to provide relevant, reliable and
credible information. From this perspective, the audit opinion was to be
interpreted neither as a "Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval"
[McCarroll, 1992; Jacob, 1991] nor as suggesting that a particular
company was a worthwhile or safe investment. Public expectations for
audits were characterized as spiralling ever upward with regards to their
ability to prevent fraud, mismanagement and business failure. Lochner
[1993, p. 94] argued that "Far too much weight is being placed on
accountants' work, in part because even some businessmen [sic] are
ignorant of how audits are performed and what they represent. . . . audits
cannot guarantee accuracy or the detection of fraud; they are not
insurance policies."
In this environment, auditors expressed concern as to whether
legislation such as that proposed by Rep. Wyden would open the door
for additional lawsuits against auditors—now by their clients
[Silverstein, 1992; O'Malley, 1993a]. Further, some members of the
profession began to characterize the necessity for liability reform as
inseparable from auditors agreeing to undertake additional
responsibilities [e.g., O'Malley, 1993a,b; Epstein, 1993]. This
connection was made most explicitly by O'Malley [1993b, p.85] who
argued that "any effort on the profession's part to meet these [public]
expectations . . . always seems to generate newer and even more
unrealistic expectations. . ." [O'Malley, 1993b, p. 85]. He also stated
point-blank that "the accounting profession will not support any further
legislative expansion of the independent auditor's responsibility without
meaningful liability reform—for it is our view that increased obligations
that create unreasonable expectations will almost certainly produce
increased litigation" [O'Malley, 1993a, p. 7]. In other words, further
participation by the public in defining the roles and responsibilities of
auditors would carry a price—tort reform.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
With the passage of the "Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995" [Public Law 104-67], the legal liability concerns of auditors
were addressed. This new legislation enacted a system of proportionate
liability under which auditors will pay damages based upon the share of
Published by eGrove, 1997
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fraud for which they are held responsible. In exchange for this
protection,22 the new law explicitly requires auditors to include
"procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance of detecting illegal
acts that would have a direct and material effect on the determination of
financial statement amounts", "procedures designed to identity related
party transactions . . . or otherwise require disclosure. . ." and "an
evaluation of whether there is substantial doubt about the ability of the
issuer to continue as a going concern during the ensuing fiscal year"
[Public Law 104-67]. Furthermore, the law places a responsibility upon
auditors to provide the SEC with a copy of their report of any illegal acts
which have a material effect upon the financial statements when
management fails to take "timely and appropriate remedial actions" and
the Board of Directors has failed to inform the SEC of such a report
within one business day after its receipt from the auditors [Public Law
104-67]. Auditors, in exchange for liability reform, have accepted an
affirmative duty to notify regulators of illegal acts in prescribed
circumstances. Auditors must still implement the requirements of this
legislation and the Auditing Standards Board of the AICPA has issued
a proposal providing additional performance requirements to enable
auditors to meet their fraud-detection responsibility [Wall Street
Journal, April 4, 1996].
After decades of vociferous opposition to accepting responsibilities
to detect fraud, such a responsibility has now been enacted into law.
Throughout much of the period examined in this paper (and before),
auditors sought to dominate the definitions of their roles and
responsibilities and to equate the conduct of an audit with the production
of credible financial reporting. Auditors were no doubt correct in
asserting that an audit could not always be depended upon to detect
frauds nor to warn infallibly of imminent business failures. However, in
defining their roles and responsibilities, they argued that neither of these
responsibilities were elements of their tasks (at least prior to the issuance
of certain auditing standards in 1988). In part, the failure of auditors to
"educate" the public as to the value of an audit that excluded such tasks
from their jurisdictional domain arose from cultural values with which
audits were aligned. The public refused to accept that despite credible
financial reporting significant fraud could remained undetected and
corporations could fail soon after a "clean" audit report was issued.

22
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Auditors had perhaps little choice in terms of the cultural values
with which to align their work. While the profession benefited greatly
from the Securities Acts, growing rapidly after their passage [McCraw,
1984], it was in another sense limited by these acts. This New Deal
legislation did not fundamentally alter either the securities industry or
public policy with respect to it. Instead, the legislation seemed designed
to restore confidence in the industry and to encourage broad-based stock
ownership. The legislation adhered to the "belief that shareholders are
'owners'" who could participate effectively in corporate governance
through disclosure and proxy provisions [Merino & Neimark, 1982, p.
39]23 Although shareholders were not expected to participate in the dayto-day operations of corporate enterprises, they would receive
information about the uses of funds, earnings, assets and liabilities of
corporations. Required disclosures would provide the light". . . so that
ownership may know what is being don with its property" [Andrews,
1932, p. 354]. Auditors were closely linked to these purposes by the
requirement in these acts for an "independent" check upon the
representations of management and the profession was thereby connected
to the provision of credible financial reporting.
The emphasis upon disclosure and financial reports as a means to
control management seemed to require a third party to verify these
reports.24 This verification may be seen as an additional mechanism to
suggest that measures had been taken to prevent management
appropriation of stockholder property. Auditors were to be the
intermediaries [Miranti, 1990] between the investing public, the claimed
owners of the firm, and possibly avaricious and unscrupulous
management. As a consequence, the administrators of the Securities
Acts were also dependent upon auditors. This dependence perhaps
partially explains why the profession was able to limit its responsibility
throughout much of the period examined. While the value of "credible
financial reporting" might be used to criticize and question the
profession, it also limited the actions of government and closely linked
the State, the SEC and the audit profession.25 No alternatives were posed
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Also see Blough [1939], who referred to shareholders as owners of the
enterprise, and Ripley [1927].
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to replace auditors as monitoring devices for private property. Instead,
the emphasis was placed again and again upon either questioning the
auditors or upon installing particular techniques to suggest their
independence from management. The profession was criticized but never
threatened with replacement or extinction.
So we see the development and installation of new self-regulatory
practices during the 1970s occurring amidst questions about the
responsibility to detect fraud or warn of imminent corporate failures.
Similar questions were raised during the 1980s amidst a myriad of
corporate failures and frauds (perhaps particularly those in the savings
and loan industry).
Auditors were again constructed as failing to
accomplish the work they had defined for themselves and were
confronted with renewed demands to alter their previously self-defined
tasks. Even then, the profession was successful in obtaining payment in
the form of liability reform in exchange for ceding some control over the
definition of its responsibilities. This paper suggests the difficulties of
altering such responsibilities for an entrenched and well-organized
profession even in instances where the definitions it forwards may starkly
contrast with those anticipated or expected by the public.
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Abstract: This study reexamines the accounting profession's
response to opportunities and incentives given it during
three unique periods in its history to foster reliable
accounting, reporting and auditing practices. By profession,
we mean the auditors of publicly held companies as
represented by the American Institute of Accountants and
its predecessor, the American Association of Public
Accountants (AAPA).
We use two models of
professionalism, the Functionalist and the Conflict models,
to interpret the profession's response to these events. We
find that both self interest and the public interest may have
motivated many of the actions taken. These motivations are
not, however, mutually exclusive and both may be used to
interpret the same behavior.
INTRODUCTION
The accounting profession in the United States developed into its
modern form by 1940. The American Institute of Accountants (AIA)
was the national organization of accountants. A code of ethics was in
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place and the AIA had disciplinary authority over its members based on
that code. The AIA's Committee on Accounting Procedure, forerunner
to the Accounting Principles Board and later the Financial Accounting
Standards Board, was responsible for setting accounting standards,
albeit not mandatory at the time. A workable, sometimes uneasy,
relationship existed between the profession and the Securities and
Exchange Commission. The state societies had licensing control over
new CPAs, setting educational and experiential requirements, although
most used the national examination written by the AIA [Miranti, 1990].
Annual audits of publicly traded companies were legally mandatory.
At the beginning of the century, little of this was in place. There was
no national organization of accountants of any size or influence [Previts
and Merino, 1979]. The first state licensing legislation was passed in
New York in 1896. Other states followed but licensing requirements
varied, ranging from substantial experience, educational and examination
requirements to virtually none. The minimal amount of regulation over
accounting and auditing practice may be explained by the relative
simplicity of accounting and a fairly small securities market.
An explosion of mergers and consolidations at the beginning of the
twentieth century accelerated the growth of accountancy. Knowledgeable
and competent accountants were needed to handle these complex
accounting transactions and the status of the fledgling discipline began
to rise [Littleton and Zimmerman, 1962; and Previts and Merino, 1979].
Growing companies and expanding manufacturing industries also needed
accountants to set up financial and cost accounting systems. With the
later passage of tax legislation, accountants carved out a permanent
place for their skills in the tax area.
Until the passage of the Securities Acts, public corporations faced
little independent oversight. Audits were largely voluntary despite
spreading public ownership of stock although companies increasingly
engaged auditors to attest to their annual financial reports [Merino et al,
1994]. A large portion of audit work prior to 1920 was the balance sheet
audit attesting to a company's collateral and liquidity to satisfy bankers
who supplied most corporate financing [Chatfield, 1974]. Companies
sometimes requested auditing services for their own information
[Miranti, 1990]. The auditor's role was therefore strikingly different
from that of today. Francis Pixby, at the 1904 World Congress of
Accountants, said that the auditor's duty was to the company not to
stockholders [Previts and Merino, 1979, p. 180]. In 1933, the accounting
firm Seidman and Seidman wrote that neither audits nor financial reports
were for the benefit of stockholders [Letter, 4/6/33]. Many prominent
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people, including accounting practitioners and academics, criticized
audited financial statements as unreliable for investment decisions
[Smith, 1912; Kohler, 1926 & 1932; Berle, 1926; Hatfield, 1927;
Ripley, 1927; Couchman, 1928; Robbins, 1929; Farr, 1933; Pecora,
1939]. Management could choose from a variety of alternative practices
and valuation methods without disclosure and could count on the support
of their auditors. Changes of method were not reported. Despite
criticism, the business sector was not interested in promoting a stringent
monitoring system over their activities and were indignant at the
suggestion. "Every businessman used his own accounting principles and
fought like hell to sustain them" [Previts and Merino, 1979, p. 219].
The voluntary nature of the audit, the absence of authoritative
accounting rules, and the weakness of auditors worked against the
presentation of financial statements in accordance with accounting
conventions considered to be sound according to textbooks and other
guides of the time [Montgomery, 1926].
So long as the discontinuance of audits or change of auditors
passes without comment from stockholders or creditors, the
auditors are hampered in their efforts to make accounts as
accurate and their certificates as complete and informative as
possible. If auditors take too rigid a stand the directors will
simply publish unaudited accounts or perhaps seek some more
amenable auditors [May, 1915, p. 251]
Twenty years later, Littleton [1935, p. 285-6] believed little had
changed: "(Q)ualified to serve these men may be, but free to serve with
a real independence they are not... When their powers of persuasion are
exhausted, auditors have but little choice except acquiescing or
resigning."
PURPOSE
This study examines the accounting profession's response to
opportunities and incentives given it during three unique periods in its
history to foster reliable accounting, reporting and auditing practices. By
profession, we mean the auditors of publicly held companies as
represented by the AIA and its predecessor, the American Association of
Public Accountants (AAPA). We use original correspondence between
the AIA, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and other published
materials as evidence.
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The profession's responses to these opportunities for change may
have been motivated by self interest rather than by protection of the
public interest as suggested by the rhetoric of the time and by some
modern historians. Wootton and Wolk [1992], for example, offer a
nonproblematic account of the development of the accounting profession
that obscures the profession's battles to preserve its independence and
extend its power.
EVENTS TO BE DISCUSSED
Three extended events in the profession's history provide the focus
for this discussion. The first event is the reaction of the profession to the
demands and regulatory threats posed by bankers, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) and the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) from around
1912 to 1917. The second is the collaboration between the NYSE and
the AIA as they worked to improve reporting practice in the face of
impending regulation in the early 1930s. The third is the response of the
profession to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) from
1934-1939. All three events threatened accountancy's professional
identity. Two models of professionalism are used to interpret the
profession's actions.
APPROACH USED TO ANALYZE THE EVENTS
The functionalist and the conflict models of professionalism
[Kultgen, 1988] help interpret the actions of accounting's emerging
leadership within the AIA. Sociologists have used both models to study
professions [e.g. Durkheim, 1957; Collins, 1979] and Hooks (1992)
applied similar models in her analysis of events occurring more recently
in accounting history.
The functionalist model explains and predicts the behavior or
characteristics of either an individual or a group but it is group activities
that are of particular interest in this research. The primary assumption
of this model is that the profession is devoted to the public interest, to
human welfare. The service offered is important and complex requiring
extensive education, training, experience and a commitment to lifetime
learning. However, mastery of technical skills is not enough. The
professional must develop and exercise judgement because client needs
are highly individual and not amenable to textbook solutions. The
complexity of these efforts means that only a professional can assess the
quality of the work performed by another (Kultgen, 1988, p. 79, 81, 91,
95).
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Professional groups form to ensure quality. They determine what
technical skills are needed, set standards for admission to the profession,
provide opportunities for continual education and monitor the work of
members through peer review and investigations of complaints. They
write codes of conduct that describe the behaviors professionals should
exhibit in their work and toward clients and other professionals. The
desire to preserve quality leads the group to lobby for licensure to
prevent the unqualified from practicing and harming the public (Kultgen,
1988, p. 74, 85).
Society gives the profession a license and a monopoly over practice
because it values the service and believes that this will help the
profession ensure high quality performance. Sustaining high quality is
the duty of a profession that wishes to maintain its license, but it is also
its desire so it willingly engages in self-monitoring activities. The
benefits of monopoly are status and high fees but these are secondary to
the rewards derived from a love of work and a desire to help others. The
professional is judged therefore, not by the fees commanded but by the
quality of the service provided (Kultgen, 1988, p. 84, 85, 95).
The conflict model, which focuses on group behavior, assumes that
self interest is the dominant motivation of a profession whose purpose it
is to monopolize control over practice to secure status, power and
economic gain. It predicts that practitioners will organize and, as a
group, position themselves as a profession to secure the benefits of
monopoly.
Organizing, unrelenting promotion of the value and need of their
services, writing a code of conduct and setting standards for admission
are actions taken to convince those in power that a profession deserving
a license is in place and, once acquired, that it deserves to keep it. Codes
of conduct may be unenforceable and disciplinary mechanisms weak, but
the group can point to them as evidence of their concern with the public
welfare. Prohibitions of contingency fees, competitive bidding and
advertising serve to create a professional appearance but also protect the
elite professionals from losing market share to newcomers, even those
admitted to the professional group. Limiting access to the profession
through examination and other requirements is not motivated by public
welfare but by securing economic gain [Kultgen, 1988, p. 122, 123,
130].
Relationships with third parties are important. "The status of the
individual professional and the entire profession is tied to the status of
those served" [Kultgen, 1988, p. 128]. The social standing acquired from
proximity
to corporate
management or other influential groups, as well
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as the fees generated, limit the willingness of the profession to jeopardize
those relationships by imposing too restrictive standards of practice upon
them.
In conclusion, the key to both models is motivation. It is possible for
an action to be in the public interest while at the same time be an element
in the profession's negotiation for market power. Since motivation is
unobservable, and the models predict behaviors that are not mutually
exclusive, they may be used as alternative explanations for the same
events.
THE EVENTS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF THEM
Event 1: Bankers and Federal Agencies Demand Change
Bankers in the second decade of this century asked for improvements
in auditing and accounting. They accused small businesses in particular
of issuing misleading and unreliable financial statements out of either
ignorance or deceit without resistance from their auditors [Smith, 1912;
AIA Special Committee Reports, 1912-1914]. Bankers wanted certain
auditing procedures to be consistently and universally applied [AAPA,
Yearbook-1913:159ff] and offered to support the AAPA in its attempts
to standardize practice. Colley [1914] and Peple [1916], representatives
of the banking community, strongly supported the audit of financial
statements and expected auditors to examine carefully accounts
receivable and inventories not only for their numerical accuracy but for
their value.
Edward Hurley, chairman of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC),
supported these views. Hurley called for auditing instructions: "Which
would serve as a guide to accountants, bankers, credit men and the
business public...that...would at least show clearly the level below which
the accountant could not go and certify the alleged verity of the
accounts" [Editorial, 1929, p. 357]. He [1916] also recommended to the
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) that a federal audit
bureau check the credentials and reliability of audit practitioners who
wished to practice before the FRB and name those approved, zone
experts.
Hurley also favored uniform accounting, believing that it would
make financial statements easier to understand and comparable within an
industry. Uniform accounting meant an industry-wide chart of accounts,
a standard definition of what was to enter into those accounts and
uniform cost accounting standards. Many anticipated that cost
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accounting standards would end cutthroat competition believing that
businesses recklessly and ruinously cut prices because they did not know
their costs [Jordan and Harris, 1921; Dohr et al., 1935].
Cost accounting standards did not disturb financial accountants but
Hurley went further, he wanted to set rules for asset and liability
valuations. This appalled accountants who believed that such standards
would grossly misrepresent companies operating in different economic
environments. They worried that standardization would degrade the
profession to mere bookkeeping [Previts and Merino, 1979].
The 1915 -1917 Minutes of the AAPA and the AIA show that the
leadership resolved to deflect this potential regulation. To do so, they had
to demonstrate control over the level of competence of their own
practitioners. The AIA was formed (and the AAPA dissolved) in 1916
as a national organization of accountants. Practitioners could gain
admission and certification by passing a qualifying examination and
acquiring experience. The Institute elected a board of examiners,
published "Rules of Professional Conduct," and established a committee
on professional ethics to exercise disciplinary powers over the
membership.1
To meet the challenges to audit practice, the AIA gave the Federal
Reserve Board a document called Uniform Accounting which the Board
later published in the Federal Reserve Bulletin of 1917.2 While its title
and preface suggested that it standardized accounting methods, it did
not.3 The FRB reissued the document in 1918 under the title Approved
Methods for Preparation of Balance-Sheet Statements deleting all
references to uniform accounting. As a result of these actions, Hurley
dropped the idea of federal registration of accountants [Carey, 1969].

1

It is probably an exaggeration to assume that the FTC and FRB dropped
these proposals solely because of the efforts of the profession. The Wilson
presidential campaign and the entry of the U.S. into World War I necessarily
deflected the interests of the administration.
2

It was an adaptation of a Price Waterhouse internal control memorandum
that dealt with auditing procedures for small and medium-sized firms
[DeMond, 1951].
3

Both Chatov [1975] and Carey [1969] believe that the AIA took
advantage of Hurley's confusion over the difference between uniform
accounting
and1997
uniform auditing.
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Wootton and Wolk [1992, p. 6] claim that this document "hastened
the establishment of minimum auditing standards by many accounting
firms." In fact, Approved Methods reduced them [Merino et al. 1994].
It gave management an authoritative source with which to avoid
procedures that many thought were vital [Carey, 1969; Chatov, 1975;
Previts and Merino, 1979]. The auditor was to rely upon client assertions
for most asset-related information including inventories - despite bankers'
requests [Smith, 1912; Colley, 1914; Peple, 1916]. Approved Methods
[10] told auditors to confirm accounts receivable "if time permits and
clients do not object." Internal control evaluations were made optional
and large companies were largely exempt because good controls were
presumed to exist. Deference to management was made official.
Approved Methods recommended a short, standard audit certificate
despite banking community complaints that the short form audit report
conveyed little or no information about scope limitations or other
deficiencies of the audit process.4 The AIA maintained that a short form
report was less confusing than the longer, unstandardized report that
smaller audit firms preferred which often contained the audit procedures
followed and actions taken. The AIA claimed that the excessive verbiage
in these reports had at times concealed the absence of major auditing
procedures.
Functionalist Theory Interpretation of Event 1
Until this time, accountancy only loosely met the definition of a
profession. Under criticism by creditors and facing possible regulation
by Federal agencies, AIA welcomed these incentives to professionalize
practice as predicted by the functionalist model. It was unthinkable that
a government agency, ignorant of accounting, might determine who was
qualified. It should be noted that these were only first steps. The AIA
was weak. Although the leadership of the AIA was composed of partners
from the largest accounting firms, it did not represent the majority of
practicing accountants and, in fact, many resented the organization for
its elitism [Previts and Merino, 1979; Miranti, 1990].

The recommended report read as follows: "I have audited the accounts
of Blank and Co. for the period from
to
and I certify that the above
balance sheet and statement of profit and loss have been made in accordance
with the plan suggested and advised by the Federal Reserve Board and in my
opinion set forth the financial condition of the firm at
and the results of
its operations for the period" [Uniform Accounting, 24].
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Accounting knowledge had arrived at a level of complexity that
called for education and experience. In view of the complaints of
incompetency and collusion voiced by the banking community, and the
wide variations in certification requirements of the state bodies, the
AIA's board of examiners recommended that candidates for certification
complete a 'preliminary education' (a controversial requirement left
undefined), five years of experience (with exceptions) and an
examination. Certification would give the public assurance that these
practitioners possessed a level of competency upon which they could
rely, an assurance unavailable in some states where certification
standards were low. These controls may be construed as the first
attempts of the profession on a national basis to contract with the state
(represented by the FTC and FRB). In the long term, only licensure
would ensure that the profession could control the quality of the services
offered.
The AIA did not attempt to set accounting standards or to limit
management choices. The leadership placed a high premium on expert
judgement and expected the professional to oppose management only
rarely, using powers of persuasion. Since audits were voluntary, there
were few other options. There was no process in place where
practitioners might debate accounting practices and find consensus.
Given the AIA's lack of influence over a wide range of practitioners,
limitations on management choice would have to wait until power was
consolidated. Until then, the AIA could only begin to control the
qualifications of its own members, build their reputations and increase
the confidence of the public. As for auditing practice, the AIA again
relied heavily on professionalism. Approved Methods offered guidelines
but retained professional judgement as the preserve of the auditor who
alone could act in the interest of outside users.
Conflict Theory Interpretation of Event I
Many of the actions taken by the AIA may have been motivated by
self interest, as attempts to gain market control and limit audit practice.
The examination was controlled by an elite group and could restrict the
number of those admitted and the type of person admitted. Indeed, there
were many complaints [Previts and Merino, 1979; Miranti, 1990]. A
national organization could dislodge competitors and avoid competition.
By successfully negotiating with federal agencies, the profession not only
avoided regulation but gained status. Though not a true license, the
perception of AIA members as purveyors of higher quality service,
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would disadvantage those practicing outside of the purview of the
national organization.
The code of ethics prohibited advertising and competitive bidding.
While leading practitioners advanced compelling arguments in support
of the bans [Editorial, 1914 & 1915], smaller firms viewed them as
deliberate constraints on the expansion of their practices [Letter to the
Editor, 1914; Shorrock, 1914]. The code, while a symbol of professional
practice, functioned to preserve the market power of the elite firm.
Advocacy of a standardized short form report also worked to the
detriment of the small firm. Those desiring membership in the AIA were
barred from differentiating their services in a positive way. Byington and
Sutton [1991] said that buyers rely on brand names as a surrogate for
quality and recent research shows that a differentiation of quality is
perceived by buyers of auditing services between the Big 6 and non Big
6 firms. Indeed, banker J. Cannon wrote " . . . we strongly advocate and
prefer to buy the paper of those concerns whose accounts are audited by
established firms of accountants" [Colley, 1914, p. 425]. The AIA
effectively cut off most of the avenues available to the small firm to
attract audit clients.
Claims of specialized knowledge and expertise may mask a self
interest motivation. The profession cultivated the perception that they
possessed information difficult to acquire and reliably exercised and
monitored only by themselves. Educational requirements, examination
and an esoteric vocabulary perpetuated this notion. The idea that these
practices might be standardized was understandably anathema. If
accounting could be standardized then it was a technical discipline which
could be performed by anyone, threatening the emerging profession.
With the support of bankers and the federal agencies, the
accountancy profession might have made progress in setting accounting
and auditing standards. But the leadership resisted, arguing that uniform
accounting practices would mislead and that uniform auditing practices
would reduce audit practice to the lowest common denominator. Only the
experienced professional could understand the audit requirements of a
unique accounting system and pass on the appropriateness of the
accounting choices made [AAPA Yearbook, 1916]. If these functions
could be exercised by rote, then accountancy was not a profession.
Deference to corporate management maintained the profession's
relationship with those with whom there were social and financial
linkages. Claims that egregious practices would be dealt with in a period
when there were no authoritative standards can hardly be taken seriously.
Approved methods provided protection against liability by giving
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auditors a defense against non-performance of tasks and for reliance on
management.
Event 2: Collaboration of the ALA and the NYSE from 1931-1933
Although George O. May, representing the AIA, had established an
advisory relationship with the NYSE in 1927 (May, 1962), it was not
until it was clear that the depression was unlikely to abate and that the
public anger directed towards business was rising [Krooss, 1970] that
the Exchange awoke to the value of instituting change. Some form of
federal regulation over corporate reporting practices appeared imminent
[Kohler, 1934]. Hoxsey [1931, p. 2ff], executive assistant of the
Committee on Stock List of the NYSE, wrote to the AIA and warned
that "some form of regulation is inevitable. . . if we act now. . . we may
retard unwarranted intrusions."
The extant correspondence reveals that neither organization was
anxious to take the lead. Hoxsey [1931] asked the AIA's Special
Committee on Cooperation with Stock Exchanges5 to assume
responsibility for the suitability of management-selected accounting
principles and for a definition of full and fair disclosure. The AIA
responded that "the primary responsibility for selection of principles and
scope of disclosure must remain that of directors and officers of the
corporation" [AIA, 1931].
With income statement data becoming more and more important to
stockholders, Hoxsey asked auditors to insist that stockholders be
advised as to the sources of income, separately disclosing extraordinary
items, and to discourage management from using reserves to smooth
income. The AIA Committee replied that auditors lacked the power to
mandate such disclosures [Letter, 5/19/31].
The AIA Committee in turn [Letter, 9/22/32] asked the Exchange to
educate the public about the limitations of financial statements,
particularly their historical nature, to require that accounting methods be
disclosed and be consistently applied and that extraordinary items and
subsidiary income be segregated from ordinary income. They
recommended an annual audit and that every company adhere to five
broad principles of accounting which they believed were generally

5

The member of the committee included Archibald Bowman, Arthur
Carter, Charles Couchman, Samuel Leidesdorf, William Lybrand, and George
May—all representatives of major accounting firms.
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accepted (see Appendix). The Exchange accepted all of the Committee's
recommendations but one, disclosure of accounting methods. Whitney,
the president of the NYSE, wrote to the presidents of all listed companies
that financial statements issued in connection with listing applications
made after July 1, 1933 had to be audited. He added that, to serve as
useful safeguards for investors, "audits should be adequate in scope and
that the responsibility assumed by the auditor should be defined" [Letter,
1/31/33]. He asked all companies to secure from their auditors a letter
addressing most of the points made by the AIA's Committee:
1)

was the audit as extensive as that outlined by the
publication Verification of Financial Statements (VFS) (the
1929 revision of Approved Methods),

2)

had all subsidiaries been audited or their relative
importance to the parent company explained,

3)

had the auditors received all information requested,

4)

were the financial statements fairly presented,

5)

were accounting methods consistently applied and,

6)

did the methods used conform to accepted accounting
practices? (see Appendix.)

Nine major accountingfirmsjointly responded to the announcement.
Although supportive of the specific points outlined above, they wanted
to clarify the some of the limits of the audit engagement. They reiterated
[Letter, 2/24/33] that the guidelines outlined by VFS were not intended
to uncover fraud and that to do so would require an audit so expensive
as to outweigh any advantages. To avoid fraud, management was
responsible for establishing and maintaining an adequate system of
internal control. They reminded the Exchange that the auditor
traditionally focused on the balance sheet and would continue to do so,
guarding against overstatements of income not by extensive testing of
income accounts but by assuring the correctness of beginning and ending
balance sheets accounts. They reemphasized the importance of
consistency rather than uniformity of method. The audit report stated
that management's representations were reasonable, not all inclusive nor
necessarily optimal, in the auditor's view. The auditor could not replace
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol24/iss2/11
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his judgement for that of management and could only qualify the report
if the choices were very unsound.
Hoxsey was not satisfied by these circumscriptions of responsibility.
He insisted that auditors "should satisfy themselves that the system of
internal check provides adequate safeguards" and "accept the burden of
seeing that the income received and the expenditures made are properly
classified in so far as the facts are known to them" [Letter, 10/24/33]. He
also asked the AIA to develop a clearer and more informative auditor's
report.
The AIA found Hoxsey's income statement requests reasonable but
were careful in their response to the question of internal control [Letter,
12/21/33]. "It is always a matter of executive judgment to weigh the
risks against which safeguards are desirable against the cost of providing
safeguards." Claiming that accountants evaluated internal control as a
integral part of the audit, they cited VFS. "The scope of the work
indicated in these instructions includes. . . an examination of the
accounting system for the purpose of ascertaining the effectiveness of the
internal check." It is noteworthy that the adverb "incidentally" which
appears in VFS in place of the three dots is omitted in the letter to the
Exchange. The use of the word "incidentally" weakened the guidelines.
It suggested that checking controls was likely to happen during the
examination, but not that it must happen.
The liability that might rise out of the wording of the audit report
worried accounting firms. May sent a draft of a revised report to the
major firms for comment and received responses from Leidesdorf, from
Barrow, Wade and Guthrie, Haskins and Sells, and Peat, Marwick,
Mitchell. Leidesdorf [Letter, 11/17/33] wrote that the statement
"supplied with all the explanations and information which are necessary"
be replaced by "based on our examination and information furnished to
us." He warned that the former did not recognize the possibility that
management might have withheld information leaving all responsibility
with the auditor. Carter of Haskins and Sells [Letter, 11/24/33] wrote
that the report should clearly state the relationship between the auditor
and the client.
I refer particularly to the theory of relationship which holds the
client to be the author of the financial statements and regards
the accountant as the reviewer of such statements.. This position,
in addition to having possible legal value, is, as we have learned
. . . , an invaluable one when controversies arise with clients as
disclosures
Publishedtobythe
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The format of the standard unqualified audit report was finally approved
at the beginning of 1934 after considerable debate.
Functionalist Theory Interpretation of Event 2
Affiliation with the NYSE gave the leadership a rich opportunity to
serve the public. With the support of the NYSE, they could resolve some
of the major issues of accounting practice and presentation and begin a
process of expanding public knowledge. The leaders of the AIA knew
that some investors misunderstood the nature of the financial statements
and the audit report, assuming that the current valuations comprised the
balance sheet and the report testified to an enterprise's future success.
Understanding their historical nature was an important component in
becoming an informed investor. However, the profession needed the
Exchange's help in publicizing this perhaps because of a lack of funds or
a lack of access to the public. Whether the Exchange actually embarked
on a program of educating the public is unknown.
The profession's unwillingness to expand its responsibility for
accessing internal control and the detection of fraud was not unrealistic,
reflecting its knowledge that both were controlled by management. To
ensure either exceeded their ability. It would not be in the public's
interest to suggest otherwise. The AIA strongly preferred disclosure and
consistency of accounting method over uniformity for two reasons. They
believed that firms were unique and that corporate management could
best determine which methods most clearly reflected performance and
condition. Disclosure of methods should provide sufficient information
for the informed user. They also argued that, taken over time, differences
between accounting methods were unimportant if those methods were
consistently applied. Although the AIA only convinced the Exchange to
require a statement of consistency, at least they minimized a common
method of manipulating financial statements. The Exchange also
supported the AIA's opinion on significant issues, such as limiting the
practice of smoothing income by using surplus accounts to bypass the
income statement (see Appendix). In this way, the profession could
protect the investing public from significant and common
misrepresentations.
Conflict Theory Interpretation of Event 2
Collaboration with the NYSE benefitted the AIA considerably. First,
the formal association with the Exchange was prestigious. Second, the
NYSE's annual audit requirement granted a contract to accountants
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ensuring future income. Although the Exchange did not limit audits to
AIA members, it is likely that its relationship with the AIA bolstered
member firm's relative power in the accounting market, at least among
listed corporations. Third, recognizing VFS as the auditing standard
distinguished the AIA as the authoring institution. Fourth, despite the
rising profile of the AIA and auditing services, there was no increase in
auditor responsibilities beyond those supported by the NYSE and
therefore, no substantive change in the auditor-client relationship.
The public collaboration with the NYSE created a perception that
the profession was working to improve the financial reporting function.
However, little changed. The accounting principles agreed to were few,
and although 'few' in and of itself is not negative adjective, many of the
most controversial issues of the period including the treatment of
depreciation, bond discount and no par stock remained unsettled and no
mechanism for resolving these issues was put in place. Audits, though
required, still left major tasks optional and corporate management
retained the prerogative of preferability choices without disclosure. The
profession had raised its profile, potentially increased the market share
of major member firms, and appeared to be working in the public interest
while minimizing any expansion of its own responsibility.
Event 3: The SEC and the AIA 1934-1939
The years 1934-1939 were critical ones. It was possible that the
traditional practice of accountancy would not survive and the profession
had to work to maintain its identity. The Securities and Exchange
Commission, created in 1934, had absolute authority over accounting
matters. It could determine who could practice before it. It could set
accounting standards and could require auditors to take responsibility for
the choice of accounting methods.
SEC members, inexperienced but determined to put the Act into
operation, decided that the best approach was to work with existing
professional bodies. They solicited the profession's help in designing the
forms needed to satisfy the Act's regulations, in appointing suitable
commissioners, and encouraged them to set accounting standards. The
AIA was slow to act on the latter. Consequently, the SEC frequently and
publicly criticized the profession for the accounting treatments found in
submissions [Landis, 1936; Blough, 1937a]. Members [Landis, 1936;
Blough, 1937c; Mathews, 1937; Healy, 1938] threatened that the SEC
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might have to standardize accounting.6 They displayed irritation at the
profession's inability to monitor management, its unwillingness to take
responsibility for accounting presentations, and its repeated issuance of
uninformative or misleading audit reports. They complained that the
often-cited generally accepted accounting principles did not exist and
questioned the qualifications of some appearing before them [Blough,
1937a, 1937b, 1938; Werntz, 1939]. The SEC began issuing Accounting
Series Releases (ASR) in 1937, setting accounting rules for registrants.
The AIA fought these encroachments. It supported corporate
assertions that disclosure of sales, cost of sales, gross profit, and salaries
would give too much information to competitors. The AIA's Committee
on Cooperation with the SEC reproached the SEC for not accepting
these claims. Chairman Wellington argued that this information "might
be damaging to the company and therefore of injury to the stockholders"
[AIA Minutes, 1936, p. 53].
Despite its threats of standardization [Landis, 1936; Healy, 1938],
the agency eventually settled for consistency and disclosure of method
[Merino and Coe, 1978]. Curiously, the SEC did not mandate that a
statement of accounting policies appear in the annual reports to
shareholders. Although such a statement was required in the 10K, the
latter was not usually mailed to shareholders. Enforcing fair disclosure
of accounting methods therefore made no sense [Kaplan and Reaugh,
1939].
The SEC's ASRs #1-3 were not new accounting standards but rather
formalizations of the accounting rules written earlier by the AIA in
agreement with the NYSE (Coffey, 1976). In 1938, they issued ASR #4.
This stated that financial statements filed with them would be deemed
misleading if they lacked substantial authoritative support and left the
determination of authoritative support to the accounting profession. The
SEC adopted the role of endorser and enforcer of the AIA rules (Coffee,
1976, p. 220).
Regarding audit practice, the AIA issued Examination of Financial
Statements [1936]. It did not expand audit procedures over internal

6

"The impact of almost daily tilts with accountants, some of them called
leaders of their profession, often leaves little doubt that their loyalties to
management are stronger than their sense of responsibility to the investor.
Such an experience does not lead readily to acquiescence in the pleas recently
made by one of the leaders of the accounting profession that the form of
statement can be less rigidly controlled and left more largely to professional
responsibility
alone" (Landis, 1939).
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control, inventories or accounts receivable. Samuel Broad, Chairman of
the AIA Committee charged with revising VFS, said that VFS had been
criticized as "too mandatory in its presentation" a defect eliminated in
this document which emphasizedflexibilityand judgement [Broad, 1936,
p. 58-9]. The document reasserted the profession's position that
disclosure was a management prerogative and that the auditors would
only rarely issue qualified reports. The audit procedures, the extent of
disclosures and the accounting principles and practices set out in this
document were "only those which we believed were pretty generally
agreed to. . .we did not try to break new ground" [Broad, 1936, p. 5960].
The AIA remained committed to the short-form standard audit report
[Letter, 1935; Couchman, 1939]. The AIA Committee on Cooperation
with the SEC debated the wording extensively [AIA Minutes 1939, p.
166,170,172]. The Committee wanted a format acceptable to the SEC
which limited auditor responsibility. The Committee on Auditing
Procedure made only a few cautiously worded changes to the audit
report approved in 1939 (Kohler, 1941). The report minimized liability
more than it provided information to investors.
Why (did SEC abdicate its power? Some historians insist it did not.
McCraw [1982] is persuaded that the SEC was entirely successful in
negotiating substantive change on behalf of stockholders with both the
accounting profession and the NYSE. Coffee (1976) is slightly less
sanguine but overall remains confident that the results of the SEC and
AIA collaboration were successful. Others, more informed about
accounting, insist all changes were merely symbolic [Merino and
Neimark, 1987; Chatov, 1975].
One reason is that the AIA strengthened itself. Attacked by the
American Association of University Instructors in Accounting (AAUIA)
[see Kohler's scathing 1934 editorial] which, with the blessing of SEC
commissioner Robert Healy [1938], might have preempted the AIA in
setting accounting standards, the AIA decided to reassert its leadership
in this area. In 1936 the AIA completed a difficult merger with the rival
American. Society of Certified Public Accountants (AS CPA), a national
accounting body of about the same size thereby deflecting a potential
alliance between that group and the academics of the AAUIA. Now
larger, representing about a third of accountants nationwide, and with a
claim to expanded self-monitoring, the new AIA could act from strength.
They formed the Committee on Accounting Procedure in 1938 to study
and write accounting standards [Previts and Merino, 1979; Miranti,
1990]. Thus, the AIA acted in accordance with the agency's wishes.
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Another reason may have been that the political tide was shifting to
the right. Business found that it was again gaining power. The economy
appeared to be improving, if slowly, and the Supreme Court had declared
major New Deal legislation unconstitutional. All of business wanted to
avoid further government regulation. In this atmosphere, it may have
been expedient for the SEC to back off.
The ALA now represented a broader constituency and established a
standard-setting body. The SEC retained their declamatory speeches
keeping their real power as a constant threat. They continued to issue
stop orders if particularly egregious accounting presentations were filed
but, as of 1938, they left accounting matters to the accountants.
Functionalist Theory Interpretation of Event 3
The functionalist model predicts that professionals will actively
protect the public interest but does not require the existence of a formal
professional organization. The AIA, up until this point, trusted in the
professionalism of individual practitioners, attempting only to ensure that
they had been effectively educated and were experienced. Circumstances
forced the AIA to move the profession to another level. The SEC could
legally appropriate control over audit practice and accounting matters,
a possibility which threatened placing nonexperts in the position of
judging a complex discipline. To protect the public, it became necessary
for the AIA to convince the SEC that it was best to keep auditing and
accounting in the hands of professionals. To do so, it was imperative that
they be able to influence and monitor practitioners since the status quo
projected disunity and carried the stigma of competition. Unlike other
businesses, competition in a profession is viewed negatively, suggesting
that profits are more important than public interest. The merger with the
ASCAP doubled the AIA's membership and probably included most of
those who audited public companies. This gave the AIA the ability to
monitor those likely to appear before the SEC.
The profession believed that unique environments call for varied
accounting methods and that standardization across dissimilar industries
would be misleading at best. Consequently, the leadership first fought the
SEC's threats of regulation by arguing convincingly for consistency and
disclosure of methods, which the SEC soon required, as opposed to
uniformity.
The Securities Acts did not give power to the profession, but did
confer on it responsibility and substantial liability. If the profession were
to act in the public interest, it needed power. This it received, when the
SEC delegated that authority in ASR #4. With few exceptions, the
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol24/iss2/11
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agency has supported the AIA and the decisions of its successor bodies.
With this in hand, accountancy's governing bodies could seek consensus
on matters of general interest and this they tried to do by establishing the
Committee on Accounting Procedure. Though in hindsight this
Committee may not have been wholly effective (Previts and Merino,
1979, 269), its formation and purpose was in the public interest.
Conflict Theory Interpretation
The conflict model is also informative. The 1934 Securities Act
handed accountancy a market.7 The AIA wanted to monopolize it and it
did so by professionalizing its image. The merger strengthened the AIA's
negotiating position with the SEC. It now had influence over and
appeared able to monitor a substantial constituency. Although often
openly criticized by members of the SEC, the AIA turned some of the
criticisms to their advantage. They requested, and the SEC agreed
[Report, 1937], that questionable accounting questions and misleading
audit certificates be forwarded to them for comment and resolution. This
gave the AIA additional authority, bringing unsatisfactory reports of
both member and non-member audit firms under their jurisdiction.
The formation of the Committee on Accounting Procedure was a
unifying one. It included AIA members, ex-SEC commissioner Carmen
Blough, and members of the AAUIA who had frequently criticized the
AIA. The AIA thus eliminated by incorporation, its challengers to
accounting setting while creating a body too large to come to consensus
on controversial issues thus retaining many alternative practices (i.e
treatment of bond discount and of gains or losses on retirement of bonds)
and maintaining management freedom. They avoided proactive, positive
improvements in audit practice. Improvements were to come subsequent
to the embarrassment of McKesson-Robbins. No significant changes
appeared in the auditor's certificate. The AIA therefore negotiated a
successful relationship with the SEC, an agency that posed a definite
threat and in doing so increased its prestige and consolidated its power
without altering accounting, the audit function or the relationship of
auditors with corporate management.

7

It is possible that the audit requirement was added as a result of back

room lobbying [Miranti 1990].
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Postscript: McKesson Robbins Expands Audit Procedures
Until the McKesson Robbins fraud came to light in 1939, auditing
guidelines were ambiguous regarding receivables, inventories and
internal controls. Even sophisticated users were unaware that auditors
did not physically inspect inventories. Hoxsey, the Secretary of the
NYSE, was furious to learn that the auditors had used the "testing"
phrase to limit the scope of audit with respect to receivables and
inventories [Correspondence, 1939].
. . . it simply did not occur to me to doubt that inventories and
receivables were spot-checked to a sufficient degree to make the
auditors feel warranted in giving the financial statements
approval...I did not know that the statement 'but we did not
make a detailed audit of the transactions' covered such omission
[Correspondence, 2/22/39].
The McKesson Robbins case resulted in increasing auditor
responsibilities significantly. For the first time, a professional
pronouncement, "Extension of Audit Procedures" (adopted by the AIA
council on May 9, 1939) instructed auditors to go beyond the books
requiring inventory verification, accounts receivable confirmation and an
assessment of internal control.
CONCLUSIONS
Historical evidence can be interpreted in a variety of ways.
Motivation is not observable and formal statements may not be taken at
face value. Certainly an interpretation that assumes that all change is
evolutionary and that evolutionary change is progress towards the good
must be challenged. So it is with the development of the accounting
profession. One may interpret the adoption of a code of ethics, the
establishment of educational standards, the creation of a national
organization with power of self regulation as actions taken to promote
the public interest. At the same time, these actions do control the
profession, limit entry to it and secure high economic rents from so
doing.
There is no doubt that accounting and auditing are learned skills that
require the exercise of judgement. But the profession rarely articulated
what audit services were meant to accomplish stressing instead what
could not be done and repeating, rather unsatisfactorily, that audit
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol24/iss2/11
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judgements were nothing more than opinions. The AIA was not proactive
in setting audit standards for critical areas, resisted setting accounting
standards, declined to clarify the responsibility of the audit firm and
deferred to the desires of corporate management. Whether these choices
were made because the profession sincerely believed that the auditor's
professional judgement must always predominate over standards and
regulations to ensure reliable reports or whether they were chosen in
order to sustain the status quo in regards to relationships with corporate
management is a matter of interpretation.
Accountancy today is without doubt a profession, carrying with it
all the characteristics that one might choose to define a profession. It is
also true that accountancy faces similar criticisms to those it received in
the past. What is the auditor's responsibility? Has the auditor failed if a
firm collapses and he or she issued an unqualified report just before the
collapse? Are the battles to deflect liability attempts to avoid
responsibility or efforts to restore justice in an unjust system? Should the
accountant 'blow the whistle' or are quitting or issuing a qualified report
still the only options available? There is still some doubt about the
identity of the client. The responses to these questions made by the
profession, as similar responses were made in the past, will likely be
claimed by the profession as in the public interest and by critics as in the
interest of the profession itself. The truth, whatever it may be, is likely
to lie somewhere in between.
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APPENDIX
Statement of Certain Accounting Principles Recommended by
Committee of American Institute of Accountants on Cooperation With
Stock Exchanges
1. Unrealized profit should not be credited to income account of the
corporation either directly or indirectly, through the medium of charging
against such unrealized profits amounts which would ordinarily fall to
be charged against income account. Profit is deemed to be realized when
a sale in the ordinary course of business is effected, unless the
circumstances are such that the collection of the sale price is not
reasonably assured. An exception to the general rule may be made in
respect of inventories in industries (such as the packing house industry)
in which owing to the impossibility of determining costs it is a trade
custom to take inventories at net selling prices which may exceed cost.
2. Capital surplus, however created, should not be used to relieve the
income account of the current or future years of charges which would
otherwise fall to be made there-against. This rule might be subject to the
exception that where, upon reorganization, a reorganized company would
be relieved of charges which would require to be made against income
if the existing corporation were continued, it might be regarded as
permissible to accomplish the same result without reorganization
provided the facts were as fully revealed to and the action as formally
approved by the shareholders as in reorganization.
3. Earned surplus of a subsidiary company created prior to
acquisition does not form a part of the consolidated earned surplus of the
parent company and subsidiaries; nor can any dividend declared out of
such surplus properly be credited to the income account of the parent
company.
4. While it is perhaps in some circumstances permissible to show
stock of a corporation held in its own treasury as an asset if adequately
disclosed, the dividends on stock so held should not be treated as a credit
to the income account of the company.
5. Notes or accounts receivable due from officers, employees, or
affiliated companies must be shown separately and not included under
a general heading such as Notes Receivable or Accounts Receivable.
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In recent years accounting historiography has been enriched by a
considerable volume of debate surrounding the chronology and evolution
of accounting theory and practice. By virtue of their attempts to explain
the processes of change, accounting historians have become identified
with a paradigm or world view that constitutes the theoretical context
within which their research findings are couched. Scholars have either
self-avowed their paradigmatic affiliations or have had their work so
classified in the writings of others. Fleischman et al. [1996a], for
example, trichotomized the field of industrial revolution cost accounting
into three "schools"—the Neoclassical (economic rationalist), the
Foucauldian, and the Marxist (labor process). A dichotomized schemata
might be employed to distinguish "critical" and "traditional" historians.
Critical historians tend to question the objectivity of much primary
source material, particularly accounting documents, which can serve the
self-interest of those in positions of power. Traditionalists have more
faith that surviving business records provide a less partisan
approximation
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of some sort of objective reality. A distinction can likewise be made
between the "new accounting history" and older approaches, typically
with a narrower focus. The new genre casts a wider net, deploying a
variety of contexts to coexist with those economic aspects traditionally
privileged in much accounting historiography. Many new accounting
historians attempt to amplify the voices of suppressed groups (women,
the poor, the illiterate) which have not been heard in mainstream
literature.
The current authors believe that recent historiography, be it
labeled "critical," "new accounting history," or "postmodernist," has
greatly enriched traditional, mainstream, archive-based offerings and has
significantly increased our knowledge of the past. On most occasions
historical reinterpretation has been achieved in a positive fashion.
However, when the way forward threatens to marginalize archival
research, disenfranchise various categories of scholars on nonideological grounds, or to restrict methodologies and theoretical
approaches, the current authors, as contemporary descendants of the
Neoclassical tradition, feel the need to urge restraint.
Our discomfiture with the current environment in accounting
history scholarship is discussed in three sections that follow. First, we
address the question raised by Miller and Napier [1993] that historians
must attempt to eliminate from their narratives references to practices
and terminology that exist only in the present. Second, we consider the
place of archival researchers in an historiographic environment
characterized increasingly by attention to paradigmatic frameworks.
Finally, we conclude by identifying the various groups of historians
seemingly marginalized in some critical scholarship. We are particularly
concerned with the status of archival researchers, potentially an
endangered species.
THE PRESENT IN HISTORY
Miller and Napier's article, "Genealogies of Calculation" [1993],
has become the catalyst for debate between traditional and critical
historians, e.g., Keenan [1996] and Scorgie [1996]. The article has also
proven to be a positive contribution from the perspective of engendering
fundamental rethinkings about historical methodology. The authors
featured four case study genealogies to articulate a comprehensive
theoretical approach for describing and evaluating the past.
The discourse in this article reflected Foucauldian rhetoric
throughout although the authors assiduously avoided labeling the
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approach as such in the narrative or including Foucault's works in the
references list. This ancestry was evident in their stress on the
discontinuities of history; their viewing of historical epochs in terms of
"ensembles of practices and rationales;" and their attention to the
symbolic aspects of institutions, "the language and vocabulary in which
a particular practice is articulated" [Miller and Napier, 1993, p. 633; for
similar Foucauldian phraseology, see particularly Foucault, 1980, pp.
146, 162; Gane, 1986, p. 24]. In "Genealogies of Calculation," Miller
and Napier not only advanced a Foucauldian approach for viewing
history, but critiqued certain underpinnings of more traditional
accounting history. In general, they suggested that conventional
accounting historians are so overly absorbed in centemporary practices
and procedures that their interpretations of past events suffer
anachronistic tendencies. In a section entitled "bookkeeping practice and
decisionmaking" [pp. 636-638], Yamey [1949, 1964] was taken to task
for linking early bookkeeping practices to business decision making,
when in reality "the notion of decision making, a concept which, despite
its seeming self-evidence, was only recently invented, is used to make
past events and practices intelligible, without acknowledgement of its
recent emergence and historically localized applicability" [p. 638].1 In
the succeeding section on "early management accounting," Edwards
[1989], Edwards et al. [1990], Edwards and Boyns [1992], and
Fleischman and Parker [1990, 1991] were similarly criticized for
introducing a present-day vocabulary into their evaluations of British
Industrial Revolution cost accounting methods [pp. 638-640]. Miller
and Napier [p. 639] charged specifically that "within the traditional
evolutionary model, the now is always present, if only in utero, in the
then." This provocative observation requires response, both to what was
said specifically and to what might be inferred. The current authors do
not dispute Miller and Napier's questioning the Whig interpretation of
history, the idea held by some historians that the past marches inexorably
into the present with a step that is evolutionary and progressive. In our
view the past conveys neither lessons nor predictions for the present.
However, the tenor of the "in utero" phrase does suggest the possibility,
nay the positive desirability, that the present can be extirpated from
historical narratives as though the historian wields a surgeon's knife. Is
it realistic to imagine that historians can so envelop themselves in the

1

It was perplexing to one reviewer of this paper that "decision making [could
be] a new invention." Apparently the phrase "decision making" as used to
describebya eGrove,
technique
of management is of modern vintage.
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past that references to contemporary conventions, idiom, and prejudices
can indeed be eliminated? If so, would not historical writing lose some
of its relevance in the process?
Noted scholars have argued that past and present events are
inexorably linked. Bloch [1953, p. 27] defined historical time as "a
concrete and living reality with an irreversible onward rush." He warned
of a "modernist climate" wherein the past is construed as unconnected to
the present [ibid., p. 36]. Muller [1952, p. 33] argued that "the past has
no meaningful existence except as it exists for us, as it is given meaning
by us." Nevins [1962, p. 18] expanded the horizon of these past/present
linkages to include the future when he observed that history "is more
than a guide for men in their daily round; it is a creator of their future."
Finally, Commanger [1965] included on a list of the uses of history how
expanded perspectives and an enlarged variety of experiences provide
valuable aid in coping with the problems and concerns of the present.
The insights of these distinguished historians have been replicated
in the work of accounting historians as well. Previts and Bricker [1994]
and Carnegie [1994] have both written about the way in which historical
research in accounting can provide a
greater understanding of contemporary practice and institutions [see also
Previts et al., 1990a]. Confirmation of these synergies has also come
from the published pronouncements of important U.S. practitioner and
academic groups, such as the "white paper" of the Big Eight managing
partners [1989] and the position statements of the Accounting Education
Change Commission [1990, 1992; see also Fleischman et al., 1996b;
Fleischman and Tyson, 1996].
Another facet of the past/present linkage central to certain
philosophies of history is the obligation of each new present to rewrite
history to enhance its meaningfulness. At a very basic level, the
historian must bear in mind his/her contemporary audience. Relating the
historical narrative to the idiom of the present renders the account more
meaningful and comprehensible to the reader, although the risks of
distortion should be managed as carefully as possible. Hill [1986, pp.
15-17], a leading Marxist historian, articulated a method by which the
historian attempts to discover those questions that the personalities of
past ages were attempting to answer. He went on to suggest that:
This would help to explain why history has to be rewritten
in every generation. New bits of experience in the present
open our eyes to questions that man had to answer in the
past. . . . Experience in the present helps the historian to
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sharpen and refine his account of the questions so as to get
better answers.
From a more philosophical point of view, Gadamer [1989, p. 24], a
leading exponent of hermeneutics, wrote:
Likewise, in the experience of history we find that the ideal
of the objectivity of historical research is only one side of
the issue, in fact a secondary side, because the special
feature of historical experience is that we stand in the midst
of an event without knowing what is happening to us before
we grasp what has happened in looking backwards.
Accordingly, history must be written anew by every new
present.
Miller and Napier had little patience with historians whose
narratives employ modern language and vocabulary, as well as with
those who reference contemporary conventions and practices in
describing the past. Miller and Napier seemingly assumed that
historians have the responsibility to exercise the care necessary to
consider only those factors and institutions chronologically specific to
the age under their investigation. While within limits we would applaud
the caution they espoused, disassociation with the present can be a tricky
endeavor. Scorgie [1996] accused Miller and Napier themselves of an
anachronistic pitfall of the very genre for which they have castigated
others in their genealogy on "discounted cash flow." Phrases such as
"principles of compound interest" and "actuarial practice" had no
relevance to the chronological periods Miller and Napier were
addressing.
Rather than pillory Miller and Napier for that peccadillo, it would
be more fruitful to debate with them the legitimacy of using the present
as a yardstick for measuring the accomplishments of the past.
References to the present permit the reader a more profound
understanding of the past and, perhaps, a greater appreciation for its
relevance. While there is no law that effective history must engage the
contemporary reader, the efforts of those historians who attempt to do so
by examining links to the present should not be denigrated. We concur
with Miller and Napier that danger exists that those historians who
assume progress as the past evolves into the present may distort or even
marginalize the past. However, all traditional historiography does not
make such assumptions. Johnson and Kaplan [1987], for example, did
Published by eGrove, 1997
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not construe the present as representative of best practice. Rather, they
used history to demonstrate how current practice is badly in need of
reform. Another effective point was raised by Tosh [1984] who pointed
out that those who search the past for precedents of present practice have
almost unfailing tend to stress similarities at the expense of differences.
Traditional historians must be careful to avoid this imbalance.
One final parameter of Miller and Napier's cautions with regard
to the present in history requires discussion—the stance they took on the
issue of historical origins. With reference to their own genealogical
investigations, they averred that "we focus on the outcomes of the past,
rather than looking for the origins of the present" [p. 632]. This
important distinction is clearly a major tenet of Foucault's philosophy of
historical writing. Variously Foucault proclaimed that historical
beginnings were lowly, that knowledge was not the quest for origins, and
that a purpose of genealogy was to destroy the primacy of origins
[Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982; Foucault, 1980; Smart, 1983].
Notwithstanding, several noted advocates of the paradigm have
subscribed to the notion that our knowledge of the past is enhanced by
investigating the origins of contemporary events and practices. For
example, Hoskin and Macve [1988, 1994], in their insightful study of the
Springfield Armory, unabashedly sought the genesis of modern
managerialism [see also Ezzamel et al., 1990; Fleischman et al., 1995;
Hoskin and Macve, 1986]. Miller and Napier have dismissed out-ofhand a substantial quantity of research centered on the search for origins.
While the democratic ideals of the new accounting history do not
mandate that all research protocols be accepted as equally compelling,
the spirit manifested in Miller et al. [1991] did suggest that rival
approaches should be respected sufficiently for a fair hearing and
possible ensuing dialogue [Fleischman et al., 1996a]. The very interest
that some historians and readers share in the exploration of origins
should establish its legitimacy although investigations of this type will
not be viewed as equally valuable by all participants.
This response to Miller and Napier is in no way intended to be
disrespectful of the Foucauldian view of history. Neither the
Foucauldian aversion to the search for origins nor the paradigm's focus
on the discontinuities of history suggests that Foucauldians are
disinterested in drawing upon the past to illuminate the present. What
we are urging here is an alternative philosophy of history. At the same
time, we are hopeful that our critique does not cast us in the mold of the
traditionalist caricature so vividly described by Carnegie and Napier
[1996, p. 8] as one:
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. . . who celebrates progress and thereby subtly denigrates
the past, who explains everything by reference to
neoclassical economics, who at worst sets out on a 'treasure
hunt' merely to establish the earliest, the oldest, the
strangest, at best views the past entirely from the
perspective of the present.

PARADIGMATIC HISTORIOGRAPHY
Writing to or within a paradigm or world view has become a
feature of much critical scholarship in the past two decades. This trend,
which is to be welcomed most wholeheartedly, has become a facet of the
new accounting history. Miller et al. [1991], often regarded as a
testament of faith in the new history, noted how the definitions and
assumptions of historical objectivity changed, with the 1960s as the
watershed. Prior to the 1960s, the authors contended, there had been a
confidence that historical truth (facts) existed and that these truths were
"unitary rather than perspectival." Subsequently, lines of demarcation
between facts and values became blurred, and the premise of "letting the
facts speak for themselves" gave way to a greater emphasis being placed
on interpretations tested by the facts rather than derived from them [p.
397]. It is indisputable that this change in direction has occurred. The
impossibility of historical objectivity gives importance and legitimacy to
the explanatory paradigms that comprise critical scholarship and the new
accounting history. At the same time, the evidentiary requirements
resultingfromthis enhanced contextualism strengthen the importance of
archival research.
A number of philosophers have supported the premise that
historical writing is necessarily subjective. Hegel [1975] observed that
in all discourse, whether philosophical or historical, everything depends
upon prior perceptions and points of view. For Hegel, the historian is "a
part of the process he is studying, has his own place in that process, and
can see it only from the point of view which at this present moment he
occupies within it" [quoted in Gadamer, 1986, p. 468]. Ricoeur [1965,
pp. 26, 31], in detailing how history is reflective of the historian's
subjectivity, labeled the "judgment of importance" the selection of those
events and developments to chronicle. "History wishes to be objective
but it cannot" [ibid., p. 76]. Historical relativism is also a key principle
in hermeneutics. Gadamer [1986, p. xx] emphasized how history
becomes old-fashioned to succeeding generations as "people read the
Published by eGrove, 1997
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sources differently because they are moved by different questions,
prejudices and interests." Gadamer glorified the differences in the social
milieux and circumstances of historical observers, while fighting against,
as Francis [1994, p. 240] neatly put it, "the Enlightenment's prejudice
against prejudice." In a similar vein, Habermas [1990, p. 27] observed
how the value judgments of historians are represented as facts in
discourse, "because the theoretical framework for an empirical analysis
of everyday behavior has to be conceptually integrated with the frame of
reference within which participants themselves interpret their everyday
lives."
The subjectivity inherent in the historian's craft is likewise
appreciated in the historical literature. Bloch [1953, p. 20] warned that
"it is dangerous and foolhardy to pretend that man can fully eliminate the
inescapable reality of our biases." Since our knowledge of the past is
necessarily indirect, it must be "filtered through our understanding of the
present" [ibid., p. 46]. Hill [1986, p. 14] chastised historians who
believe that they are providing an objective account for they are
"ignoring the distorting lens through which they observed past history."
Given the subjectivity of historical writing, an attention to
paradigmatic frames of reference logically follows. Historical data are
always incomplete and must be supplemented by conjecture.
Himmelfarb [1987, p. 100] noted the attractiveness of the new history to
"the brightest and the more ambitious," who, based on whatever facts
they can "ferret out," are then able to submit the data to "deduction,
generalization, extrapolation, supposition, intuition, and imagination."
Kuhn [1970, p. 146], with Dobb [1973] and Chalmers [1978] similarly,
observed the logical transition to paradigmatic analysis given the nature
of historical subjectivity:
If, as I have already urged, there can be no scientifically or
empirically neutral system of language or concepts, then the
proposed construction of alternate tests and theories must
proceed within one or another paradigm-based tradition.
Accounting scholars have also confronted the issue of subjectivity,
both with regard to source materials and the personal biases of
historians. Tinker and his collaborators have frequently cautioned that
accounting historians, like accounting practitioners, can achieve neither
neutrality nor objective reality [Tinker et al., 1982; Tinker and Neimark,
1988; Tinker, 1991; Tinker et al. 1991]. Merino and Mayper [1993, p.
245 fn.] observed that the dangers of "belief transference," ascribing
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current concepts to past historical figures, "increases exponentially when
researchers use a theoreticalframeworkto explain a particular historical
phenomenon." Though we have no wish to silence the historian's voice,
we urge that historians should expose their own biases whenever possible
to allow the reader to judge whether it is the past or the historian
speaking at key junctures. We concur with Muller [1952, pp. 29-32]
that since "a historical fact never speaks for itself and that every
historian has some philosophy of history, "however vague or
unconscious," that determines the selection and evaluation processes, the
historian does best who makes his/her philosophy "clear, conscious, and
coherent" and overtly declares these biases. We also aspire to Hill's
[1986, p. 17] definition of a good historian as one who "questions his
own assumptions and prejudices," though the task is difficult and the
way unclear.
Exposure to primary source material is one way in which readers
of historical narratives can begin to grapple with the issue of whether
they are listening to the historian's voice or to the persona of the times.
By gauging the historian's interpretation of archival materials, in
combination with knowledge of the historian's frame of reference, the
reader can evaluate how well the historian has done in offering a
persuasive account within the context of his/her personal paradigmatic
view.
There can be no doubt that archival evidence may be
misinterpreted, manipulated, culled out, or selectively included in order
to bolster a particular perspective. In the absence of primary sources,
readers may place undue reliance on the historian's personal bias and
interpretation. Thus, although there are critical questions regarding the
objective reality of evidence, the complete substitution of data with
theory, language, interpretation, and contextualism is even more
problematic. Zagorin [1990, p. 274] described shortcomings of
historical writing unsupported by archival materials:
they have rarely disputed the reality of the historical past.
. . . historians, working historians, have traditionally
assumed some correspondence between interpretation and
fact, between language and reality.
It is also the case that to ignore archival evidence assaults one
cornerstone of historical research and scholarship. To fail to listen to the
words with which the past attempted to speak to us is an affront to the
individual men and women who cared enough about the future to
Published by eGrove, 1997
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document events and preserve an archive. Himmelfarb [1989, pp. 667668] described the deleterious impact of this insult:
What is being deprivileged and deconstructed is not only
history as traditional historians have understood it but the
past as contemporaries knew it...it is condescending or
demeaning to make them bear witness not to their own
experiences but to those of the historian.
Of course, it may serve no useful purpose for us to recognize the past as
it was or perhaps we ought to concede that efforts to do so are fruitless.
In conclusion, we wish to offer a partial disclaimer lest it would
appear that we overstate the case either for the dangers of paradigmatic
historiography or the necessity of archival research. A distinction can
be made between an historian writing "to" a paradigm (generally
conceived as an unwarranted intrusion of bias) and writing "within" a
paradigm (generally welcomed for providing an explanatory context).
We are not prepared in this paper to attempt a demarcation of the two
realms. Also, we appreciate the paradox in that we are arguing for the
virtues of archival research into primary sources, while at the same time
espousing the theory that facts do not speak for themselves. Here we
suggest that primary materials can be helpful in supporting an
explanatory theory, although they are not an imperative. Much critical
scholarship is based on archival research; other extremely valuable
critical offerings have been accomplished without direct reference to
these materials. It is our personal preference to use primary sources to
support historical theorizing and interpretation, but we do not feel such
recourse to be a prerequisite for good scholarship.2
THE ENDANGERED SPECIES
Miller et al. [1991] not only served as an introduction to a
collection of papers from the Second Manchester Interdisciplinary
Perspectives on Accounting Conference, but as a concise and readable
preamble for the "new accounting history." It augured a greater

2

We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer who suggested the distinction
between writing to and within a paradigm, brought to our attention the
paradox of calling for sources that cannot speak for themselves, and felt that
former drafts of this paper marginalized the contributions of critical scholars,
many of whom did archival research.
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eclecticism through its inclusion of political, social, behavorial, and
environmental contexts to accompany more traditional economic
explanations for particular practices and processes of change in
accounting's history. The article was replete with welcoming phrases
such as the "pluralization of methodologies" [p. 395] and the
"heterogeneous range of theoretical approaches" [p. 400] which promised
not only an expanded universe in accounting historiography, but a more
democratic one as well.
However, all has not been halcyon in the world of accounting
history. While a heightened attention to paradigmatic issues has created
an interpretive richness and a faster pace of change absent in past
generations, the process has occasionally been carried out against a
backdrop of dysfunctional hostility. One participant elegantly referred
to this disharmonious environment as "academic antler-clashing" before
lowering his own head to engage in a theoretical contretemps [Hoskin,
1994, p. 59]. We have argued elsewhere [Fleischman et al., 1996a] our
conviction that dialogue and collaborative effort will harness the
synergies and additive value forthcoming from the interactions of
differing paradigms.
If it be true, as Gadamer [1986, p. 465] observed, that "even a
master of the historical method is not able to keep himself entirely free
from the prejudice of his time, his social environment and his national
situation etc.," are we faced with paradigmatic anarchy in accounting
historiography because all interpretations of the past are equally valid?
We think not. Although the new accounting history democratically
welcomes the full gamut of theories and promises a hearing for all, those
efforts that are more cogently argued and those that more convincingly
use source material to reinforce arguments will be more compelling.
The welcoming spirit of the new accounting history
notwithstanding, a place at the table does not appear secure for certain
categories of scholars. Earlier in the paper it was documented how
aspersions have been cast on those historians who find value in utilizing
contemporary reference points in their evaluations of the past [Miller and
Napier, 1993, pp. 632-640]. Likewise, those historians who have
interest in seeking the origins of accounting practices in history have
been soundly criticized, particularly in Foucauldian scholarship [Miller
et al., 1991, p. 398; Miller and Napier, 1993, p. 632]. In this concluding
section, we consider the plight of other classifications of accounting
historians who seemingly stand at the periphery of the new accounting
history or, in a worst case scenario, appear to be disenfranchised. Our
main concern, as the title of this article conveys, lies with archival
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researchers whose contributions have been marginalized when they
attempt to stand apart from the paradigmatic debates that have both
expanded and factionalized contemporary historiography. These
scholars are ultimately the endangered species.
Many traditionalist historians, very much aware that seemingly
objective evidence is value-laden, have appreciated that the mere
reporting of data derived from archival investigations may not serve a
useful purpose in the absence of interpretation. Typical is the remark of
Previts et al. [1990b, p. 146]: "Historians,. . . influenced by the research
traditions of the social sciences, champion the view that explanation is
inherent to history and thus interpretation, more than just the factual
story, must be undertaken." A substantial majority of traditionalists do
evaluate the documents they have unearthed in their archival research,
usually within the context of an economic rationalist paradigm [e.g.,
Edwards, 1989; Edwards and Newell, 1991; Fleischman and Parker,
1991, 1992, 1997; Tyson, 1990; 1993]. In this regard, their
methodology, although not their chosen paradigmatic grounding,
parallels the efforts of critical scholars [e.g., Hoskin and Macve, 1988,
1994; Walsh and Stewart, 1993]. Others, however, feel more
comfortable presenting research findings with little or no interpretive
analysis, leaving such evaluations to others possessed of a more
theoretical bent. While these researchers may not be the objective
reporters of data they might consider themselves to be because of the
partisan nature of their selection processes, their contribution to the
historical process ought not be minimalized.3
Critical scholars have repeatedly told traditional historians that
their work suffers a major shortcoming when revealed data are
unaccompanied by explanation and evaluation. There is value in quoting
this perception at length from the classic statement of the new accounting
history's philosophy [Miller et al., 1991, p. 398].
However, the fortunes of accounting history are likely to
depend on more than the tenacity of researchers in
uncovering new facts or dating the initial practice of this or
that accounting technique. The questioning and debates
that have generally taken place around the objectivity
question in history more rudely impose themselves within

3

Although one reviewer urged that citations to work of this genre be
provided, we decline to do so lest the scholars so identified be embarrassed by
this categorization.
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accounting. A concern with language, with the rationales
and ideologies for accounting practices, comes to assume a
prominent role in the new accounting history. But this is
not the same as saying that the analysis of particular
accounting events can be conducted with disregard for
chronology, national specificity or the key actors or
institutions. Far from it. However, these important issues
of archival enquiry only gain their significance within a
particular theoretical or explanatory framework.
The critique of archival researchers disinclined to analyze their
findings has not always been so kind. Napier [1989, p. 241] charged
that the reporting of historical records without interpretation was "simple
antiquarianism." Stewart [1992] used the same word to describe
approaches which emphasized facts rather than explanations. Hopper
and Armstrong [1991, p. 405] branded as "accounting antiquariansm"
the efforts of those researchers concerned more with the discovery of
accounting origins than with the articulation of theories of change.
While these critics may not feel they are disparaging the research efforts
of their colleagues in using this phraseology, the epithet "antiquarian"
conveys a greater pejorative connotation among North American
historians (perhaps as distinct from accounting historians) than in U.K.
academic circles. We must be cautious not to brand archivist colleagues
as drones whose only job is to provide grist for the paradigmatic mills.
The new accounting history has been characterized by a
substantial expansion in the variety of influences collectively investigated
in the ongoing effort to explain past developments and patterns of
change. The panorama has now come to include social, political,
ideological, and cultural contexts, as well as the voices of suppressed
peoples. At one time many traditional historians in accounting were
deserving of an economic reductionist label, sharing that identity with
early Marxist scholars ("vulgar" Marxism). While many traditional
historians have broadened their horizons, influenced perhaps by the
exponents of critical history, some have not. Some traditionalists
continue to privilege the economic environment as the motivating force
behind institutional change. Notwithstanding, these scholars have a
substantial contribution to make in bringing new information to light.
The issue for them should not be a blanket indictment of their
methodological choice, but rather the danger that their contributions
might not be remembered since their more limited focus diminishes the
possibility for a compelling narrative.
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It is our view that the regard with which archival research is held
by traditional historians is not paralleled in postmodernism.
Postmodernists are skeptical of the tendency of some archival
researchers to consider historical documents as bias-free representations
of reality. Many of those who do archival research typically fit those
categories marginalized in recent literature, including those who gather
facts which are allowed to "speak for themselves," those who investigate
the origins of contemporary practice, those who believe that historical
figures are essentially motivated by economic influences [Tyson, 1995],
and those disinclined to write to a paradigm. Napier several years ago
appeared more sympathetic to archival researchers of various stamps
than in his more recent work with Miller. He perceived a dichotomy of
function in the accounting history craft. Traditional archival researchers
would feel most at home in "the discovery stage" in which original
accounting sources and documents are studied. These investigations
constituted an essential precursor to the "contextualising" function so as
to "avoid the erection of theoretical superstructures on inadequate
foundations" [Napier, 1989, p. 239]. Napier staked out a niche for
traditional archivists, observing that "the contextualisers are likely,
however, to wish to rely on the traditionalists to generate much of the
raw data for their theorising" [ibid., p. 250].4
We would urge the contextualizers to be mindful that the flow of
data used to support the theorizing must continue. Summary articles
relating the findings of archival research should not be minimalized lest
scholarly articles of the new history genre come to be written and
rewritten without bringing new information to light. This plea in no way
intends the suggestion that the discovery and contextualizing functions
are mutually exclusive. Many practitioners of the new accounting
history, particularly critical and postmodernist historians, have done both
extraordinarily well. However, the research protocols of the new
accounting history seemingly allow academics the freedom to choose
their research agendas in confidence that both discovery and

4

In a recent article with Carnegie, Napier has returned to the traditionalist
fold that typified his archival research over the course of the past decade.
Carnegie and Napier [1996, p. 8] acknowledged that "historical research in
accounting gains its strength from itsfirmbasis in the 'archive,'" though they
do define that term in its broadest possible sense. Moreover, they observed
that historians who rely upon secondary sources open themselves for others
"to challenge these conclusions by reference to primary archival material"
[ibid., p. 20].
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contexualizing contribute value to our knowledge and understanding.
Miller and Napier should be keenly aware of the importance of
archival research based on their own past experience. One of the four
genealogies Miller and Napier [1993, pp. 641-642] narrated to illustrate
their approach was the emergence of costing at Wedgwood pottery. Our
knowledge of accounting at Wedgwood comes almost entirely from the
archival research efforts of Professor McKendrick [1960, 1964, 1970].
The Wedgwood archive at the Keele University Library is largely
uncatalogued to the modern day. It took painstaking and meticulous
effort to generate the source material vital for later analyses by Hopwood
[1987], Fleischman and Parker [1991], and, last but not least, Miller and
Napier [1993]. Two of the most prestigious contributions to critical
scholarship have been Miller and O'Leary [1987] and Hopper and
Armstrong [1991]. Both these substantial theoretical undertakings were
done without reference to primary sources. The debt owed to those who
provided the archival background should be obvious. We would ask the
further question, by what standard is it more acceptable to write an
interpretive piece without doing archival research than it is to report the
results of archival research without accompanying interpretation? We
subscribe to the belief that effective history comes in multiple
forms—well-researched
archival
investigation,
well-reasoned
interpretation and evaluation, and combinations thereof. We conclude
by challenging critical and traditionalist historians alike to recall the
democratic tenets espoused in Miller et al. [1991, p. 400]:
It is inappropriate to specify criteria that would exclude
certain types of research on the basis of their
methodological protocols or the time period they address.
It is also highly inappropriate to specify the methodological
protocols that stamp a particular piece of research as a part
of the new accounting history.
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Abstract: Historical research in accounting and management,
hitherto largely neglected as a field of inquiry by many
management and accounting researchers, has experienced a
resurgence of interest and activity in research conferences and
journals over the past decade. The potential lessons of the past for
contemporary issues have been rediscovered, but the way forward
is littered with antiquarian narratives, methodologically naive
analyses, ideologically driven interpretation and ignorance of the
traditions, schools and philosophy of the craft by accounting and
management researchers as well as traditional and critical
historians themselves. This paper offers an introduction to
contributions made to the philosophies and methods of history by
significant historians in the past, a review of some of the
influential schools of historical thought, insights into philosophies
of historical knowledge and explanation and a brief introduction
to oral and business history. On this basis the case is made for the
philosophically and methodologically informed approach to the
investigation of our past heritage in accounting and management

Accounting and management research has proliferated in both
volume and variety in recent decades, yet much of it remains curiously
ahistorical. Many contemporary research journal articles for instance
contain all but the briefest allusions to prior practices and knowledge,
often confining themselves to the almost obligatory but cursory review
of the previous ten years' literature. Not only do many contemporary
accounting and management researchers risk leaving themselves without
a sense of tradition, but they also risk revisiting earlier solved issues or
making decisions about the future in isolation from the past. The
problem does not end here. It is not difficult to locate in the extant
accounting and management literature, examples of historical research
Submitted December 1996
Revised February 1997
Accepted April 1997120
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol24/iss2/11

et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 1997, Vol. 24, no. 2
112

The Accounting Historians Journal, December 1997

that varies from theoretical naivete to doctrinaire predisposition, and
from archival neglect to antiquarianism, or that simply appear to be
methodologically uninformed. The value of such material to
practitioners, policy-makers and researchers may therefore be doubtful
or at least suspect.
This paper aims to address some of these issues by offering a
selective overview of the theoretical and philosophical traditions that
have informed historical research and writing generally. It therefore sets
out to acquaint the accounting and management reader with theories and
methodologies adopted and advocated by a sample of significant
historians in human history. Also briefly reviewed are some of the most
influential schools of historical methodology as well as historical
philosophies of knowledge and explanation that have informed
interpretive historical research. In addition, two particular areas of
accounting history research extension, oral and business history, are
highlighted. Finally some implications for future historical research in
accounting and management will be discussed.
PURPOSES, BENEFITS AND DIRECTIONS
Why should we concern ourselves at all with undertaking studies
of accounting and management history? One pragmatic answer can be
offered by Alfred Chandler's (1977) work. His are arguably the books
on business history most often consulted by business executives and
possibly the reason is that they have "explained the sea to the fish who
swam within it" (Smoler, 1992).
In general, history offers a variety of potential uses. It may be
employed to build a view of the past from which professional
consciousness and cohesion can be manufactured. It can reveal and
render visible parties, practices, and outcomes previously ignored.
Alternatively it can challenge and overturn fallacious beliefs and
unfounded traditions or offer some indicators of precedents and previous
experiences that may affect future actions and policies (Tosh, 1991).
Management and accounting policy and practice are often discussed and
applied ahistorically. Historical research can offer a prologue to
deliberations on contemporary issues and provide insights into not only
precedents but also conditioning factors (economic, political, social, and
institutional) and possible outcomes (Previts et al, 1990a, b).
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Identifying Benefits
Accounting and management history can help us identify within
our particular nations and cultures, what has worked in the past and
what hasn't. It also helps us understand why we have had our successes
and failures over long periods of time. It offers the prospect of
accountants and managers learning from ignored or forgotten past
experiences, both successful and unsuccessful. Chandler himself argues
that our focus on quantitative tools and analyses have been the source of
many of our present day difficulties in accounting and management, in
that they have emphasised what is measurable but not necessarily what
is important, and that they have lead to a short-term decision making
focus rather than a long term decision making orientation. A better
understanding of the histories of accounting, management and business
may assist us to avoid these pitfalls.
The study of accounting and management history also offers the
prospect of researchers operating in particular cultures (such as Asian
versus Western cultures) being able to discover the unique features,
impacts and potential advantages of the cultural contexts within which
their organizations and professions operate. This may for example avoid
the tendency towards wholesale adoption of Western management and
accounting practices in Asian or Middle Eastern contexts and
organizations within which they may prove to be inappropriate and
therefore unsuccessful (Parker, 1994). So there are strong arguments to
suggest that we should indeed bother with history. It helps us put our
present into context and better informs and sensitises the accounting and
management decisions we must make tomorrow.
Accounting and Management Directions
Napier's (1989) overview of recent research directions in
accounting history argues that examination of original accounting
documents gives our contemporary theories and generalisations some
empirical content. Despite invariable limitations in availability of
historical evidence, historical analysis of accounting and business
records can reveal much about techniques and processes as well as what
has been accounted for in the past. Historical analysis can provide us
with information as to accounting choices taken in the past and as to the
interaction of accounting considerations and business decisions. Napier
correctly points out that accounting records are not the only sources that
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are available to the historian. Further sources include publicly available
documents such as legal cases, journalistic writings and also private
documents such as minute books of directors meetings, correspondence
between owners and managers, managers notebooks and so on. However
he notes that much historical accounting research has been aimed at
assembling primary and secondary historical evidence, which has been
much needed but at times accused of antiquarianism. Further benefits
from historical research in accounting include the contextualising of
accounting history. This implies that the researcher studies the history of
accounting not as a technique in itself but as one element of a social,
institutional and organizational context over time. This can be provided
by interpretive, critical or postmodern approaches.
Goodman and Kruger (1988) have provided an informative review
of the potential contribution that historical research can make to the
management literature. They recognise that historiography (the body of
techniques, theories and principles associated with historical research)
has been attacked for lacking objectivity but argue that as a research
method, historiography is no more subjective than many other social
science methods. Historiography has also been criticised for data
dredging but generally, historiographic research examines sources with
the intention of providing explanations and generating substantive
theory. Goodman and Kruger argue that historical research has three
major potential applications in management research:
1.
2.
3.

Variable selection and evaluation.
Theory construction.
Hypothesis generation.

In all the above areas historical research has the strong potential to make
major contributions through its evaluation of multiple sources, its
addressing of questions such as "what happened?", "what was?", and
"why?", and through its emphasis upon multiple influences and multiple
hypotheses that enables the researcher to set hypotheses within a broader
context. An example of that broader context which management
historiography offers can be found in Pindur et al's (1995) global review
of the history of management in which they argue that to understand and
apply contemporary management principles and techniques effectively,
an understanding of historical theories, models and processes is required.
To that end they traverse the scientific management, administrative
management, behavioural management, quantitative management, as
well as systems, contingency, strategic and "Japanese" management
movements.
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The potential utility of a historical perspective in accounting
research has already been argued by such writers as Baladouni (1979),
Baxter (1981), and Parker (1981). Contributions to accounting
historiography have also been gradually emerging in the research
literature since the 1970s (Goldberg, 1974; Baladouni, 1979; Parker,
1981; Gaffikin, 1987, 1988a, 1988b). With the accumulation of such
writings, particularly in the accounting literature, there has developed a
growing appreciation that history in this discipline, as in others, is a
cultural product reflecting social, economic, and political environments
(Lister, 1983; Previts, 1984; Hopwood and Johnson, 1986). In addition
has emerged the understandings gained from the perspectives offered by
critical accounting history researchers that accounting is an influencing
activity that creates its environment at least as much as it may reflect
that environment. From such studies, our understandings of accounting
have broken away from its previously assumed characteristics of
neutrality, objectivity and technicist isolation (Gaffikin, 1987, 1988a).
Recent Reflections
A number of historians have been more recently adding to the
historiographic literature in the field of accounting research, expanding
upon the themes of history's nature, utility, methodologies and ongoing
developments. Previts et al (1990a,b) produced two papers which
commenced by distinguishing between narrative and interpretive history,
and considering the relevance of extant accounting history research to
accounting teaching, policy and practice as well as outlining some of the
limitations of historical research. Their review included some of the
major areas of accounting history inquiry, including biography,
institutional history, development of accounting thought, general history,
critical history, data base development and critical history. Their
consideration of historical method extended to general methodological
issues, cliometrics, empirical and statistical studies, content analysis, and
case studies.
Even more recently, Carnegie and Napier (1996) provided a
significant analysis of the state of the art with respect to critical and
interpretive history research in accounting in which they addressed the
roles of accounting history in conferring status upon the discipline of
accounting, serving functionalist policy informing purposes, and
providing bases for critiques of past and present practice. As Previts et
al (1990b) had done, but with differing selections, they highlighted a
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variety of areas of ongoing accounting history research including studies
of surviving firm records, accounting records in business history,
biography, prosopography, institutional history, public sector accounting
and comparative international accounting history.
From a more strictly methodological "primer" viewpoint,
Fleischman, Mills and Tyson (1996) revisit the concept and definition of
history, and discuss issues of subjectivity, evidence types, historical
construction, and historical versus social science perspectives. They also
briefly outline some significant accounting historians of the 20th century
as well as research journals currently publishing accounting history and
comment on the emerging critical history research perspectives as
opposed to interpretive and narrative, archival traditions.
This paper builds further upon these foregoing historiographic
works by returning to a somewhat broader canvass in providing an
introduction to the work, philosophies and methodological perspectives
adopted by some of the leading historical writers of the past. The
intention is to illustrate the wealth and variety of theoretical and
methodological sources available for accounting and management
historians to consult. This also provides a backdrop to some of the
pervasive schools of thought that have been influencing historical
scholarship in the 20th century. Some of these foundation philosophies
are reflected in methodological elements such as historian's attitude,
objectivity, events, facts, ideas, causation, interpretation, explanation
and discovery through writing. Indeed even in such growing areas of
historical research innovation as oral history, faint but perceptible traces
of the work and approaches of very early historians can be detected.
SIGNIFICANT HISTORIANS FROM THE PAST
In some respects accounting and management historians could be
accused of deficits in their appreciation of the predecessors in their own
historical writing craft. Yet there is much to be learned and appreciated
in terms of perspective, theory, and methodology from the work of
significant historians from the past. What follows is a very brief and
admittedly selective review of the contributions to methodological
thought made by some of these historians (Barker, 1982; Gooch, 1952;
Thomson, 1969; Tosh, 1991; Goetz, 1986). These brief overviews
provide an insight into the methodological foundations and debates in
historical thinking and offer the management and accounting historian a
variety of issues to consider and a range of potential research approaches
that might be adopted.
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Herodotus was born in approximately 484BC and wrote the first
great narrative history of the ancient world, the history of the GrecoPersian wars. He is considered to be the first historian in that he recorded
what happened and tried to show how the two peoples involved, came
into that conflict. His work brought a new principle of critical enquiry
in asking why the war had occurred. His histories were designed to be
read aloud and included features still common to the discipline of history,
namely critical enquiry, prose narrative, popular presentation and
cultural significance. Herodotus employed a then new method of
historical enquiry that first asked a question, looked for information
relevant to that question and then drew a conclusion from the data
collected.
Thucydides was born around 455BC and wrote the history of the
Peloponnesian War. He wrote a contemporary history of events through
which he lived and attempted to explain impartially the intricacies and
complexities of the events that he observed. Like Herodotus, Thucydides
wanted to enquire into the origins of the war and to distinguish
precipitating from underlying causes. He was also concerned to answer
the question "what actually happened?" and grappled with the questions
of "what is the nature of power?" and "what lessons can history teach?".
His methods included cross checking between witnesses' accounts before
recording and establishing a reliable chronology. His work had three
definable stages:
1.
2.
3.

Notes he made of events as they took place.
The arrangement and rewriting of those notes into a chronicle
(consecutive narrative).
The construction of a final elaborated narrative.

Pan Ku was born in China in approximately 32 AD. He was one
of China's most notable historians. He was an official and scholar of the
Eastern (later Han) dynasty and his Han Shu (History of the Former Han
Dynasty) became the approach most frequently employed by later
Chinese historians. Carrying on work commenced by his father, he spent
over 16 years compiling and editing the history. Pan Ku attempted to
represent the Han dynasty and empire as factually as possible through
an organised compendium of existing documents. He founded the socalled Han style of prose - simple, lucid, not particularly vivid and
avoiding elaborateness. His work has been admired for its thoroughness
and apparent objectivity.
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Voltaire was born in Paris in 1694. His historical works ranged
over the whole field of culture and society. His approach to history had
four major characteristics:
1.

A scientific methodology which included a critical
appraisal of evidence.

2.

Treatment of the past on a universal scale.

3.

A view of the Reformation as a social and political as
well as religious phenomenon.

4.

A concentration on the history of the human mind.

Voltaire hoped to establish a fundamental historical law - to explain the
historical process and benefit the human race. He developed a law that
humanity had never progressed without guidance of strong enlightened
persons in positions of authority.
Gibbon (Edward) was born in Surrey, England in 1737 and was
regarded as a rationalist, historian and scholar. He broke from the 18th
century belief in God's will being the primary explanator of past
patterns. His historical writing was characterised by rational argument
and the employment of irony. Gibbon adopted an analytical, secular
attitude favoured by most historians today. The influences upon events
he chose to investigate were not divine or miraculous, but the interplay
of personality, ideas, conditions and events. His History of the Decline
and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776-88), a continuous narrative from
the 2nd century AD to the fall of Constantinople in 1453, is regarded as
a masterpiece of philosophical historiography. It realised his ideal of
writing history that was related to and explained by the social institutions
in which it is contained. He was motivated to write it by his worry about
the possible collapse of Western civilization. He sought to unravel the
causes of the Roman empire's collapse so as to argue that Western
civilization had reached a superior state of development and was,
therefore, immune from similar collapse. Gibbon, untiringly industrious
and accurate in consulting his sources, demonstrated a sense of fairness
and probity, and employed a literary writing style that exhibited both
flair and acumen.
Ranke (Leopold von) was born in Saxony, Germany in 1795.
Ranke is considered to have founded modern historical professionalism.
He introduced the critical approach to sources into mainstream
historiography and founded a new breed of historians trained in the
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critical evaluation of primary sources. He attempted, by applying his
skills of textual criticism to history (working on original documentary
sources) to "show the actual past". He perceived history as drawn solely
from original documents, critically examined and authenticated. The
facts were to speak for themselves. Ranke's concern to portray, as
objectively as possible, the past as it really was, represented a protest
against the moralising history commonly being written in the early
1800s. Indeed a Rankean scholar exhaustively explores the small area
of the past in which he or she is an expert, asking limited questions and
then producing a reliable report for other historians to use (so that there
will be no need for the evidence to be inspected again). Ranke believed
that history evolves in the development of the individual, peoples and
states which together constitute the process of culture. For him,
continuity was a prerequisite for the development of a culture and its
underlying historical reality. His approach to historical research also
emphasised the role of contemplation and intuition required for
addressing the variety and unpredictability of individual human
behaviour. Ranke is regarded as the founder of Historicism and has
exercised a major influence over Western historiography.
Karl Marx was born in Germany in 1818. He developed his ideas
starting from the classical economists, believing he had discovered a
science of human society in which politics, economics, philosophy and
literature as well as history, interacted to create the social structure from
which it sprang. He learned from the German Idealist philosopher
G.W.F. Engel that the past could exhibit a pattern and a destination.
Marx chose to envision these as a class war between those who own the
means of production and those who are limited to selling their labour. In
his view, humanity's beliefs reflected primary physical needs and
everything in the human world had grown from humanity's attempts to
satisfy those needs. His concept of history is called historical materialism
or economic determinism. His work accelerated the trend of history
away from memoirs and letters towards documentation provided by
public records, charters, parish registers and the like.
Marx saw history as being about the growth in human productive
power. Once humanity had satisfied its basic needs, then it could pursue
self-fulfillment and achieve its potential in all other spheres. Thus he
contended that the only true, objective view of the historical process is
rooted in the material conditions of life. He therefore chose to reject
nationalism, freedom and religion as major defining themes of history.
Instead he believed that people are the victims of material forces, but
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under the right conditions can be the agents of historical change. Classes
were not defined by him in terms of wealth, status or education, but in
terms of their role in the productive process. Thus each mode of
production was seen to result in the emergence of classes with
antagonistic interests, each successive stage producing its own dominant
class.
In proposing his theory as a guide to the study of history, Marx
rejected the historical methods employed by the leading historians of his
day, considering Ranke and others to be captives of the dominant
ideology of the age being studied by them. That dominant ideology (of
each period being researched) was in Marx's view, a cover for the
material interests of the dominant class. The dialectic between the forces
and participants in production was for him, the principal driver of long
term historical change. However it is arguable that Marx never
developed his own clearly specified methodology of historical research.
Trevelyan (George Macaulay) was born in Warwickshire,
England in 1876. He was Master of Trinity College Cambridge 1940-51;
liberal by training and temperament, he demonstrated an appreciation of
the Whig tradition in English politics and thought. Trevelyan wrote
history for the general reader as well as for the history student and
campaigned for the revival of a literary style of history - elegantly
presented and able to interest a wider public readership. He spearheaded
a reaction in England against scientific approaches to history that had
almost stifled the reading of history. For example he wrote English
Social History (1942) which portrayed the life and pursuits of society
via a powerful literary style. Trevelyan was not so concerned with
explanatory history, preferring to argue that the appeal of history is, in
the final analysis, poetic. He did make the telling observation that for the
historian it will always be difficult to tell the story as it really was
because inevitably the historian has to select from all the available facts
in compiling his or her account.
Collingwood (R.G.) was born in Lancashire, England, in 1889.
He was an English historian and philosopher who attempted to reconcile
philosophy and history. He was a tutor in philosophy at Oxford
University from 1912 till 1941 and was regarded as the leading authority
of his day on Roman Britain. In his last work, the posthumously
published The Idea of History (1946), he argued that all history is
essentially the history of thought and that the role of the historian is one
of re-enacting in his/her own mind the thoughts and intentions of
individuals in the past. According to Collingwood, only by immersing
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oneself in historical events participants' mental processes and rethinking
the past in the context of one's own experiences, can the historian
discover the significant patterns and dynamics of cultures and
civilizations. As the most sophisticated exponent of the Idealist position
Collingwood made a contribution to setting history on a new path,
eschewing the desire to provide a synoptic vision of the entire historical
process and the idea of proposing universal laws to explain historical
occurrences. Instead he advocated an analytical approach to historical
research, focussing upon concepts, methods of classification,
justification of interpretations and the logic of explanations proffered.
Toynbee (Arnold Joseph) was born in London in 1889. His
monumental 12 volume work, A Study of History (1934-61), proposed
a philosophy of history based on the analysis of the cyclical development
and decline of civilizations, demonstrating an awareness of the relativity
of historical thought. He also produced volumes on world religions,
western civilization and world travel. He was a traveller and observer of
international affairs and asked the broadest of questions (often those
asked by laypersons). Toynbee was obsessed with humanity's necessary
choice between self-subordination and self-extinction.
He was
preoccupied with the task of explaining historical change (e.g. how did
the laws of civilised warfare become overthrown in the 20th century?).
He was a historian of the Thucydidean kind - scientific in his methods,
thorough in his investigations and detached in his conclusions. Unlike
Marx, Toynbee saw history as governed by spiritual forces subject to the
law of God. His A Study of History is essentially a 20th century
condemnation of the idea of progress and of the historians who produced
that idea. It is a personalised, holistic and subjective interpretation of
history which argues that under the leadership of creative minorities,
civilizations grow by responding successfully to challenges and decline
when leaders fail to react creatively. He is considered therefore to be a
historical system-maker, repudiating the idea that history is chaotic and
fortuitous, revealing no discernible pattern or rhythm Toynbee
encouraged a recognition that large scale patterns of behaviour have
always been with humanity and are enshrined in myth and legend. While
his work has been criticised for its ambiguous definitions, its
assumptions, its large scale system building and its according to myths
and metaphors, equality of status with facts, his work has also been
praised as a stimulating response to the specialising tendency of modern
historical research.
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Carr (Edward Hallett) was a British political scientist and
historian, born in London in 1892. He was assistant editor of The Times
from 1941 to 1946 and was subsequently a tutor and fellow of Balliol
College, Oxford and fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. His major
contribution to historical thought came from his book What is History
(1961). He argued for a distinction between the facts of the past
(limitless and unknowable in their entirety) and the facts of history (a
selection made by historians in order to reconstruct and explain history).
He regarded any attempt to reconstruct the past from the inside as
misconceived, preferring to apply a standard of significance to the past
based upon a sense of the direction of history including the trajectory of
contemporary events, thereby approaching an understanding of the
future. Carr argued that all historians reflect to some degree the outlook
of their own age but advocated that historians should read and write
simultaneously in order to better understand the significance and
relevance of what they find. For him, facts without explanation and
interpretation leave history that is unappealing to the reader and of
limited use. Facts and explanation should be in constant interaction in the
process of historical research and writing.
Drawing Lessons For Today
While the above historical writers by no means constitute an
exhaustive list of major contributors to the field of historical scholarship,
they give us a brief insight into both the commonality and variety of their
approaches to historical research. There is much from which we can
select to inform the conduct of our own historical research projects. Both
narratives and interpretations of past events and circumstances have been
of vital concern to historians and continue to offer alternatives for
investigating periods and practices in the accounting and management
past. In studying history, many historians have been drawn to the search
for patterns of events and behaviour as well as relationships between
institutions, people, events and general contexts. We are invited to first
discern what are significant (rather than trivial) questions that
researchers in thisfieldshould be addressing and then to impose rigorous
standards of critical enquiry in our investigation of evidence, depth of
interpretation and logic of argument.
Since historians are inevitably faced with the task of dealing with
the complexity and sheer volume of data involved in past events,
thoroughness and detail should not be sacrificed in pursuit of
interpretation and explanation. Both have an essential part to play in the
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telling of the story and the revealing of its undercurrents. We are called
onto search for the dynamics of change and its conditioning influences,
being alert to the potential discovery of direction and destination in
historical events and seeking to portray the interplay of people, ideas,
conditions and events. One important challenge to accounting and
management historians is to immerse themselves in the literature of the
period they select to investigate so that they can gain a broader and
deeper appreciation of the perceptions, behaviour and context of the
historical participants of that period themselves. Finally, as historians we
are challenged to rediscover the value and power of more adventurous
and engaging styles of writing history in accounting and management so
that readers will be attracted and drawn into investigation and debate of
the issues historians seek to raise and contribute to the enhancement of
knowledge and practice in the accounting and management disciplines.
The above albeit brief insights demonstrate the opportunities for
informing the theoretical "lenses", methodological approaches,
interpretive approaches and styles of presentation that contemporary
accounting and management historians have available for their selection.
Revisiting the works and critiques of leading historians from the past
offers a rich and hitherto inadequately tapped resource for this purpose.
Some of this resourcing of contemporary historians' theoretical and
methodological approaches to their research has been provided via
particular methodological schools of thought that have gained support
and adherence from groups of historians this century. For example
Ranke's work provided the underpinning impetus for the historicist
school of thought, while Marx provided the basis for the school of
historical materialism. By way of contrast however, we must also
recognise the contemporary popularity of the Foucaultian school of
thought in historical research which is based upon the work of the French
philosopher and sociologist Michel Foucault, who would not have
considered himself to be a major historian and has not primarily been
recognised as such. Others such as Herodotus, Thucydides, Gibbon,
Collingwood and Carr provided the methodological foundations for the
more general interpretive historiographic tradition represented in this
paper's discussion of philosophies of historical knowledge and
explanation. These complex linkages cannot be explored in any detail
here, but they lend further support to the argument that our historical
research in accounting and management would be well served by a
revisiting and appreciation of the perspectives and methodologies of
leading historians of the past. For now, we turn to a brief review of some
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historical schools of thought that are pervasive amongst contemporary
historians.
METHODOLOGICAL SCHOOLS
Considerable debate continues between various schools of
historical thought as to the relative merits of their philosophies of and
assumptions about historical knowledge and methodology. What they do
offer is an increasingly rich array of historical perspectives, each
offering potentially new insights into or critiques of our past. For a
detailed assessment of the debates between three particular schools in
relation to interpretations of industrial revolution firms' cost
management practices, Fleischman et al (1996) provide a useful case in
point. What follows here is a brief outline and summary of critical
aspects of five particular schools that have been influential amongst
contemporary historians - historicism, the Annales school, historical
materialism, the Foucaultian school and postmodernism. As the works
of leading individual historians from the past offer contemporary
historical researchers a useful theoretical and methodological resource,
so do these following schools of thought.
Historicism
As already pointed out earlier in this paper, Leopold von Ranke
was pre-eminent in establishing historicism as the dominant mode of
contemporary historical research beginning early in the 19th century in
Germany. Historicism started as a conservative reaction to the excesses
witnessed in the French revolution. Their observations of what happened
when radical elements turned their backs on their country's past led to
their rejection of previous beliefs in history as progress. The
fundamental premise of historicism is that each age is a unique
manifestation of the human spirit, having its own culture and values.
Thus present-day values must be set aside and an earlier age seen from
the inside (that isfromthe standpoint of its own time-bound context and
beliefs). Accordingly historicism argues that the culture and institutions
of a particular period can only be understood from the standpoint of that
period itself (Tholfsen, 1967).
Historicism does not simply aim to reconstruct the events of the
past but to also reconstruct the atmosphere and mentality of the past trying to ascertain why people acted as they did by stepping into their
shoes and attempting to see the world of their day through their eyes and
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hence gaining a better understanding of their perceptions and
judgements. Thus historicism tries to elucidate what is durable and what
is transient or contingent upon our present condition or unique situation
at a particular point in time. This recreating of the past in context or
from the inside is regarded as a necessary precursor to explaining the
past. Explanation requires the identification of trends, influencing and
conditioning factors, consequences and an understanding of history as a
process. In these respects historicism lays claim to a legitimate
facilitating role (Goetz, 1986; Tosh, 1991).
There are qualifications and criticisms that have been levelled at
historicism. If historians try to examine a social grouping from their own
perspective, whose standards ofjudgement should be adopted? - manager
or employee, accountants or marketers, regulators or shareholders? It is
certainly arguable that the historian can be subject to the influence of the
priorities or assumptions of those who created the sources of evidence
and by his or her own values (consciously or subconsciously). So
objectivity for the historicist remains an elusive ideal. It is also argued
that we can never recapture the complete impression of a historical
moment as it was experienced by people at the time, because with the
benefit of hindsight, we know what happened next and therefore our
interpretations of the events and the significance we ascribe to them are
unavoidably conditioned by that knowledge. However that same
hindsight offers the historian an opportunity in two particular respects.
It assists in identifying conditioning factors of which the historical
participants were unaware and it enables the comparison of actual with
originally intended consequences (Tosh, 1991).
Annales School
It is important for accounting and management historians to be
aware of the work of the Annales School of historical research which
was founded in 1929. Its founders were Marc Bloch (a mediaevalist) and
Lucien Febvre (a 16th century specialist) who established a historical
journal known as Annales d'Histoire Sociale et Economique. Febvre
called for a "historical psychology" to be developed by historians and
psychologists working together in order to avoid psychological
anachronisms (the assumption that the mental framework by which
people of earlier periods interpreted their world was the same as our own
contemporary mental framework). This school demanded that historians
learn from other social sciences such as economics, sociology, social
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psychology and geography in order to make them aware of the full range
of questions that they could ask of their sources of evidence. They
attacked l'histoire evenementielle which was a narrative approach to
history that sought to identify grand causes of events and situations.
Instead the Annales School argued for more detailed and specific
analyses of events, their interrelationships and influencing factors.
Annales historians called for an end to compartmentalisation in
history. They aimed to write "total history" (histoire totale or histoire
integrale) which would recapture the great variety of human life and
events (Stanford, 1987). This aim also oriented them towards the ideal
of integrating physical and human geography, economic and social life,
and political structures. Such an ideal remains difficult to achieve
without some degree of compartmentalisation. The Annales School
considered that historians who specialise in one branch of history risk
attributing too much to one kind of factor in their explanations of
historical change.
Hence their advocacy of interdisciplinary
considerations in historical study and their affinity for the methodologies
of the social sciences. Historians of this school have continued to refine
and broaden historical content and methodology and new directions in
history over recent decades owe much to their influence ( Stanford,
1986; Tosh, 1991).
Historical Materialism
As referred to earlier, this historical school of thought emanated
from the writings of Karl Marx (Goetz, 1986; Tosh, 1991). From this
perspective, events and structure are central to the understanding of
historical process and action and structure of society are reciprocally
related. The tensions between classes in a class ridden society are
therefore a focal point of concern for historians of this school. Historical
materialism contends that people engaging in social production enter into
relations of production that are independent of their will and that the sum
total of these relations of production constitute the economic structure of
society. On that foundation, the legal and political superstructure are
built. The mode of production in material life determines the general
character of the social, political and intellectual processes of life. Thus
political, legal and social structures and relationships are all based upon
and dependent upon material production.
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In this conceptualisation, society is conceived of as comprising
three levels:
1. Underlying the other levels are the forces of production (tools,
techniques, raw materials, labour).
2. The relations of production (the economic structure of society,
being the division of labour and forms of co-operation
/subordination sustaining production).
3. The superstructure (the legal and political institutions and
their supporting ideology).
The interplay of these and certain long term structural factors are
considered to make some historical events inevitable in the long term and
constitute defining limits to the actions of groups and individuals.
Over time, Marx's materialist concept of history has been applied,
expounded and extended by many subsequent authors who have sought
to refine and elaborate his approach to the past. The growth of Marxist
historiography in recent decades has been diverse in nature although the
bankruptcy and fall of some communist governments, the rise of renewed
forces of conservatism in western societies, and a postmodern reaction
against Marxism and other grand theories has produced a more acute
appreciation of the limitations of historical materialism. Nevertheless,
while subjecting history to such a doctrinaire theory risks producing
interpretations of historical events that ignore or distort the complexities
of the historical processes involved, this approach can produce
challenging and illuminating hypotheses that raise important questions
not previously considered by scholars bring some of the big questions of
history more insistently to the centre of the arena (Tosh, 1991).
Foucaultian History
Another emerging tradition of historical scholarship in more recent
times has been informed by the work of the French philosopher Michel
Foucault. In studying the history of asylums, prisons and other closed
institutions, he developed a theory of power and knowledge that has been
taken up as an approach to historical investigations and analysis by
historians concerned to discern these factors as underlying explanators
of events and patterns of behaviour (Stewart, 1992). From the
perspective adopted by this school of thought, power and knowledge are
closely interconnected, power being viewed as a network of relationships
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that operates from below as well as from above, being both potentially
repressive and productive. Historians of this persuasion consider that
from the late eighteenth century onwards, industrialists developed
economic surveillance systems that constituted a new form of
disciplinary power (Fleischman et al, 1995). Thus from the Foucaultian
perspective, management and accounting systems are not simply rational
economically driven mechanisms designed to facilitate economic
efficiency and market competitiveness, but are systems of surveillance
that render human activity subject to measurement and control. The
Foucaultian historian is not particularly concerned with the origins of
practices or events under study, nor with their patterns of development
over time. Instead, the focus is upon the exercising of power and control
within the historical situation being investigated.
Arguably then, for Foucaultian historians, the central question is
one of diagnosing the present by asking "How did we reach the present
position?". They reject notions of evolutionary progress, of continuity in
history (although Foucault became uncomfortable with being
characterised as advocating the discontinuity of history), of the primacy
of origins and economic forces (Fleischman et al, 1995; Stewart, 1992).
Marxist historians have been the most vocal critics of the
Foucaultian school, accusing them of ignoring power at the level of the
State and being averse to economic and class structure variables in their
analysis and explanations. They point to the Foucaultians' concern with
language as diverting attention from materialist concerns and to the
problematical nature of a universalist view (at the micro level) of power
being allegedly common to all disciplinary regimes regardless of
organizational differences. At the general level, the Foucaultian school
has been criticised for undertheorising material, economic and political
realities (Neimark, 1990, 1994; Armstrong, 1994).
Postmodernism
Foucault reflects a trend in some more recently constructed
historical methodologies to reject the notion of grand theories and long
term patterns of development in favour of diverse and eclectic
approaches to and reinterpretations of historical events and practices
(Tosh, 1991). Postmodernism seeks to problematise conventional
explanations of history and to break away from an alleged
unidimensional picture of historical development (Stewart, 1992). Such
theorists as Foucault and Derrida have been identified with the
movement towards discourse analysis which attempts to overturn any
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notion of a privileged reading of history, instead choosing to reappraise
discourses such as philosophy, politics, linguistics and history (Tosh,
1991; Jenkins, 1991; Francis, 1990).
So a growing number of historians of the postmodernist school
reject what they see as the privileging of various centres (eg. Eurocentric,
ethnocentric) and metanarratives. They represent a group that is postliberal, post-Marxist, post-western, post-industrial, but do not represent
some cohesive, unified alternative group of scholars. They operate from
a variety of perspectives but have reached a common view that neither
their own positions nor anyone else's have an identifiable foundation.
Instead they see history as "willed" and historical interpretations as
entirely contingent upon the varying mix of epistemological,
methodological and ideological assumptions adopted by the historian or
reader. Thus instead of allowing "professional histories" to exercise
hegemony, a whole range of distinctive histories are being constructed,
including black histories, feminist histories, revolutionary histories, oral
histories etc. Thus the postmodernists see history not as aiming at a real
knowledge of the past but as a discursive practice that allows
contemporary people to investigate the past and to reorganise it and
reinterpret it according to their contemporary interests. The intention is
one of making the previously invisible (eg. activities of women and
previously ignored ethnic groups) become visible and developing fresh
insights into the past that can be utilised to emancipate the present
(Jenkins, 1991).
A Rich Tapestry
The above schools exhibit an array of widely varying philosophies
of and approaches to the study of history. Together, they offer the
contemporary historian a rich tapestry of divergent images and colours.
Depending upon their particular research subject and objectives,
historians acquainted with such schools have the opportunity to select
from their theoretical perspectives, focal issues of concern, and preferred
methodological and interpretive schemes in designing and executing their
research. While research conducted upon the same archival material
from perspectives of differing schools may yield alternative and at times
conflicting historical stories and interpretations, such diversity in
approach and outcomes should be celebrated rather than feared. This
argument has recently been made by Fleischman et al (1996) in the form
of advocating the potential advancement to knowledge through dialogue
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between historians of different schools concerning their variant findings.
The revisiting of archivesfromthese differing perspectives affords us the
opportunity to accumulate incremental knowledge concerning different
dimensions of particular historical events, situations and periods. Some
may be additive and complementary and others may conflict and thereby
challenge previously held views that may have previously been
uncritically accepted.
While the various schools do differ in their philosophical,
theoretical and methodological assumptions and underpinnings, it is
arguable that accounting and management historians should have due
regard for fundamental elements of historical knowledge and
explanation. While there are divergent views concerning these elements,
it is incumbent upon historical researchers to be familiar with the
fundamental approaches to such matters as researcher beliefs and
attitudes, the question of objectivity, the conceptual nature of historical
events, facts and ideas, the attribution of causation, the process of
interpretation and explanation, and the discovery role of historical
writing. Without familiarity with these elements, historical researchers
risk making methodological assumptions and/or selections that are
inappropriate to the subject of study and incompatible with the school of
thought to which they wish to adhere. What is being advocated here is
not a slavish subservience to a set of methodological principles, but an
awareness of some of the fundamental methodological choices which
researchers should consciously consider and decide upon before
embarking upon each project.
PHILOSOPHIES OF HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE
AND EXPLANATION
As a rich and distinctive field of research, history, like other
disciplines, searches for events, relationships, values, significance,
causation, and explanation. Philosophers of history have been primarily
concerned with examining the significance and truth of historical
statements, the plausibility of objectivity, and the process of
interpretation and explanation (Atkinson, 1978). What follows is a
selective excursion into approaches to the creation of historical
knowledge that have informed traditional interpretive historical
methodology. The approaches are reflective of "traditional
historiographic" understandings which nonetheless have exhibited a great
degree of variance between historiographers and philosophers of history
over time. Nevertheless both in their commonalities and diversity, they
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offer a fertile source of methodological approaches to investigation and
analysis from which accounting and management historians can draw.
That drawing may occur in a variety of ways. For example, a historian
of the labour process school may not consider the question of researcher
objectivity to be as desirable or achievable as might a historian of the
historicist school, but can still benefit from an understanding of the
traditional historiographic concern for the pursuit of objectivity. The
benefit takes the form of making an informed choice about the degree of
prior theorisation admitted to evidence interpretation and the clarification
of the grounds upon which that variance from the pursuit of objectivity
is to be justified. The traditional interpretive historian benefits from
exposure to methodological choices which can facilitate greater rigour
in the accessing and interpretation of primary sources and can lift the
ensuing analysis above the level of naive antiquarian narrative. What
follows does not represent a set of uncontroversial general principles but
rather, key areas of historical understanding and explanation that have
concerned historiographers over time and about which they have debated
and advocated a variety of views and arguments.
The Historian's Mental Attitude
The mental attitude of the historian is both conditioned and
disciplined by a number of elements and factors. They influence the
historian's "angle of vision", define the approach, questions posed and
avenues of inquiry utilised (Tholfsen, 1967, p.258). Arguably, the
attitudinal characteristic most vital to the historian is historical
understanding. This is produced by a combination of accumulated
knowledge of the field and era, maturity of judgement and sufficient
experience for the tasks of assessing probability, determining influences
and consequences and assessing the relative significance of
immeasurable forces (Thomson, 1969). Historical understanding is
particularly assisted by the historian's general knowledge of the age
within which his or her particular study is situated. This is essential if
the historian is to identify and understand the governing presuppositions,
assumptions, values and characteristics of people, institutions and
organizations in the period under study ( Stanford, 1987).
The historian is of course subject to a variety of influences that
affect his or her investigation, analysis, interpretation and conclusions.
This has been well recognised by those interpretive historians well versed
in their philosophical underpinnings and methodological craft (and well
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before critical historians voiced their concerns in this area). The
historian's own psychological makeup, personal life experiences, areas
of education, and contemporary social environment all influence his or
her work. Further influences include the informal relationships and
interchanges with colleagues and the current dominating philosophies
and methodologies of relevant academic and professional disciplines
(Stanford, 1987). These influences cannot all be recognised by the
historian, but as far as possible the historian should aim to be self-aware,
identifying and declaring any particularly significant potentially hidden
assumptions or sources of bias (Barzun and Graff, 1985).
While searching for relationships, patterns and trends, the
historian should be alert to the risks of unjustified system building and
simplistic generalisations. Diversity in time and place, change and
continuity and discontinuity over time are all possibilities for discovery.
Individuality, situational uniqueness and change are all elements of any
age and their discovery and assessment requires the tracing of their
relationships (whether continuous or discontinuous ) with prior and
subsequent periods and the appropriation of knowledge and insights from
other disciplines such as literature, philosophy, politics and other areas
of the social sciences. In this way both the uniqueness and the evolution
of events, practices and beliefs can be more fully penetrated (Tholfsen,
1967; Thomson, 1969).
For both the historian and the reader, history is a vicarious
experience - a "second life extended indefinitely into the dark backward
and abysm of time" (Barzun and Graff, 1985, p. 40). The practice of the
craft requires imagination in determining the types of desirable sources
before seeking and finding them, and in the reconstruction of a past
world. The documents and artifacts of themselves have no life and never
did have. What gave them life was the part they played in the activities
and interchanges of people, so that to give meaning to these dead things,
the historian must utilise imagination as well as judgement and argument
in reconstructing the personal, organizational, social, economic and/or
political world in which they were utilised (Barzun and Graff, 1985;
Stanford, 1987).
Still, essential disciplines of historical investigation and writing
include the continual striving for accuracy in recording, order in
assembling supporting notes and documentation, logic in tracing and
making sense of sources, and intellectual honesty in confronting evidence
and declaring its implications, regardless of whether they support or
shatter one's hypotheses. Traditional interpretive historiography calls for
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independence of attitude from creed, regime or orthodoxy so that the
historian remains focussed upon the pursuit of truth, to the extent that it
can be determined (Barzun and Graff, 1985; Thomson, 1969). As
Thomson (1969, p. 104) has said;
a vigorous and flourishing historiography is a symptom ,
and evidence, of a free society and a free culture. To fear
the truth even about the past is a mark of true despotism.
The Quest For Objectivity
The past can never be seen or experienced "as it was" because
historians can only access it via documents, artifacts and other people's
recollections. Even then, objective knowledge of the past can only be
approached via the subjective "experiencing" of these sources by the
historian (Stanford, 1987). Historians in turn, are influenced in their
selection and interpretation judgements by their contemporary social
culture, interpretive framework and world-views (Weltanschauungen)
(Tholfsen, 1967; Stanford, 1985).
Atkinson (1978) points out that concerns about historical
objectivity do not all arise at the same level. First, there is the issue of
selection, for it is impossible to write down all valid statements about
even the most narrowly defined past period or topic - such an exercise
would fill untold volumes and never be read ! Further up the scale is the
issue of interpretation and explanation. How is this informed and upon
what questions (eg. conscious intent versus unconscious class interests)
is it focussed? Yet selection and interpretation need not be automatically
condemned as incompatible with objectivity. Different selections or
interpretations of elements of a situation or event may prove to be
complementary or supplementary, providing a greater composite picture
of a complex "whole".
What positivist researchers in the scientific tradition often fail to
recognise is that the concept of objectivity is subject to multiple
interpretations. For example it may be referred to as corresponding to
fact or external reality, or alternatively it may be referred to as capable
in principle of being agreed upon by any rational person. These two
meanings may be divergent. Mathematical or scientific statements may
be objective in the latter rather than the former sense because they are
too abstract and idealised to correspond with reality in any external,
independent sense. Biographical statements drawn from oral histories
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may be objective more in terms of the former than the latter sense. When
two or more historical accounts of the same event diverge, they may
differ in terms of only one of the above meanings of objectivity and not
always both. Historical objectivity might be asserted as increasing when
the inevitably subjective judgements of a number of historians about a
particular train of events or circumstances are found to be in agreement.
This is characteristic of the social sciences where we seek to understand
and explain people's thinking and behaviour by observing what they do
across cumulative cases or repeated observations ( Atkinson, 1978;
Stanford, 1987).
In both scientific and historical research domains, the terms
"subjective" and "objective" are at times used quite loosely to imply
"opinion" versus "fact". This is a serious mistake. Barzun and Graff
(1985) argue that every living person is automatically subjective in all
his or her sensations, whether experiencing sensations of objects or his
or her feelings relating to those objects. Objects are no more real than the
sensations attached to them because objects can only be known by
persons who subjectively experience them. Therefore they contend that:
An objective judgement is one made by testing in all ways
possible one's subjective impressions, so as to arrive at a
knowledge of objects. (Barzun and Graff, 1985, p.175)
For the historian then, the quest for objectivity is not the
impossible challenge that scientific researchers might assume. Values
and experiences of historians and historical subjects are not
automatically obstacles to be overcome, but are useful tools in the
rendering of historical accounts and explanations. To at least some
degree, the determined historian can step outside his or her own time and
its influences to study and empathise with the past, utilising inherited
language, concepts and techniques of that period. At the same time,
historians must recognise that they cannot entirely avoid the influence of
their contemporary environment upon their selection and interpretation
of facts.. Objectivity for the historian assumes a different meaning to that
of the scientist or positivist. It represents the desire and continuing
attempt to see things as they really were, striving to remove as far as
possible the colouring of understanding by personally held intellectual
presuppositions, political persuasions, and moral or philosophical
principles. This requires self-criticism and declaration of the possible
personal predispositions by the historian. Thus objectivity, variously
defined, and admittedly difficult to attain (or even closely approach)
nonethless represents a challenge that can be addressed by critical and
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traditional historian alike—even if in different ways. Both can pursue
historical objectivity via self-awareness, commitment to truth, and
capacity for critical thinking and analysis (Tholfsen, 1967; Atkinson,
1978; Stanford, 1987).
Events, Facts and Ideas
Stanford (1987, p.30) has argued that "What men and women do
and suffer, make up the events of history." In turn, a selection of these
events "make history" in their own right or in the judgement of a
historian. Events can be variously conceived from the historian's
perspective. They can be conceived as being the effects of causes and the
portents of events to come (Oakeshott, 1983), patterns of experience that
are brought into focus by individuals, groups, institutions and ideas
involved in the event's organization (Porter, 1981), and happenings that
do not survive but which are judged by observers to be important
occurrences (Stanford, 1987). Events are divisible into smaller parts
which may range in duration from a split second to a period of years.
Thus the notion of time is derived from events. It is not an absolute but
is comprised of the interaction between events (Stanford, 1987; Porter,
1981). Thus the historian reconstructs the past from an assemblage and
interpretation of events. History-as-account (the historian's
reconstruction) emerges from history-as-event (events preserved in
verbal and written forms) via the process of selection, analysis, creative
imagination, interpretation and argument (Stanford, 1987; Oakeshott,
1983).
In selecting and assembling facts about events, we face another
issue of conceptual specification. Facts are connected both to the world
of things and the world of words, being neither wholly one or the other
but always part of both. They are formulated only when a human mind
judges that the world part and the word part of a fact fit one another.
That is to say, the existence of facts depends upon human judgement
about events and states of affairs and the words to appropriately
represent them (Stanford, 1987). Any tendency to assume that facts
speak for themselves must be studiously avoided. As Thomson (1969, p.
39) puts it, "They speak only when spoken to and when asked the right
questions". Facts very rarely can be found to occur independently of
ideas or interpretation and even if they could, their assemblage would
amount to no more than an unintelligible chronicle of little interest or
intellectual merit (Barzun and Graff, 1985; Thomson, 1969). Indeed
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Stanford (1987) argues that the term "fact" is best left unmentioned,
given its "slippery" conceptual nature.
Causes and Conditions
In the most simple historical narrative there can be found
embedded causal inferences or assumptions even when the authors were
not ostensibly concerned with explaining what they were describing.
What the writer may have intended as a factual observation, may prove
to be an implication concerning causation to a reader (Atkinson, 1978).
So for historians and their readers, the question of ascertaining causation
is unavoidable and its nature and manner of approach is therefore crucial
to the historian.
When dealing in human affairs, it is almost impossible to uncover
the cause of any particular event or circumstance. We can only hope to
identify some of the conditions that lead to the emergence of the observed
event or circumstance. Formalising causal analysis or assigning a
dominant cause implies a capacity to model and measure which history
rarely affords (Barzun and Graff, 1985). Thus multiple causes or
preconditions are the likely background to any event, though the
historian may be able to ascertain and justify some hierarchy among
those conditions (Carr, 1987). These attendant conditions are the
interaction of ideas, personality, environment, and events that yield some
explanation of historical change (Thomson, 1969). Historians then, tend
to offer a variety of conditioning historical factors, including states of
affairs, events, actions and reasons for actions. Such conditioning factors
tend to be offered in specific terms rather than as general causes
although there is a willingness to attempt to identify more important
conditions, as just stated. In addition, the historian may elect to
distinguish between longer term fundamental conditioning factors that
may have rendered an event more likely than more immediate factors
(Atkinson, 1978).
Thus historians are faced with the task of selecting conditioning
factors of significance, just as they do when selecting from the sea of
facts available to them. Carr (1987) argues that the standard of historical
significance is whether the selected conditions can be fitted into a pattern
of rational explanation and interpretation. That selection and
determination is of course influenced by a variety of elements such as the
historian's primary discipline (eg. economics, politics, accounting,
management, sociology), or the focus of the overall study of which a
particular event being explained forms part. Even the length of time
between the event and when the historian studies it may influence this
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selection, given comparisons with subsequent events (Atkinson, 1978).
Thus it is a virtual dictum that historical assertions about factors that
have conditioned events must be made not in terms of possibility, nor in
terms of plausibility, but only in terms of probability. The probability of
conditions leading to a particular event must be weighed up and critically
judged by the historian. Those that are judged to have been significant
must pass the test of having had a significant and highly probable
influence upon the event under study and capable of having a logical and
rational case made for their probable influence (Barzun and Graff,
1985).
Once again, the notion of causation in history can be said to differ
from the natural sciences. The field of study and multiplicity of events,
environments, conditioning factors and outcomes with which the
historian must inevitably deal, is far too complex and variable for
containment in any scientifically testable model requiring "necessary and
sufficient under all circumstances" conditions to be met before any
causal inference can be made. Intuitive but disciplined causal judgement
is a necessary part of the historian's world. Partly this is also the result
of evidence rarely being available in appropriate or sufficient form for
a scientific approach to theory testing. Attempts to replicate the scientific
approach in this regard may lead the historian to draw conclusions about
conditioning factors well beyond the scope and justification of the data
available. Thus judgement regarding conditioning factors is to be
improved through a disciplined understanding and application of the
concepts and tools of the historian's craft and by recourse to as much
reliable evidence as can be located and analysed (Atkinson, 1978).
Interpretation and Explanation
Interpretation and explanation are closely related historical
activities. Interpretation attempts to render an account of what really
happened rather than what appears to have happened, thereby
penetrating the manifest history of the conscious and stated intentions to
reveal a latent history of underlying values, economic, social, cultural
and political influences of which participants at the time were unaware
(or only partly aware). The role of explanation is to clarify the minds and
intentions of the historical participants and to elucidate the linkages
between conditioning factors, events and outcomes ( Stanford, 1987;
Tosh, 1991). Historical explanation, Atkinson (1978, p. 138) argues, has
"achieved the highest level of sophistication and professionalism, without
becoming theoretical; without to any significant extent developing a
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technical vocabulary of its own...." Historical thinking, with its precise
and subtle content, stands in contrast to the relative simplicity of its
forms of expression. In Atkinson's (1978, p. 139) view then, history has
developed into "an impressive exemplification of what can be achieved
by the careful use of very ordinary intellectual tools".
Explanation in history operates along a gradient, from implied
explanations that underpin a purely narrative historical account to
studies that focus upon rational evidence-based explanations of observed
events. Some historians concentrate their efforts upon presenting a
seamless narrative, pruned of methodological scaffolding and posing
questions or relationships by implication. Others present the narrative as
part of a broader canvass that clearly paints the questions left
unanswered from prior studies or new questions raised by the discovery
of new evidence. The latter choose to tackle historical questions directly
by way of detailing processes involved in the events portrayed in the
narrative, making them intelligible to the reader, and accounting for the
reasons why the process appears to have occurred, taken its observed
shape and produced its observed outcomes (Atkinson, 1978).
Historical interpretation and explanation have their limitations.
For example, readers often expect historians to explain how and why
events occurred as they did. So explanations may be in part conditioned
by the focus of the study and the historian's own background and
perspectives but also by the historian's perceptions of the readers' own
expectations (Stanford, 1987). The standing of historical explanations
is somewhat more limited than those to be found in the sciences.
Scientifically derived and tested hypotheses may be subject to change as
new evidence emerges, but at any one point in time, they can be found to
attract a wide range of support and agreement among scientists.
Consensus can be rather more difficult to find among historians in
relation to some historical events and their associated explanations.
Diverse explanations can be brought about by the number and
complexities of factors to be considered and assessed, the multiple
elements involved in historical change, and the variety of overlapping
environments that may have been at work. Each historical situation is
unique in that it represents a confluence of environmental variables,
people, situations, circumstances and events that will never be exactly
repeated. Thus each historical situation must be investigated anew, with
the attendant possibility of different findings, all subject to the already
discussed limitations of being able only to ascribe probable conditioning
factors and their relative importance (Tosh, 1991).
Published by eGrove, 1997

147

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 24 [1997], Iss. 2, Art. 11
Parker: Informing Historical Research in Accounting and
Management: Tradition, Philosophies, and Opportunities

139

That no historical explanation can be valid or reliable because it
is always capable of being rewritten ten or twenty years on, misses the
point and value of historical explanation. That explanations can and do
change offers clear evidence of the usefulness of the exercise. History
should and does respond to the demands that society makes upon it.
Successive revisions of past explanations do not necessarily negate
former explanations but are potentially additive, revealing more and
more about our past, gradually eliminating those views that are clearly
untenable and offering us a richly textured picture of a complex past
(Barzun and Graff, 1985).
Revelation Through Writing
The discipline of writing is probably nowhere more important than
in the course of historical research. History is a way of using language
and language has many different functions including recalling the past,
conveying information, enabling imagination, stimulating emotion,
provoking action, and giving form to life. History addresses and
represents the world almost completely by means of language, in both
linguistic and literary senses. Thus history has the capacity at the one
time to be descriptive, analytical, philosophical and poetic (Stanford,
1987). Historians therefore can enhance their analysis and final product
greatly by attention to the organizing of sections, chapters etc.; the words
and idioms employed; the emphasis, tone and rhythm of their sentence
construction; the art of quoting and citing; and the modes of presentation
employed (Barzun and Graff, 1985).
But the task of writing history of itself offers the prospect of
revelation. Sources and the complexity of conditioning factors and
interrelated events may prove so difficult to penetrate at the stage of
primary analysis that only through the discipline of writing historical
prose does the researcher begin to more clearly identify and more folly
comprehend the interconnections between different elements and
experiences. Thus for the historian, the task of writing is a creative one.
This stands in marked contrast to the scientific or positivist researcher
whose research and analysis has usually yielded its findings and
conclusions before writing commences. For the latter, writing is a task
of clearly expressing and summarising what the researcher has already
discovered before commencing the writing up process. Quite a different
experience awaits the historian who commences writing with a partial
understanding of the sources of evidence and their possible implications,
but who travels further on a voyage of discovery that invariably yields
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol24/iss2/11
148

et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 1997, Vol. 24, no. 2
140

The Accounting Historians Journal, December 1997

new insights and understandings progressively as the composition of the
prose proceeds (Tosh, 1991).
In addition, for the historian, writing represents a crucial tool for
conveying a mental reconstruction of the past to the readers. The
historian's construction of the past stands between the past events and
the present book or article and the book or article stands between the
historian's construction and the reader's construction. Thus the writing
of history is a disciplined and demanding art, attempting to meet the
challenge of conveying the intended meanings of the historian's
construction of the past intact to the reader, thereby achieving a similar
construction in the readers' minds. It is a task of securing the readers'
intellectual and imaginative co-operation (Stanford, 1987). Thus history
emerges as hybrid discipline that requires the simultaneous application
of disciplined technical and analytical procedures with imaginative and
stylistic skills, implying a composite application of scientific, critical and
artistic methods (Tosh, 1991).
Historical Discipline
The above excursion into elements of traditional interpretive
historiography offer the intending accounting and management history
researcher a set of disciplinary philosophies, reference points and tools
which can be considered, selectively employed and modified according
to the school of thought or particular methodological perspective adopted
by the researcher. Regardless of the school of thought or perspective
adopted, they offer a disciplined starting point that can enhance the
rigour and credibility of the investigation and its resulting findings. That
such methodoligical discipline is facilitative and adaptive is best
demonstrated by the emerging extensions of accounting history into
interdisciplinary areas such as oral and business history (oral history
being sociologically oriented and business history being economics
oriented). Once again methodological issues common to traditional
interpretive historiography and unique to the characteristics of these
other fields of study are apparent. As is depicted in the following brief
outlines of these two fields, they present both challenges and
opportunities.
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EXTENSIONS INTO ORAL AND BUSINESS HISTORY
Oral History
Oral history provides us with first-hand recollections of
participants in events or situations being studied. Their recollections are
obtained by interviews (normally taped) which are archived in electronic
form or written up in print form (Tosh, 1991). Early historians such as
Herodotus and Thucydides utilised oral sources as major primary
sources of evidence for their work, as did historians and chroniclers in
the Middle Ages. From the Renaissance to the 19th century, while written
sources grew in importance, oral sources were still regarded as a
valuable supplement. In the 19th century, oral sources were largely
abandoned, until they regained a measure of popularity in the late 1960s,
particularly among social historians. That resurgence has been further
stimulated by historians' investigations of groups such as women, the
working class, immigrants and ethnic minorities who have been omitted
from recorded history (and until more recent times, thereby silenced).
Oral history interview techniques generally follow social science
field research interview techniques (Collins and Bloom, 1991;
Thompson, 1988). Background literature requires consulting for
familiarising the researcher with context, issues, terminology and to
assist the formulating of interview questions. Decisions must be made
regarding the degree of structuring of the interview (versus unstructured)
and some pilot interviews may assist in testing, determining and refining
the appropriate approach. Even when a structured set of interview
questions have been developed, the interviewer may find it necessary to
allow the interview to digress into unplanned matters due to unexpected
observations being made by the interviewee. Generally, questions should
be framed in as simple, straightforward and neutral a style as possible.
Complex issues should be tackled via a hierarchy of questions. The
language employed in questioning should be familiar to the interviewee
and leading questions must be avoided at all costs. The interview is
generally located in a place where the interviewee feels at ease and
generally the person is interviewed alone (to help avoid any peer pressure
for socially acceptable answers). Interviewer comments are restricted to
questions, prompts, acknowledgements and encouragement. Oral history
can be assembled as a single informant's narrative story, a collection of
stories or as a cross sectional or longitudinal analysis.
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Oral history allows us to penetrate how events, structures and
contexts were experienced. Indeed, it allows us to penetrate perceptions,
motivations and beliefs. In explaining past actions, what participants
believe happened can be just as important a contribution to our
understanding as the "facts" of what happened (Thomson, 1969).
Impressions, symbols and even myths are all inextricably mixed in
individual and collective human perception and can shed light on change
processes, past decisions, attitudes and relationships. In this way, oral
history offers the historian the prospect of getting a little closer to
entering into the experience of people in the past, penetrating the deeper
structures and processes at work in the activities of participants in
historical events and their environments (Tosh, 1991). Of course oral
history carries its own limitations. The interviewer may have
unintentionally (eg. even by relative social status to the interviewee)
affected interviewee responses. The interviewee in a sense shares in the
creating of new evidence. Interviewees' recollections may be
contaminated by information they have absorbed from other sources,
nostalgia for times past or some sense of past grievance. The
researcher's topic may not be of great interest to the interviewee or they
may not be willing to tell the truth about certain events. Assertions may
be made with less care than if they had been written and recollections
may be
a combination of past memories and contemporary
reinterpretations in the mind of the interviewee (Thompson, 1988;
Collins and Bloom, 1991). As Tosh (1991) puts it, the notion of an
absolutely direct encounter with the past is an illusion, since the voice of
the past is the voice of the present too. Nevertheless, oral history
provides us with history that is more personal, more socially oriented and
more immediate than traditional written sources. It has the potential to
add significant new dimensions to published history.
Relatively recent examples of oral history research in the field of
accounting include Spacek (1985), Mumford (1991), Hammond and
Streeter (1994), and Parker (1994). Most recently, a critical appraisal of
methodological issues in oral accounting history has been provided by
Hammond and Sikka (1996). They challenge the notion of apolitical and
objective histories and focus their attention upon oral history's potential
for giving a voice to individuals and groups who have been
underrepresented in the accounting literature and hence effectively
silenced. Their methodological discussion extends our understandings
of the unique potential, methodological characteristics and interpretive
challenges of oral history research.
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Business History
The foregoing methodological dimensions apply equally to the
research and writing of accounting, management and business histories.
While critical and postmodernist historians would debate the
applicability of some dimensions to their particular approaches, the
perception, rigour, and defensibility of all historians' work stands to gain
from greater attention to such dimensions. Duke and Coffman (1993)
have provided a detailed methodological guide to the writing of business
histories and their observations are equally applicable to accounting and
management historians who may be contemplating or engaged in such a
task. They address important practical issues such as the contract of
access and work between the company and the researchers, defining the
scope of the project, interviewing and transcribing, writing and rewriting,
and the employment of photographs and images. The role and
methodologies of business history are critically reviewed by Gourvish
(1995) who addresses the problems of developing theory, the relationship
between business history and the social sciences, and argues for the
retention of case study method.
Armstrong (1990) has provided a comprehensive discussion of
approaches to dealing with archival materials in the writing of business
histories (with specific reference to British archives).. These offer a
foundation for accounting and management historians dealing with any
research topic involving the investigation of archival sources. The
premier examples of business history research can be accessed in the
journals Business History (UK) and Business History Review (USA).
The potential uses and problems in business history have been discussed
and critiqued by Coleman (1987). He summarises the problems as those
histories which are manifestly anecdotal, unreadable, purely narrative
(lacking any analysis), and public relations exercises. The potential he
ascribes to scholarly business histories are a more profound
understanding of the most important unit of organization in our
contemporary economies, ascribing equal importance to the business and
political past, and rendering assistance to the process of contemporary
economic change. In the business history domain, researchers are
beginning to appreciate the potential for cross fertilisation between the
work, foci and concerns of business and accounting historians. This is
evidenced in the accounting research being published in business history
journals (eg. Edwards and Newell, 1990; Parker, 1991). This potential
relationship between business and accounting history is more explicitly
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discussed by Mathias (1993) who argues that synergy exists between
them with potential advantages accruing to both.
IN CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion has painted a broad canvass that offers
a "grand tour" view of the foundations of historical research. It reiterates
the case for the importance of historical research in the fields of
accounting and management, introduces some of the significant historical
writing traditions in the history of humanity, outlines some of the schools
of thought that have governed historical research and writing in the past,
and identifies dimensions of historical philosophy that inform historical
investigation and writing. While each of these areas of discussion have
generated and warrant whole fields of literature in their own right, they
have been assembled here to give the reader an outline of the overall
context within which accounting and management history studies must
find their place.
Historians' purposes include the identification of patterns, the
analysis of causes and consequences, and the interpretation and
explanation of historical events. They aim to make visible past
situations, activities, groups, issues and contexts. Arguably, the
analysies and interpretations offered by historical researchers of all
philosophical and methodological persuasions will be better informed by
an appreciation of the variety and wealth of philosophical traditions that
to date have underpinned historical scholarship. Such familiarity should
permit a selection of approach from among these traditions that is
appropriate to the purpose of study and defensible. Similarly, a
consciously articulated position on historiographic concepts such as
objectivity, reconstruction of events, causation, interpretation and
explanation, can better position and inform the construction of narrative,
the explanation of events and the arguments concerning outcomes.
The responsibility of accounting and management historians is to
provide a historical perspective that can bring new insights into our
understanding of the past and inform debate rather than producing
historical interpretations simply aimed at servicing or supporting a
particular predetermined ideology or strategy. For accounting and
management historians it is also important to remember that an
excessively single-minded preoccupation with a narrow set of technical
issues may lead to evidence being taken out of context and
misinterpreted. Indeed we must be wary of the temptation to develop
histories that are exclusively or narrowly technicist focussed. Accounting
and management issues, concepts and practices may be equally
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effectively investigated in the broader context of organizational, social
and political studies. Furthermore, the historian must be sufficiently
flexible and broadly focussed to modify objectives in the light of
questions generated by the sources themselves rather than imposing
predetermined ideas on the evidence itself.
Nevertheless we must recognise and welcome the emerging
contribution of critical and postmodernist historians. Through their
particular theoretical lenses, they offer fresh perspectives and insights
into "old" issues, and challenge previously accepted assumptions and
interpretations. By the questions they raise, accounting and management
researchers are forced to reconsider their taken-for-granted assumptions,
to confront previously invisible or silenced constituents of accounting
and management. Finally, critical and postmodernist historians compel
us to grapple with contemporary questions of ethics and equity in the
light of newly revealed historical understandings.
History is a craft that offers a voyage of discovery in the process
of consulting sources of evidence and in analysing discourses. This also
occurs in the very act of writing, when the historian is confronted by new
understandings and insights that emerge from the process of detailing
situations, events, relationships and their contexts. In their "scientific"
pursuit of knowledge, the majority of contemporary accounting and
management researchers have chosen to ignore the heritage of the past,
failing to see its potential relevance to contemporary issues and avoiding
the challenge of dealing with its investigation. Yet there are encouraging
signs of an upsurge in accounting history, and more recently,
management history papers and texts in the research literature.
Researchers of various theoretical and philosophical persuasions are
beginning to discover that historical reservoir of untapped knowledge.
We have an opportunity to press ahead in that voyage into the past and
a duty to equip ourselves adequately for the journey.
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In MEMORIAM
MARY ELLEN DECOSTE

And he will raise you up on eagle's wings, bear you
on the breathe of dawn, make you shine like the sun. .

Mary Ellen DeCoste, a doctoral student at UNT, served as
Associate Editor of AHJ from 1994 until her untimely death on
April 15, 1997. She brought the same indomitable spirit to that
task, despite trying circumstances, that she did to all of her work.
Mary Ellen was trained as a mathematician and worked as a
research scientist at MIT for many years until the death of her
oldest son in the Gulf War prompted a career change. She
brought a keen analytic mind, a love of learning, and a pure joy in
teaching to our doctoral program. She brightened everyone's day
with her boundless enthusiasm. She is sorely missed by all who
worked with her; but she has left a rich legacy of resiliency and
pursuit of excellence that will not be forgotten.
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S. PAUL GARNER: ACCOUNTANCY'S
AMBASSADOR TO THE WORLD

Abstract: Samuel Paul Garner spent nearly seven decades,
as a student, professor, administrator, leader and visionary,
enhancing the understanding and development of our
academic community. Born in 1910, he studied at Duke
University, then briefly as a non degree student at Columbia
before teaching and then entering the Ph.D. program at the
University of Texas at Austin. At Texas, under the
direction of George Hillis Newlove, he focused upon
accounting. His interest in history had been kindled by a
noted economic historian Earl J. Hamilton, under whom
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Garner had studied at Duke. His first post doctoral
appointment would be his lifelong assignment, as a member
of the faculty of what is now the Culverhouse School of
Accountancy at the University of Alabama. Starting in
1939 he served as a faculty member, next as department
chair, and then for seventeen years, from 1954 to 1971, as
dean of the College of Business. His career achievements
are many and include being the only person to serve as
President of both the American Accounting Association
[1951] and the American Assembly of Collegiate Schools
of Business [1964-65]. His post-retirement activities
identified with the quarter century from 1971 through 1996
permitted members of subsequent generations to benefit
from his knowledge and counsel. Garner's work as a
scholar, a historian, an institutional developer and a
visionary—especially in the area of international relations,
are told in this paper. A special appendix, which contains
the last known curriculum vita prepared by Garner, is also
provided.
Si Monumentum - Requires Circumspice/If You Seek His
Monument, Look Around You.
Paul Garner died October 16, 1996, at the age of 86. In this paper,
we present some of his many achievements. However, this is but a
"glimpse" of the accomplishments of this remarkable human being. Paul
was perhaps the last of the leaders of an age when the academic and
professional community were driven to new levels of size and activity
during the economic expansion of the post World War II period. Garner
worked with and knew well the individuals who comprise a list of
Accounting Hall of Fame members, including William Paton, Carman
Blough, Eric Kohler and David Solomons. His involvements spanned
the six decades following his doctoral work at the University of Texas,
which was completed in 1940. Although he "retired" in 1971, he enjoyed
good health most all of his life, and he remained a presence in events,
including the Accounting Historians Seventh World Congress in
Kingston, Ontario in August 1996 and being in attendance at research
seminars and Ph.D. student presentations until shortly before the brief
hospitalization which preceded his death.
This paper is presented in six sections. The first provides a
biographical review, followed by a section which profiles Garner's view
of scholarship. The third and fourth sections consider his research and
institutional contributions. The final two sections address his
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international activities and role and his legacy of wisdom. An appendix
is also provided which reproduces curriculum vita, believed to the last
one completed by Garner. It contains many details which are beyond the
scope of the text of this paper.

BACKGROUND
Paul Garner was born August 15, 1910, in Yadkinville, North
Carolina to a family of moderate means, a factor that proved repeatedly
important in shaping his life. He was the oldest of seven children and
fond of telling stories about these times and the lengthy walks required
to get to school, or to anywhere for that matter. His younger brother
Thad, [who died in 1997], with whom Paul was very close, and advised,
became a local business legend in the Carolinas for making "Texas Pete
Hot Sauce" which is one of the best selling products of is kind in the
nation.
Garner did undergraduate study in the field of economics at Duke
University where he had earned a scholarship. He tutored football
players, waited tables and worked in the library and during the summer,
drove a cab for his father who owned a taxi business, so as to pay part
of the cost of his college education. He even managed to save. From his
savings, Paul paid for a graduation trip to Europe in the summer of 1932.
This six week trip was the prelude to his becoming a famous global
traveler and the "ambassador" of academic accountancy from the U.S.
Paul returned to Duke and, in 1934, earned a Master's degree in
economics. With the support of Dr. Earl J. Hamilton, a graduate of
Mississippi State University, under whom Garner had first studied
business history at Duke, Paul was hired to teach at Mississippi State for
two years, 1935-37. Among the five courses he taught each semester
were several courses in accounting. He became aware that accounting
professors were relatively better paid than those in economics. Realizing
that a doctorate in accounting would provide him a better return, he
decided to specialize his advance studies in the accounting discipline.
Garner entered the University of Texas in the Fall of 1937 to pursue the
Ph.D. Working under the direction of, and with materials available from
George Hillis Newlove, he completed a dissertation, Evolution of Cost
Accounting to 1925, in 1940.
Prior to defending this dissertation, he chose his most rewarding
offer, of an appointment at the University of Alabama, in 1939. He and
his wife, Ruth Bailey Garner, who he had married in 1934, and later
traveled the world with and had three children by, settled in to make
Tuscaloosa their home. At the University, he achieved full professorship
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in 1943 and became department chair in 1949. In 1954, Dean Lee
Bidgood, who served 35 years in that office, retired and Paul succeeded
him as dean where he would serve until his retirement at age 60 in 1971.
GENTLEMAN SCHOLAR
Perhaps the quality which was universally attributed to Paul Garner
by all who knew him well was that he was a gentle man, the truest
gentleman. His presence at conferences and seminars constantly
reminded all of gentile consideration and behavior of a time gone by.
Paul was always constructive in his comments at seminars, glowing in
his praise when he heard a new idea, supportive of scholarly efforts
irrespective of direction, conclusion or paradigm. He was genuinely
interested in all areas of accounting and he read widely to support his
ability to understand issues. Above all, Paul continuously, but gently,
sought to keep research presentations focused on the application to
current, practical problems facing accounting. In Paul's world, it was
not scholarly to demean another's work as a tactic in attacking a
different paradigm. His world of scholarship involved growth,
expansion, new ideas and new insight and breadth of understanding and
knowledge. In this world, no person and no research was omniscient.
No one possessed all the answers to a particular question. Research was
exciting because of its promise of discovery. In this sense, his pursuit of
knowledge was a lifelong scholarly endeavor.
RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION
Paul Garner published over forty scholarly papers which appeared
in a variety of languages from 1940 to 1980. Several of these papers
were published in the Accounting Review [TAR]. The subject matter
included historical and biographical topics, papers on accounting
education and papers on practice issues such as cost accounting for
government contracts.
His last major publication activity was to serve as co-editor with
Atsuo Tsuji for the Greenwood Publishing volume Studies in Accounting
History—Tradition and Innovation for the Twenty-First Century, which
appeared in 1995. A reviewer, writing in the July 1996 volume of the
CPA Journal, observed that while "reading this book one is reminded
that some of these situations have occurred in other countries over an
expansive period of time." In this regard, the volume had served its
purpose to provide perspective for today's practitioner!
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In addition to this extensive variety of publication, Paul served as
originating editor of the "Teacher's Clinic" a popular section of TAR,
from 1947-1950.
Paul's most notable contribution to the literature of our discipline
stemmed from his dissertation. With the support of his mentor,
Newlove, Garner revised and updated the doctoral project and published
it in 1954. Evolution of Cost Accounting to 1925 has been reprinted in
paperback and hardback and has consistently been used by scholars into
a third generation. It has been translated and published in Japan [1954]
with a version in Chinese [1989] as well. In 1996, with the support of
The Academy of Accounting Historians and an alumnus of the
University of Alabama, Garner gave permission for the book to be
"published" it is entirety on the Academy's website, without any fees or
charges to be assessed. It was to be his final legacy. The work appeared
in full text in June 1996. It is now available instantaneously around the
world; the first accounting book known to be so published. In this way,
Paul Garner was the visual, living and symbolic link between classic
accounting theorists such as William Paton and A.C. Littleton and
cyberspace. A. C. Littleton's comprehensive tome Accounting Evolution
to 1900,firstpublished in 1933, provided both a guide and a challenge to
Garner. Littleton's work was recognized and acclaimed, but seemingly
overlooked cost-managerial accounting's role in the development of
industrial capital market accounting. Paul undertook his research project
with materials provided by Newlove during this early period of academic
historical research development in the United States.
Garner
meticulously traced numerous examples of cost accounting for labor and
materials in job cost systems in the 14th through 16th Centuries in Europe
and thereby established the "provenance" of what was becoming known
as management accounting. He observed that these early cost techniques
were not widespread, perhaps due to secrecy as required in the business,
for such techniques were valuable to managing complex enterprises. He
also observed that, despite evidence of books published on financial
accounting for trade and agriculture, no texts on cost accounting appear
until the mid-Nineteenth Century, thus limiting the dispersion of cost
practices. Cost accounting during the Renaissance arose, Gamer noted,
because "owners of small central workshops found themselves
competing now not only against guilds, but also among themselves" [pp.
2-3]. More accurate records of costs became necessary as a factor of
success. An incentive was provided then for careful study of many
phases of practice which had previously been neglected.
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After examining why, where and how cost accounting was used in
the centuries before the Industrial Revolution, Garner then devoted the
major portion of his work to the examination of various topics in cost
accounting such as overhead allocation, transfer pricing among
departments, byproduct and scrap accounting. As noted above, Paul's
work was just as Littleton's, a general history. Furthermore, Garner
begins and ends his work with quotations from Littleton's "Evolution"
[pp. 1; 349].
In addition to this major treatise, Garner's other major writings
included authorship of textbooks and teaching materials with his mentor,
George Hillis Newlove and others. Elementary Cost Accounting [1941]
written with Newlove and revised in 1949 was adopted by the United
States Department of Defense during World War II as a basic instruction
manual to train defense contractor personnel in the Educational Defense
Program. Thousands of managers and engineers of companies dealing
with the Defense Department learned cost accounting via the NewloveGarner book. With the revision in 1949, the text was translated into
Spanish and distributed throughout Latin America by the U.S. Agency
for Assistance in Development.
Another major Newlove-Garner project was a two volume advanced
accounting text written in the early 1950s which received excellent
reviews in TAR. [16 (Fall 1950) p. 47 for Vol. II 17 (Spring 1951) p. 60
for Vol. I]
BUILDER OF INSTITUTIONS
Paul Garner will be remembered not only for his scholarship but also
because he was instrumental in the development of several important
institutions. Paul's skill as a leader and visionary have benefited a wide
range of organizations. This legacy will be felt into the 21 st Century.
His involvement, for instance, in the American Accounting Association
[AAA] began in the early 1940s. Paul assisted in the 1948 founding of
the Southeast Region of the AAA, including annual regional meetings.
The Southeast was the AAA's first region and served as an important
example for the formation of other regions. Paul served as national
president of the AAA in 1951. Under his leadership, regionalism was
promoted and regions expanded. Paul visited many locations and gave
support to the idea of regions, which critics argued would divide the
association. One of Paul's legacies is the success which the regions have
achieved in building the service base for the AAA. Decades later, Paul
also assisted in the formation of both the International and Public
Interest sections of the AAA.
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When the American Assembly of Collegiate Schools of Business
[AACSB] initiated an international outreach program in the mid 1960s,
Paul was an influence, especially during his term as President of that
organization in 1964. In the 1950s, he had begun to "invest" in his
personal balance sheet by traveling to business and academic
conferences throughout the world. Accompanied by his wife, Ruth, he
thus came to be recognized as the unofficial ambassador of the U.S.
academic accounting community. His network was supported by a "pen
pal" correspondence list which numbered in the hundreds. An active
correspondent, Paul's letter's, dictated, typed but then most often hand
addressed, were a common link before the rise of e-mail. He continued
this activity until immediately before his death. His worldwide contacts
and his standing among not only accountants, but also business school
deans and business leaders, especially in countries which were
developing management education, continued to grow until the very end.
His interest in international subject matter was an important catalyst in
the eventual development of an accreditation rationale for the subject.
In the 1970s, Paul supported the formation of The Academy of
Accounting Historians, which held its formative meeting in Quebec
during the 1973 annual meeting of the American Accounting
Association. Although the Academy did not become a special interest
section of the AAA, it predated and modeled the special interest
movement, and early Academy leaders counseled with the founders of the
American Taxation Association, for example, when the latter group held
its formative meetings in 1974 at the AAA meetings in New Orleans. In
1984, Garner served as founding President of the International
Association for Accounting Education and Research [IAAER]. This
organization presently serves as a unifying force to enhance global
relations among accounting academic organizations worldwide.
Perhaps the institution which benefited the most from a long
association with Paul is The University of Alabama. During his years,
as enrollments grew from post World War II expansion, Paul was
instrumental in preparing the foundation for the future of management
education in the state through supporting program development. Student
enrollment in the College of Commerce grew from a small base to more
than 700 annual graduates at the time of his retirement. Graduate and
undergraduate program faculty grew and, in turn, improved curriculum
and performance. Under Paul's leadership as accounting department
chairman, the College's first two Ph.D.s were awarded to Catherine
Miles and Robert Seiler in 1953. Paul had actively supervised their
accounting research. These were the sixth and seventh Ph.D.s granted
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by the University of Alabama which had begun offering Ph.D.s in
selected areas only three years before. Catherine Miles was not only the
first Ph.D. from the College, she was the first female at UA to earn a
doctorate. In 1965, Vivian Malone Jones, the first black student to
receive a degree from the University, graduated in management. Paul
had played a role in opening new programs and in opening doors in other
ways as well.
Soon after Paul was appointed to the faculty, he and Chester Knight,
the chair of the accounting faculty, formed the CPA firm of Knight and
Garner. It was the first such firm in Tuscaloosa. In his CPA capacity,
Paul served as the external auditor for the city, and later, as its financial
advisor over many decades as the city grew substantially in the 1970s
through the 1990s. Up to the time of his death, he maintained a small tax
clientele and continued to serve on boards of directors of several
businesses. From this perspective, Paul made his contribution to the
financial and professional infrastructure of his community, serving as a
counselor, guiding new practitioners and a developing city.
During the early 1950s, Garner became involved in continuing
professional education. This concept had been popularized in the
literature following World War II as CPAs returned from either military
or government services and required "refresher" courses. Paul led to the
effort to teach the first course of this type in Alabama. He presented a
course on "How to Set Fees" in Birmingham in 1954 which was
subsequently used in other states across the country. Also, at about this
time, following the departure from the University of Alabama of
Professor Ralph Russell, one of Garner's Ph.D. classmates, Paul
"inherited" the fledgling CPA Review Course, and invited others on the
faculty to participate. Fifty years and over 10,000 candidates-students
later, the program continues as a hallmark of continuing education
activity at the University.
ACCOUNTANCY'S AMBASSADOR
At the time of his death, Paul was continuing his "pen pal"
correspondence and was in active communication with scores of the
individuals who were a part of his letter writing network at home and
abroad. In several places, especially the Far East, his role and influence
is widely recognized. Indeed it was in the Far East where Paul and Ruth
first traveled extensively—continuing to "invest" in the personal balance
sheet asset of professional contact development. Citizens of South
America, Africa and Europe also were his neighbors. Paul, in fact,
visited many of the principal countries in these regions not once, but
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several times. For example, South Africa alone was visited by the
Garners on six separate occasions. In the 1970s, following his "official"
retirement from the University, Paul would respond with interest to
inquiries about a travel map in his office, a wall map of the world with
pin and string routes leading from Alabama to all the parts of the world
he had traveled. It was an impressive "website."
Beginning with the six week, $500 graduation trip to Europe in 1932,
to which he treated himself from savings from his college work, Paul
enthusiasm for travel was unbounded. More significantly, the travel had
a mission of meeting scholars, exchanging ideas and building a network.
He attended innumerable world conferences in the 1950s and 1960s. In
a video taped interview in 1992, Garner suggested that his desire to
continue to travel and develop the international accounting community
had been a reason for his decision to retire just before his sixty-first
birthday in 1970. And travel he did! When someone from the U.S. visited
a country and met with accounting faculty there was likely to be the
question asked of the American "Do you know Paul Garner?"
REMEMBERING HIS LEGACY OF WISDOM
Paul was as unassuming as he was courteous, almost to a fault.
These personal traits will be emulated and remembered. He will be
remembered for his research and his writings, for his colleagueship and
mentoring, for his leadership and for his genuine hospitality. Paul's
example of fellowship, international friendship and historical scholarship
will not likely be surpassed. It serves as a model to us at a time when the
truly global nature of our profession is being defined and the nature of
teaching and scholarship in this environment is being designed in daily
exchanges on the Internet and by e-mail.
In conversation with Paul shortly before his death, one could not
help but be impressed with the clarity and purpose with which he would
become engaged in a discussion. There was a sense of graciousness
about his commentary which might lead the unwary or pretentious to
ignore the wisdom which would unfold in the short commentaries he
provided. One example which comes to mind involved Paul's concerns
about the limits of human perception and ability to adapt characteristics
of human nature which he had studied his entire career. Paul, appearing
sincerely perplexed, observed: "It is difficult to perceived the average
person grasping all the implications, on a day to day basis, of a truly
global economy. And yet that is what will be required because that is
what it has become." He wondered aloud whether an individual's ability
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to think in global terms...beyond regional and national boundaries...
would be the principal restraint to achieving lasting global harmony.
This was the type of issue, beyond mere accounting, which Paul
challenged his friends and colleagues to consider. In this manner, his
sense of intellectual curiosity served to stimulate us to exercise our own
capacity for thinking about the future. His investment to our discipline,
our professional community and to international fellowship has provided
the downpayment for future generations.
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South Dakota, 1963; East Carolina University, 1965; Virginia Polytechnic
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Appalachian State University, 1973; University of South Africa, 1973, 1983;
University of Southwestern Louisiana, 1973; Florida International University,
1974; Georgia Southern College, 1974, 1983; Oklahoma City University,
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1977; University of Santa Clara, 1978; Auburn University, 1978; London
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol24/iss2/11
170

et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 1997, Vol. 24, no. 2
164

The Accounting Historians Journal, December 1997
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1978.
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U.S. Delegate to 1st World Seminar on International Accounting Standards,
Torino, Italy, 1971.
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Distinguished Faculty Lectures, 1976, 1979.
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Cooperation, Inc., Washington, DC, 1966 to 1878.
Member, Nominating Committee, 'Accounting Hall of Fame', 1950-55,
Member, National Association of CPA Examiners: Chairman, Special
Projects Committee, 1953-56.
Member, Committee on Examinations, 1957-60. Chairman, Committee on
Education, 1960-61.
Member, Committee on Long Range Planning, 1963-64. Member, Committee
on Examination Requirements, 1972-73. Member, Committee on Education,
1973-74.
Corresponding Member, Society of Expert Accountants of France, 1958 to
present.
Institutional member, American Association Collegiate Schools of Business:
Member, Executive Committee, 1959-66. Chairman, Committee on
International Relations and Cooperation, 1965-71. Member, Committee on
Long Range Planning, 1962-64. Secretary-Treasurer, 1962-64. Vice
President and Program Chairman, 1963-64. President, 1964-65.
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Member, Editorial Board, The Accounting Review, 1966-68.
Member, Editorial Board, Essays in International Business (Annual), 196769.
Member, Board of Directors, U.S. Council (AIESEC) for International
Exchange of Commerce Students, 1965 to 1978.
Member, Council of Educational Advisers: American College of Chartered
Life Underwriters, and American Institute for Property and Liability
Underwriters, 1961-69.
Life member, Academy of Accounting Historians, 1973 to present. Trustee,
1973-76; member, Corporate Board, 1973 to present.
Member, Society for International Development, 1969 to present.
Member, European Accounting Association, 1977 to present.
Member, European Foundation for Management Development (Brussels),
1971 to present.
Member, United States Council for International Progress in Management,
1961 to 1971.
Member, National Board of Directors, 1965-68. Member, Committee on
Program and Activities, 1965-68.
Member, International University Contract for Management Education
(Rotterdam), 1963-71. Member, Governing Council, 1970-71.
Member Editorial Advisory Board, Management International Magazine,
1964-76.
Member, Beta Gamma Sigma National Executive Committee, 1961-66.
Fellow Member, Academy of International Business, 1962 to present. Official
historian, 1977 to present.
Member, Advisory Committee on Relations with Universities, Federal
Government Accountants Association, 1961-65.
Member, Financial Executive Institute of America, 19955 to present.
Member, National Committee on Education, 1956-1971.
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Member, American Institute of CPAs, 1939 to present.
Member, Committee on Accounting Personnel, 1953-56.
Member, Advisory Committee on CPA Examination, 1956-58. Chairman,
Committee on Professional Statistics, 1960-62.
Member, Committee on Management Services, 1964-67.
Member, Advisory Committee on Intercorporate Investments Research
Project, 1962 to present.. Honorary Life Member, 1979—.
Member, National Association of Accountants, 1945-62.
Member, National Commission on Standards of Education and Experience for
CPAs, 1952-58.
Member, Alabama Society of CPAs, 1942 to present. Secretary-Treasurer,
1949-58. Member, Committee on Education, 1945-49; 1967-68. Chairman,
Committee on Accounting Research, 1959-61. Member, Committee on
Accounting Research, 1962-67. Member, Committee on Long Range
Planning, 1974-79. Member, Committee on Government Accounting, 198083. Chairman, Committee on Society History, 1983—. Member Board of
Directors, Tuscaloosa Chamber of Commerce, 1969-72; 1975-78.
Member, Board of Directors, Ames Bag and Packaging Corporation, 1969 to
1974,
Member, Board of Directors, Hardin's Bakery, Inc., 1970 to present.
Member, Board of Directors, J. Oviatt Bowers Co., Inc., 1970 to present.
Member, Board of Directors, Tuscaloosa Hotel, Inc., 1960-63.
Member, Board of Directors, First Federal Savings and Loan Association,
Tuscaloosa, 1963-75.
Member, Board of Trustees, Alpha Kappa Psi Foundation, 1960-68.
Member, Sigma Alpha Epsilon, Phi Beta Kappa, Beta Gamma Sigma, Beta
Alpha Psi, Omicron Delta Kappa, Alpha Kappa Psi, Pi Tau Chi, Pi Gamma
Mu, Omicron Delta Epsilon.
Author, Evolution of Cost Accounting to 1925, published in 1954 (reprinted,
1977), Japanese edition, 1956.
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Co-author, Elementary Cost Accounting, first edition, 1941; revised edition,
1949; Spanish edition, 1952.
Co-author, Advanced Accounting, Vol. I (1951), Vol. II (1950).
Co-author, Advanced Accounting Problems, Book I (1951), Book II (1950)
Co-author, Handbook of Modern Accounting Theory, 1955.
Co-author, Education for the Professions, 1955.
Co-author, Readings in Cost Accounting, Budgeting and Control, 1955;
revised edition, 1960.
Co-author, The Dynamic World of Education for Business, 1969.
Co-editor, Readings in Accounting Theory, 1966.
Co-author, Management Development—New Perspectives and Viewpoints,
published in India, 1973.
Co-editor, Readings on Accounting Development, Arno Press, New York,
1978.
Co-author, International Encyclopedia of Higher Education, 1978.
Contributor to: Accounting Review; Journal of Accountancy; NACA Bulletin;
Accountants Digest; National Public Accountant; Proceedings, Third Annual
Louisiana Accounting Conference; Proceedings, Second Asian-Pacific
Accounting Congress (Melbourne, Australia); Proceedings, Fourth InterAmerican Management Congress (Buenos Aires, Argentina); Proceedings,
Fifth Asian-Pacific Accounting Congress; University of Alabama Business
News; Pathfinder Service Bulletin; Collegiate News and Views, Southern
Economic Journal; Turkish Accounting Journal, Istanbul; Journal of
Insurance; Journal ofBusiness; Journal of Higher Education; Le Commerce
(France); Proceedings of OECD International Conference on Management
Education (Paris, France); Bulletin, French Society of Expert Accountants
(Paris, France); Twenty-four Ore (Milano, Italy: Quotidiano Economico
Finanziario; Neue lurcher Zeitung, (Zurich Switzerland); Bulletin, American
Association Collegiate Schools of Business; Journal
of
Association
d'Organization Scientifique du Travail (Geneva, Switzerland); Revista
Italiana di Administrazione Economia and Sociologia Industriale (Torino,
Italy); AIESEC Journal (Geneva, Rotterdam, and; London,); CHRONOS
Journal, Greek Productivity Center (Athens, Greece); Survey of Management
(Calcutta, India); AIESEC Jahresbericht 1966 (Koln, Germany); Festschrift
in honor of Prof. Karl Kafer, University of Zurich, Switzerland; My Way
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Magazine (Tokyo, Japan); The Accountant's Journal (Manila, Philippines);
Festschrift in honor of Prof. Erich Kosiol, University of Berlin; The
Tuscaloosa News; Bulletin, Society of Industrial Accountants of Canada;
Indian Administrative and Management Review; Revista del Dottori
Commercialisti (Italy); Abacus (Australia); Accounting Historian Notebook;
The Georgia CPA Magazine; The University ofAlabama Faculty Monograph
Series No. 1 and No. 2; Alabama Today and Tomorrow Magazine; The
Woman CPA: The Management Accountant Monthly (India); Research
Bulletin of ICWA (India).
Listed in:
Who's Who in America;
International Yearbook of Statesmen's Who's Who;
The Blue Book: Leaders of the English Speaking World;
Dictionary of International Biography;
International Biography of Men of Achievement;
Personalities of the South;
Who is Who: Berlin, Germany.
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B O O K REVIEWS
Jonathan Barron Baskin and Paul J. Miranti, A History of Corporate
Finance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997, 350 pp.,
$29.95).
Reviewed by
Raj Aggarwal
John Carroll University
This book is a study of the role of institutions and organizations
in the historical development of corporate finance in Western Europe
and North America. A major goal of this book is to "demonstrate the
need for greater recognition of path dependence and historical evolution
in the modern theory of finance" [p. 3]. In addition, a number of
writers have argued that the study of economic and financial history
can be useful in understanding contemporary developments [North,
1978; Braudel, 1982]. However, there are relatively few books on the
history of corporate finance and, thus, this book is a particularly
welcome addition.
This book consists of a preface and an introduction, seven
chapters organized into three parts, and an epilogue and two
appendices. The introduction notes that business institutions represent
constraints that "are, in effect, the rules of the game for pursuing
opportunity...and their value lies largely in their ability to reduce
uncertainty" [p.4]. It is also noted that "firms bolstered efficiency
through financial innovation" [p. 5].
The introduction goes on to explain how finance contributed to
business efficiency and growth. First, finance allowed firms the time
and stable funding to exploit economies of scale and scope. Second,
financial innovation often helped firms cope with and even take
advantage of external economic shocks. Financial innovations also
lowered perceived risks faced by investors and allowed better
monitoring of managers. Finally, financial innovation also allowed
better management of corporate resources and gave firms the ability to
overcome market imperfections by internalizing high-cost market
transactions. The rest of the introduction describes the development of
the modern theories of asset pricing, agency costs, asymmetric
information, and corporate debt policies. Curiously, in discussing the
random behavior of market determined asset prices, this book cites the
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1953 study by M.G. Kendall as the beginning of this recognition,
ignoring the well-known and much earlier (19th century) work of Louis
Bachelier and others (e.g., Bernstein, 1996).
Part I consists of three chapters that review finance in the preindustrial world (actually just Europe). The two chapters in Part II
cover the development of European finance during the era of
industrialization. Part III traces the evolution of finance in Western
Europe and North America into the modern era.
Chapter one describes the development of finance in Italy in the
late middle ages and the early Renaissance period. This chapter has
some excellent descriptions of international banking and how business
financial structures in Florence and Venice of the thirteenth and
fourteenth centuries were used to diversify risk and leverage returns on
equity. However, it has very little about business financial
arrangements prior to that period.
Chapter two covers the fifteenth through the eighteenth centuries
and traces the rise, along with international trade, of the Joint Stock
Companies, like the East India Company, as precursors to modern
limited liability corporations. Chapter three covers the early
development of public securities markets in England and western
Europe in the eighteenth century.
Part II consists of two chapters and covers the development of
corporate finance in the age of industrialization (late eighteenth to the
mid twentieth centuries). Chapter four covers the financing of canals
and railroads especially in the United States and chapter five describes
the rise of equity markets and managerial capitalism in the first half of
the twentieth century.
Part III also consists of two chapters and traces the evolution of
corporate finance into the modern era. Chapter six focuses on the
financing of large US companies in the post-war era until the oil shock
of 1973, while chapter seven covers the rise of the conglomerate firm
and the leveraged buy-out phenomenon in recent years. The epilogue
is an essay on the relationships between environmental and firmspecific factors in explaining the evolution of corporate finance.
While this book does not break much fresh ground, it is a fairly
comprehensive review of the history of Anglo-Saxon corporate finance.
It is well written and seems reasonably well researched. In fact, as is
the case with any other good book, it leaves us wanting more. For
example, the focus on post-Renaissance Anglo-Saxon corporate finance
in this book means that there are at least two important areas that are
omitted.
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First, there is relatively little on finance in times before the
Renaissance. This is unfortunate especially since many aspects of
modern finance were developed in the so-called Dark Ages (see for
example Braudel, 1982; or the footnotes in Tuchman, 1978). Second,
while even the English language literature has many excellent sources
(e.g., Banerji, 1995; Chandler, 1990; Cizakca, 1996; Hirschmeier,
1964), there is practically nothing in this book on the development of
Indian, Islamic, Ottoman, or Asian corporate finance. This latter
omission is particularly unfortunate given that it is widely contended
that even the non-Japanese Asian economy is on track to be larger than
the North American or European economies in the next few years (e.g.,
Aggarwal, 1991; Kennedy, 1993). While North American hearts and
minds are likely to remain largely in Europe, its wallets are increasingly
in Asia, and it is necessary that American books and other publications
include Pacific Asian perspectives.
On balance, these limitations are relatively minor quibbles, and
this book is recommended for scholars and others interested in the
historical development of modern corporate finance. In addition, this
book would also be useful reading for any student of corporate finance.
It could be, and perhaps should be, required reading for advanced
undergraduate and graduate students in finance and accounting. In
conclusion, this book is recommended reading as it is an excellent and
very readable review of the extensive scholarly literature on the
historical antecedents of modern North American corporate finance.
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Garry D. Carnegie and Peter W. Wolnizer, Eds., Accounting History
Newsletter 1980-1989 and Accounting History 1989-1994 (New
York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1996, 416 pp., $80).
Reviewed by
Michael E. Scorgie
La Trobe University and Nilai College, Malaysia
This anthology is a tribute to Robert Gibson, a foundation editor
of the antipodean newsletter from which the 25 articles were drawn.
Gibson retired from Deakin University in 1993 where he had
encouraged others to conduct accounting history research. Noteworthy
amongst those at Deakin were the joint-editors of the anthology, Garry
Carnegie, the present editor of the new series of Accounting History,
and Peter Wolnizer. Gibson's interest in accounting history was
undoubtedly stimulated during the 1960s when he worked with Lou
Goldberg at the University of Melbourne.
The compilation of a worthwhile anthology is not an easy task
particularly if the source(s) from which articles may be drawn is
limited. Such was the case in this instance. Yet, Carnegie and Wolnizer
succeeded because their anthology demonstrates that humble
beginnings combined with Gibson's dedication provided stimulation not
only to established scholars but also to those who sought to enter the
field of accounting history. Carnegie and Wolnizer classified the
articles selected into five sets, each comprising four, five or six items.
The sets are: Early Accounting Systems; Twentieth Century
Accounting Thinkers; Professional Associations; Accounting and
Auditing Standards; and Accounting Education. The names of some of
the authors, Willard Stone, Ray Chambers and Lou Goldberg are wellknown. Others such as Warwick Funnell, Dale Flesher and Garry
Carnegie may yet reach the same heights.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol24/iss2/11

180

et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 1997, Vol. 24, no. 2
Book Reviews

175

The first set classified as Early Accounting Systems comprises
four items that might be summarized by key words: Werner Sombart;
medieval estate management and accounting; charge and discharge; and
mining cost accounts. Similarly the second set of six items grouped
under the heading Twentieth Century Accounting Thinkers can be
reduced to: Stephen Gilman; Ray Chambers; G.E. and A.A.
Fitzgerald; Henry Sweeney; Paton and Littleton; and Kenneth
MacNeal. In contrast to the somewhat international flavour of the
second set the last three sets that deal with professional associations,
standards and education are devoted to the Australian experience. Yet,
the form and content of the items will be useful guides to those
elsewhere who seek to document, describe and interpret the history of
the accountancy profession in other countries.
In conclusion, anthologies were designed for browsers long before
surfing the internet became a popular pastime. In this regard Garland's
contribution has been outstanding. Their catalogs list a number of
anthologies such as Accounting in France, Accounting Research
1948-1958 and Milestones in the British Accounting Literature that
in effect are companion volumes to Carnegie and Wolnizer. Volumes
that ought to be acquired by every university, college and professional
library that aspires to be known for its research collection.
Alfred W. Crosby, The Measure ofRealty: Quantification in Western
Europe, 1250-1600 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997,
245 pp., $24.95).
Reviewed by
Richard K. Fleischman
John Carroll University
The title of the book, coupled with the vivid reproduction of
Barbari's famous portrait of Pacioli on its jacket, conveys the
impression that the reader will be treated to a monograph on the
European origins of accounting. That expectation is not realized,
however, as only the last chapter before the conclusion
["Bookkeeping," pp. 199-233] is dedicated to accounting history topics.
Furthermore, that single chapter deals only with the famous friar (at
considerable length) and Datini (more briefly). Although the dates
provided suggest an inclusion of the exploits of the Medicis, Plantin,
the Bracci, Francisco del Bene, the Fuggers, and others, these early
pioneers are scarcely mentioned. Moreover, this chapter suffers a
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diminution of the high research standard that characterizes the
remainder of the volume. As the author himself admits, the analysis of
the Summa is based almost entirely on the work of Taylor [1980] and
Brown & Johnston [1984]. Consequently, Crosby's interpretation lacks
the breadth and cogency of other recent work of this genre, as, for
example, Macve's chapter on Pacioli in Lee, Bishop, & Parker [1996].
It is unfortunate that the book's weakest chapter would be the very
one of greatest interest to accounting historians. Indeed, the
background Crosby provides through the remainder of the book
describing the intellectual climate within which Pacioli wrote is of great
value. The author demonstrates convincingly the remarkable transition
in Europe from a society almost without hope to one that based its
emerging culture, culminating in the Renaissance, on the calculation
and quantification of its reality. This transition is richly illustrated in
chapters dedicated to changing European perceptions of time and
space, accompanied by resultant achievements in mathematics, music,
painting, and, last but sadly least, bookkeeping.
Crosby writes with a vibrant style that has earned him high honors
for previous books and perhaps for this offering as well. His research
for the chapters other than the one on bookkeeping is impressive and
reflective of his pedigree as a history professor at the University of
Texas, Austin (visiting at Yale). The number of historical actors that
appear on his stage is staggering. Though having myself instructed
medieval history for many years, I confess to knowledge of only about
half of the figures encountered in this historical panorama. The book
was a humbling but valuable learning experience for me. I marvel at
its flowing style and erudition.
In conclusion, I accord the book my highest recommendation for
readers with considerable background in medieval studies who wish to
grapple with a thought-provoking, yet highly entertaining masterpiece
of historical narrative. However, within the more limited confines of
pure accounting history, aficionados will find less of value.
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Alan J. Richardson, Ed., Disorder and Harmony: 20th Century
Perspectives on Accounting History, Selected Papers from the Seventh
World Congress of Accounting Historians, CGA-Canada Research
Foundation Research Monograph Number 23 (Vancouver: CGACanada Research Foundation, 1996, 356 pp., $30 Canadian).
Reviewed by
Vaughan Radcliffe
Case Western Reserve University
For evidence of the vibrancy and potential of historical research
in accounting, colleagues need only turn to Richardson's impressive
collection of papers from the recent 7th World Congress of Accounting
Historians, held in Kingston, Ontario, Canada. The breadth and vigor
of current historical research is well represented in a collection which
brings together a range of topics and national perspectives. As
Richardson observes in the introduction to this volume, "the papers
published here and presented at the Congress provide a fascinating
snapshot of the current state of the global economy and the range of
issues which are in the collective conscious" [p. 2]. Given this diversity
of work, it is impossible to do fully address the range of topics covered
in the collection. Instead, I provide a broad overview of what is
available here, and of the body of work represented.
The papers are organized into six sections: Cost and Management
Accounting; Education; Financial Accounting and Auditing;
Professional Organizations; Taxation and Texts. A variety of
approaches are represented, including the more traditional scholarship
as well as emerging research paradigms inspired by work in other
disciplines.
In the Cost and Management Accounting section De Beelde
explores aspects of the Belgian experience, while Okano revisits
Emerson's work on cost accounting. McNair and Vangermeersch
provide a stimulating and thoughtful analysis of the US National
Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) and its influence on management
accounting concerns. Their discussion of the "blue eagle" symbol used
to mark the goods of those supporting the NIRA provides fascinating
insights into the broader socio-political frameworks within which
accountancy operates. Their overall argument that full cost pricing was
fostered by the NIRA at the expense of more economically inspired
approaches was, for me at least, a real eye opener.
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The occasion of the centennial of the US CPA exam motivates the
two education papers represented here. Flesher et al. review the
accounting education movement and provide brief biographies of
relevant characters. Oliverio and Newman focus more on the first CPA
examination, its format and nature. The Financial Accounting and
Auditing section includes a variety of work, dealing with American,
Spanish and Portuguese experiences: a refreshing breadth of national
experience, given the more limited empirical domains associated with
financial reporting work in the bulk of the accounting literature.
In the Professional Organizations section of the monograph, two
authors discuss differing aspects of professionalisation projects in
Australasia. Anderson analyses the integration of cost accounting
bodies within the national societies of accountants in Australia and
New Zealand, arguing that this was to the detriment of cost accounting
as a profession. Kathie Cooper casts a critical eye on the legitimization
of Australian accountancy, suggesting that broad alliances among
those interested in accounting associations, (such as the business press,
financial interests, government bodies, and the then colonial British
government) were an intrinsic part of the professionalisation project in
Australia. I am unsure that these alliances really are as "nontraditional" as Cooper characterizes them; surely such networks have
been recognized in the literature as being integral to the production and
reproduction of professional claims. But this argument stands as a
counterpoint to a more traditional (and often functionalist) view of the
pre-eminence of education, examination and training in procuring
professional status.
Several papers comprise the Taxation section of the monograph,
with work from Samson, Smith and Yelvington et al. These papers deal
with the progressivity of the US and Canadian income tax, the
historical development of the lower of cost or market rule in the UK,
and an examination of "sin" taxes in the US and Canada respectively.
In reading these papers shortly before dealing with my own US taxes
I must admit that Yelvington et al. approach taxation with more good
humor than I have so far been able to manage—one reason for their
paper being an entertaining as well as informative read. Their analysis
of the political promotion of "sin" taxes has special resonance to me as
I write in Cleveland, a city that has chosen to raise regressive sin taxes
so as to erect the palatial facilities demanded by the monied elite of
professional sport. Though not centrally a part of their analysis,
Yelvington et al.'s work serves to highlight issues of social justice.
Clarke and Lanero round out the monograph with two papers
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examining original texts, their focus being Ireland's Ammonet, and
Mellis' English treatise. Both approach their subject with sensitivity to
detail, and to the context in which the work was written.
The monograph includes a listing of papers presented at the 7th
World Congress, and a review of this work and the contents of this
volume suggests two clear themes. Firstly, historical work seems
poised to explore a variety of national experiences, including those
influenced by former colonial rule. The breadth of contexts explored
within the monograph itself provides evidence of the variety of venues
in which accounting history is being explored. The analytical
significance of the nation state could well be questioned, but the
differing cultural experiences and traditions that are pointed to in this
body of work suggests a broadening of historical discourse.
The second theme can be discerned in certain of the papers, but
especially in the work presented at the Congress. Although more
traditional historical work still appears to dominate historical effort, it
is clear that theoretically informed critical (or, as Richardson terms it,
"emancipatory" [p. 1]) work is on the rise. Kathie Cooper's work in the
monograph provides one example; more are found in remaining papers
which depart from what Neu and Richardson describe as a more
conventional narrative concerned largely with the details of practice
rather than the context in which practices evolved [p. 339]. The
relevance that the U.S. Accounting Education Change Commission
finds in history as a means to understand practice seems likely to be
met by a more theoretically informed literature more directly concerned
with producing a "history of the present." In this, the monograph
reminds us that accounting history is a discipline in flux.
Kyojiro Someya, Japanese Accounting: A Historical Approach
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996, 241 pp., $70).
Reviewed by
Robert Bloom
John Carroll University
An anthology of essays on Japanese accounting since World War
II written by Kyojiro Someya, a retired professor, this book deals with
the history of accounting in Japan. Outside of Japan, not much is
known about academic studies in accounting in that country since such
research is usually published in Japanese. In the preface, the author
contends that the application of this research served to enhance
economic recovery and growth in Japan following the war.
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Someya's own research is historical for the most part. In
particular, his interest in cash flow theory was an attempt on his part
to comprehend post-war inflation in Japan. His study of financial
statement analysis began as a need to understand business productivity.
In addition, his work on financial accounting theory was intended to
shed light on securities exchange, focusing on the process of raising
capital in Japan. As international business expanded in Japan starting
in the 1960s, his research shifted to that area.
The book is divided into three parts. Part I covers Japanese
accounting history, the most useful piece being "Accounting
'Revolutions' in Japan," originally published in The Accounting
Historians Journal in 1989 [Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 75-86]. Part II is
concerned with issues in financial accounting, the best piece of which
is "Accounting Standard Selection and Its Socio-economic
Consequences," originally published in the International Journal of
Accounting in 1993 [Vol. 28, No. 2, pp. 93-103]. Part III focuses on
the cash flow statement, the most informative section being "The Use
of Funds Statements in Japan," originally published in the Accounting
Review in 1964 [Vol. 39, No. 4, pp. 983-989].
In the 20 articles republished in the book (13 having been first
published in Japan), Someya accentuates the role of accounting in
providing accountability and information for decision making. He
asserts that accounting is dynamically a function of the environment in
which it prevails, and therefore should be compatible with that
environment.
Someya is critical of Japanese accounting, and for good reason.
In view of the emphasis that taxation exerts on accounting standards,
which is typically the case in code law countries like Japan, the
accounting profession appears to be weak. The Minister of Finance
is responsible for setting accounting standards. Additionally, while the
author does not say so, there is no fundamental conceptual framework
offinancialreporting in Japan. Conservatism appears to be one, if not
the, basic accounting standard, and present value, lease capitalization,
and inflation standards are non-existent. Furthermore, a cash flow
statement is not required for external reporting, which the author does
acknowledge. Someya wishes to see considerably more emphasis on
economic substance rather than legal form in Japanese accounting.
Moreover, he observes a need in Japan to limit the flexibility companies
have in selecting alternative accounting standards in light of their social
and economic consequences. Paradoxically, Japan has prospered
economically despite its inadequate system of financial reporting.
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For those who have no previous knowledge of Japanese accounting
history, this book may be of interest. However, considerable overlap
exists in topics covered among the articles in the book.
Atsuo Tsuji and Paul Garner, Eds., Studies in Accounting History:
Tradition and Innovation for the Twenty-First Century (Westport:
Greenwood Press, 1995, 280 pp., $75).
Reviewed by
Thomas N. Tyson
St. John Fisher College
Tradition and Innovation for the Twenty-First Century brings
together 13 of the 50 papers presented in August, 1992, at the Sixth
World Congress of Accounting Historians in Kyoto, Japan and may
represent Paul Garner's final contribution to accounting literature. I
was privileged to know Paul Garner personally and to receive two
wonderful letters encouraging me to continue research in accounting
history. Notwithstanding my respect for Paul and his dedication to
accounting history, I am unable to recommend unequivocally this
collection which is co-edited by Atsuo Tsuji and Paul Garner.
In their prefaces, Tsuji states that the selection criteria for
inclusion were "regional factors and treated themes" [p. vii], while
Garner notes similarly that these essays "show an unusually wide range
of research and investigation" [p. x]. Thus, readers are forewarned that
the collection is wide ranging and will include essays on disparate
topics. In addition to thematic variation, however, essays by
practitioners and new scholars contrast markedly from those by more
renowned historians, especially in terms of organization structure and
the extent of literature reviewed. Consequently, active and seasoned
scholars, those most likely to acquire the collection, may be
discomforted by these multiple dimensions of diversity. Readers who
prefer more critical perspectives of accounting history will also be
disappointed by the paucity of essays written in this venue.
The collection does contain a number of interesting and wellwritten pieces. For example, in a smoothly flowing introductory essay
entitled "Accounting History and Public Policy," Gary Previts provides
an overview of accounting history in the context of a constantly
changing and politicized world. Tsunehiro Tsumori crafts another
strong entry entitled "Development of a 'Philosophy of Disclosure' in
Accounting Institutions of Japan." Tsumori describes thoughtfully the
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impact of the Anglo-American and Franco-German accounting
traditions on the historical development of accounting disclosure in
Japan. Christopher Napier sustains his excellent scholarship with an
essay on secret reserves in New Zealand. Unlike many accounting
historians, Napier explains clearly the business environment to which
the accounting issues he explores relate. Napier's attention to the
background story and historical context makes the essay much more
intriguing and accessible.
The subtitle of the collection, "tradition and innovation for the
twenty-first century," intimated to me that a number of essays would
address current historical debates or long-standing controversies in
accounting history. Papers by Gormly and Wells, "Costing Activities:
Alternative Views of History," and Kataoka, "The Relationship
between the Bookkeeping Systems of Pacioli and Schweicker," fulfilled
this expectation. However, most essays focus on disparate and
regional issues. Once again, certain readers might be displeased in this
regard.
Perhaps the collection's most noticeable shortcoming is the
absence of active editorial involvement. Given its diversity, readers
would have benefited greatly from an introductory essay which
summarized each paper and indicated the rationale for its inclusion.
Alternatively, each essay could have been preceded by a short synopsis,
or authors could have been asked to provide an abstract describing
their essay's scope and purpose. Unfortunately, because these aides
are not furnished, readers must rely on an essay's title or its author's
repute for guidance about content and perspective. In the case of
unknown authors, readers must venture forth and hope the experience
is worth the effort. A related concern is that biographical information
about contributors lacks consistency and omits important details. In
several cases the editors provide only the name and affiliation of an
author while in others, they identify an author's academic department
but fail to mention their terminal degree, research interests, publication
record, or teaching or practice specialty.
In summary, while there are a number of well-written essays that
will interest new and seasoned accounting historians alike, the
collection is too diverse, the quality of essays too variable, and the
absence of editorial assistance too salient to produce a monograph
which can be regarded as a notable contribution to accounting history
literature.
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